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        April 2017 
This thesis explores a new perspective for Christian education. Written in the light of two 
contrasting paradigms within contemporary practice, the thesis philosophically critiques 
notions such as relation and learning, before proposing new ideas that pertain to learning as 
Spirit for an authentic and continued life of faith.  
 
The Literature Review outlines the theological and philosophical inspirations for each 
paradigm. Critique highlights how scholars and practitioners posit paradigms against each 
other, resulting in dualism; the illusion of dualism is therefore considered, as is the inadequacy 
of any idea presented as ‘in-itself.’ Examples of how this dualism might be overcome are 
presented, before highlighting the need for a revised idea of relation.  
 
In Chapter One, the role of the learner is considered. Heideggerian philosophy provides the 
framework for this consideration. Exploring Heidegger’s concept of Being, it is identified how 
in this position, the learner and learning are one. The implication of this for Christian 
education is critically noted and the need for a new perspective is highlighted. Chapter Two 
considers further the idea of relation, and in the light of Hegelian philosophy, a dialectical 
relation of self and other is investigated. This is continued in Chapter Three, which in the light 
of three texts by Kierkegaard, begins to consider relation not only as either/or but as a broken 
triune shape. 
 
Drawing on the idea of the triune shape, identified as the relation of relations, Chapters Four 
and Five explore further how the relations of the teacher and learner, as well as learning and 
the learner, might be revisited for authentic learning and faith. The notion of learning as a 
movement is also considered and critiqued. Furthermore, using Kierkegaardian literature to 
underpin the argument, the discussion considers the moment of breakthrough that 
establishes the triune shape, and highlights its significance for education. 
 
The final two chapters explore two pedagogical movements: Bildung and Repetition. After 
exploring both these concepts, the thesis identifies how their relation might provide a new 
perspective for Christian education. Therefore, the concept ‘Bildung as repetition’ is proposed. 
In conclusion, the thesis identifies the Biblical Parable as an example of the breakthrough of 
the Absolute into the life of the learner, and suggests how ‘Bildung as repetition’ might 
contribute to authentic learning for a life of faith.  
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           The significance of this thesis lies in the proposal of a new perspective in Christian education. 
It is argued that this new perspective is faithful to both the Christian religious tradition and 
the personal spiritual life of learners, and thus contributes to the promotion of a meaningful 
and long-lasting life of faith. The thesis also considers how individuals learn and particularly in 
a religious context, it examines how a new educative movement of faith development might 
be considered authentic,1 embracing learning as a spiritual task and allowing for a reimagining 
of truth. Therefore, it also provides new ideas for practice and it is briefly outlined how 
educators and learners might apply the concepts presented here.  
           The new perspective is explored in the light of a critical assessment of two existing positions of 
contemporary church-based Christian education. Having either an epistemological or 
ontological priority respectively,2 these positions are seemingly contradictory yet both aspire 
to encourage a life of faith in learners, particularly children and young people.3 For the 
purpose of this thesis, these positions are considered as paradigms of Christian education, 
each paradigm constructed by the current author in order to identify distinctive ideas and 
methods as well models for practice. As each paradigm is critically assessed in turn and as 
philosophical inadequacies are highlighted, the discussion illuminates the need for new 
theory; thus, it sheds light on the inadequacies of the paradigms when prioritised in 
themselves and rather than creating a new paradigm, presents a perspective that re-imagines 
their relation, in relation to the Absolute.  This introduction represents a personal reflection 
on how the thesis was inspired; it also outlines the purpose of the thesis for Christian 
education, and a provides a rationale for its overall structure. At the outset, it is important to 
identify the nature of the paradigms to be explored and highlight how they came to be 
constructed as such.  
                                                          
1In the context of this thesis, ‘authentic’ concerns education that has personal significance for the 
learner. In contrast to the voyeur who only looks upon learning, the authentic learner engages fully 
with the learning experience, often embracing ambiguities and contradictions, and lives it out 
accordingly (see pages 144-5).  
           2The priorities consider either the doctrine of the Christian religious tradition or the individual as the   
starting point for learning. 
           3 Whilst the context for the thesis is church-based Christian education undertaken with children, and the 
literature pertaining to the practice of such work predominantly considers learners to be children and 
young people, the overall discussion considers the learner as a single individual. He or she might be 
represented by a child or young person, but this is not exclusively so. Nevertheless, ‘children’ in the 
current context refers to those of U.K. Primary school age, that is between ages 5 and 11 and ‘young 
people’ those aged between 11 and 18.  
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As a philosophical practitioner 4 engaged in Christian work with children, it became 
increasingly apparent over several years, that two contrasting strands of thought regarding 
epistemology, ontology and pedagogy were evident within the theory that underpinned 
practice. Whilst having a common aim, that is to inspire and educate learners for an authentic 
life of faith, each seemed to negate the other. For example, within a Christian mission 
movement, the doctrinal priorities of repentance and conversion motivated educational 
methodology. However, this seemed to be at odds with suggestions emerging from 
conferences and publications concerning children’s spirituality, that an ontological starting 
point for learning might provide a more authentic platform for Christian education. 
Furthermore, research data gained for a Master’s degree dissertation suggested that 
repentance and conversion were not necessarily a requirement for an experience of, or 
relationship with God. Whilst each strand was located within a Christian framework, there 
seemed to be a disparity between the two. 
Having identified the two contrasting strands through reflection on practice, it became 
necessary to investigate the theoretical influences on each. Further study highlighted two 
distinct routes. In terms of the first strand, a literature survey indicated John Calvin’s notion of 
‘original sin’ (1536/1986) as having significant influence: a precursor to this idea was found in 
the works of St. Augustine, most notably Confessions of a Sinner (Augustine, 397/2001) and 
City of God (426/1972). An engagement with the writings of these figures illuminated the 
suggestion that an act of confession was necessary for entry into a life of faith (Calvin, 1986: 
236-42; Augustine, 2001: 62).  
 
The second position, prioritising personal spirituality as the starting point for religious 
education, drew on the influence of Alister Hardy (1979), Martin Heidegger (1927/1962) and 
William James (1902/1982) in the Twentieth Century. Reflecting both the notion of apophatic 
                                                          
4 This footnote is written in the first person. For twelve years, I was a church-based practitioner with a 
Christian mission organisation. My work included engagement with both church and school-based 
religious education. At the same time, through reading the Doctoral thesis of a colleague, the notion of 
‘children’s spirituality’ was introduced to me. Developing an interest in this idea, I discovered a 
movement of Christian practitioners whose conference papers, journal articles and wider publications 
indicated that the spiritual life of children must be prioritised in educating for faith. My interest in this 
notion was received critically by some work colleagues. However, fellow delegates at conferences on 
children’s spirituality were also critical of the ontological, epistemological and pedagogical perspectives 
of the organisation for whom I worked. It seemed that I had to make a choice; however, I was unable to 
do so, leading to a sense of tension and uncertainty regarding my position and how to continue in my 
practice. This led to an investigation into the background to each strand, which I subsequently 
identified as paradigms, as well as the consideration of their relation; this forms part of the purpose 
and outcome of this thesis.  
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spirituality, illuminated ideas within texts such as The Cloud of Unknowing first published in 
the late Fourteenth Century (anon, 2009), and the idea of God being present within all of life, 
promoted by Fourth Century Celt Pelagius (Newell, 1997: 10-15), this position also evidenced 
the rejection of knowledge and symbols in favour of a prior and often unexplained ontological 
connection with God. A template for access to a non - cognitive religious dimension of life was 
illuminated, thus raising critical questions regarding the first strand.  
 
It also became possible to make connections between views on epistemology and ontology, 
and the specific pedagogical methods adopted in their light. For example, in the first strand, 
teaching about sin and salvation afforded learners the opportunity to repent and gain new 
life. In the second, everyday events were considered the inspiration for spiritual encounter, 
which purporting to bypass intellect, ontologically connected the learner with God. Therefore, 
the sense of awe inspired by the striking of a match (Hay and Nye, 2006: 72), was afforded as 
much spiritual value as an understanding of doctrine. As Rebecca Nye states, Christian 
education is about ‘God’s ways of being with children and children’s ways of being with God’ 
(Nye, 2009: 5). 
Thus, having evidenced how theory robustly inspired methodology, each strand became 
identified as a paradigm.5 It is important to note again that the paradigms have been 
constructed for this thesis rather than having been already defined by others. Within each 
paradigm it is argued, is a distinct theological position, representing specific contents of belief, 
as well as distinct educational practices. Each are outlined more fully in the Literature Review.  
Whilst the paradigms themselves are not considered problematic, it is suggested that the 
perceived uncritical adoption of ideas, models and methods within each paradigm on the part 
of a range of contemporary scholars and practitioners is problematic for authentic Christian 
education, as is the claim to the contents of each paradigm as ‘truth.’ This thesis argues then 
that there might be difficulty in placing oneself as a philosophical practitioner within one 
position or other; for authenticity, one must not be required to choose. Rather, one might 
seek to redefine the relation between paradigms for a new and dynamic learning experience 
and a re-imagining of what might be considered true.  
                                                          
5 The Augustinian route is identified as Paradigm One and the Heideggerian route is identified as 
Paradigm Two. The paradigms proposed here reflect my own interpretation of the way existing 
approaches and perspectives toward practice are viewed and therefore are only defined as such within 




           It is therefore an exploration of relation that underpins the new theory presented. The 
inadequacy of the dualistic positing of paradigms is highlighted, as is the problematic idea that 
each might relate dialogically. Rather, a dialectical relation is proposed; this does not aim to 
unify positions, but serves to embrace the creative tension inspired by mediation and 
negation. It also concerns a re-negotiation of ideas. Christianity per se is then not rejected in 
this thesis; neither is the significance of its fundamental values and beliefs minimised. An 
ontological view of spirituality is similarly not ruled out. Nevertheless, the new perspective 
proposed here includes the idea that authentic learning might take place in the ‘broken 
middle’ (Rose, 1992: xii) between the two. In the ‘broken middle’ it is not possible to reside 
comfortably within one paradigm or other. Neither is it possible to negate the influence of 
each, or indeed to reconcile them as equals. There is no safe place to be, and no educational 
label with which to be identified. As such, it is suggested that a new perspective in Christian 
education might pertain more to the middle space than any position or paradigm.  
           As the proposed new perspective predominantly concerns learning for faith, the need for a 
philosophical enquiry into education, rather than theological evaluation, is identified. 
Furthermore, whilst the context for the thesis is church-based Christian education, a 
philosophy of education discourse that might be also transferrable to the classroom is 
presented. Thus, the thesis considers how individuals learn and proposes how a new 
pedagogical perspective might inspire authenticity in education that is both meaningful and 
transformative.  
           The new perspective also considers learning as a spiritual task that takes place in this middle 
space. It explores for example how individuals might learn for faith at the nexus of Christian 
teaching and their own contingent life, considering the importance of both the religious 
tradition and their own personal spirituality. Thus, the proposed new perspective also 
contains a new view of learning: that is, learning as Spirit. The notion of learning as Spirit is 
considered particularly by three significant Western philosophers: Martin Heidegger (1889-
1976), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 1831), and Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). It is 
also noted at some length in the thesis how each philosopher considers or even re-imagines 
relation in education; thus, an exegesis of philosophical texts provides the platform from 
which new theory is developed. This examination of themes such as Being, relation and Spirit 
forms the first part of the thesis. 
           The philosophical inspiration for the new perspective, drawn from Hegel, proposes that the 
difficult relation of self and other is in fact the starting point for authentic learning. This 
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difficulty is addressed through the theory of the Unhappy Consciousness (Hegel, 1977: 131-
138).6 From this philosophical premise it is made clear that the tension induced from an 
unresolved relation of self and other, indeed inspires a third way in learning that disallows any 
pre-determined outcomes. The misrecognition of the Unhappy Consciousness takes the 
educator and learner away from the security that comes with locating oneself within a certain 
paradigm and allows for an education of uncertainty.  
This third way moreover is developed by Kierkegaard in terms of the educational movement 
of ‘Repetition’ (Kierkegaard, 2009). This is a movement that inspires an unequal triadic shape 
so to recognise the broken middle space. This third way is not a new paradigm itself, nor does 
it promote a new methodology. Rather, in transcending the dualism of the paradigms already 
identified, and disallowing any resolution regarding ideas or beliefs, it allows individuals to 
reflect on how learning for truth might become the truth of learning. The third way is also 
described by Nigel Tubbs as subjectivity’s subjectivity (Tubbs, 2005: 221). In its relationship 
with the relation of paradigms, it allows individuals to gain a new perspective on how one 
might educate for a life of faith that is authentic to both the learner and the Christian context, 
inspiring life-long learning and continual spiritual growth.  
Therefore, the current thesis argues for a new perspective and not a new paradigm. Drawing 
on the work of Gillian Rose in the text Mourning becomes the Law, it is argued that devising a 
new paradigm would only invite the tragedy that comes with establishing oppositions. Such 
oppositions are restrictive, teleological and inspire domination (Rose, 1996: 70-72). On the 
other hand, Rose suggests that the misrecognition of the Unhappy Consciousness might 
provide a template for an educational perspective that is never established as a totality (Rose, 
1996: 72;75) The ‘discordant outcome’ (Rose, 1996: 72) of the representation and 
misrepresentation of the Unhappy Consciousness ensures that learning is always provisional. 
The struggle between two paradigms highlights the failure of self-recognition, out of which 
the new perspective, that considers education as a reflection on the struggle, emerges. This 
perspective invites the recognition of the space that is the ‘broken middle’ (Rose, 1992: xii; 
1996: 75) and in this space, is Spirit (Rose, 1996: 75).7  
The failure of self-recognition is inspired by an interruption. The new perspective thus argues 
for a new way of reflecting on education that allows teachers and learners to invite the 
interruption of any particular claims (be they theological or philosophical). It might be 
                                                          
6 The theory of the Unhappy Consciousness is explored in more detail in Chapter Two (see pages 84-6).  
7 As will be highlighted later in the thesis, Spirit in the new perspective is the one who educates.  
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suggested that this perspective inspires a ‘one degree shift’ that unsettles teachers and 
learners, so that education becomes more about unknowing than knowing, and embraces 
misunderstanding rather than understanding. 
Hence the structure of the thesis serves to interrupt the safety of the paradigms, as well as 
their theoretical positions. Outlining and critiquing both paradigms, as well as their dualistic 
relation, the Literature Review considers each to be in error when considered as complete in 
themselves. This establishes the need for a new perspective that considers their relationship 
in relation to the Absolute in a more dynamic way. Therefore, the Literature Review forms a 
discrete chapter. The philosophical discussion begins in Chapter One.  
Chapter One involves further investigation into the ontological concepts and ideas of 
Paradigm Two that can be traced to Heideggerian thought, and as such provides a detailed 
account of Heidegger’s philosophy of Being. Here the priority for learning lies with the 
individual who is his or her own potentiality-for-Being (Heidegger, 1962: 27). This as such 
eliminates the need for an external other. Chapter Two serves to interrupt this position. An 
overview of Hegel’s theory of self and other as forms of consciousness reveals the folly of 
proposing any individual or entity as a totality (Hegel, 1977: 54) and through the illustration of 
a master and slave, leading to the proposition of the Unhappy Consciousness (Hegel, 1977: 
131), it highlights the error of negating the ‘other’ in education (Hegel, 1977: 118). This 
chapter also serves to present the idea of the third dimension in learning and thus develops 
the notion of learning as Spirit. 
Chapter Three takes the educational shape beyond the self and other relation. Again, 
disallowing totality and embracing the notion of learning as Spirit, an engagement with 
Kierkegaardian material identifies this third dimension of learning as the Absolute, who again 
interrupts. This idea of Absolute is not akin to the absolute knowledge that represents the 
conclusion to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel, 1977:479); rather this Absolute 
ruptures self-sufficiency and self-knowledge. Chapter Three explores the self and other 
relation further, and proposes that authenticity in faith is gained when the individual makes 
the leap to the Absolute.  
           Chapter Three thus establishes the triune relational shape that is the relation of relations. This 
shape ensures that the ‘broken middle,’ which is inspired by the interruption of the Absolute, 
and is the space in which Spirit educates, is not between self and other, but beyond relation. 
Also drawing on Kierkegaardian material, Chapters Four and Five subsequently explore the 
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nature of this relational shape in terms of an individual’s experience of faith. Chapter Six 
relates this relational shape to learning, considered in terms of the educational notion of 
Bildung. Bildung again re-imagines the relation of self and other. Presenting a philosophical 
appraisal of learning, the learner and the learning context, the discussion highlights how 
interplay between self and other, in relation with the absolute, might allow for imaginative 
and creative learning. Chapter Six also outlines Kierkegaard’s movement of ‘Repetition’ and 
illustrates how learning involves not only the recollection of prior knowledge, but the re-
imagining of truth for an authentic spiritual understanding.  
Finally, in Chapter Seven, examining how the relation of ‘Repetition’ to the movement of 
Bildung might create a new perspective of learning, new theory for Christian education is 
presented. The proposed new perspective rests on the dialectical relation of Repetition with 
Bildung. Described as ‘Bildung as repetition,’ it highlights for learners, educators and policy 
makers, how the loss of the claim to epistemological or ontological priorities allows for 
freedom in learning and how the leap of faith to uncertainty, risk and danger, provides for the 
authenticity that each paradigm desires. It also highlights how the relation of self and other, 
when considered in relation to the Absolute inspires learners to make the ‘one degree shift’ 
away from self-sufficient belief, allowing them to reflect on the contents of faith in a new way. 
In the light of the new perspective then, both the tradition and beliefs of the Christian faith 
are re-appraised in the light of the contingent life of the learner, in relation to the Absolute.  
This thesis does not propose a new position, model or methodology. However, it provides an 
encouragement to learners and practitioners to invite an interruption regarding any claim to 
positions, models and methods. It suggests that reflection on learning as Spirit might inspire 
the potentiality of the ‘broken middle’ in which new ideas, perceptions and even 
representations of faith might emerge, and as such provide the ‘nudge’ by which educators 
might understand how learning for truth is indeed the truth about learning.   
  
       






 LITERATURE REVIEW 
            0.1 Background 
           Drawing on more than fifteen years of personal experience of activity within Christian 
education, it has been possible to highlight key beliefs within a variety of initiatives which in 
turn have inspired the development of a number of methods and models. Furthermore, a 
robust engagement with information made available through publications, conferences and 
web-based resources has illuminated these initiatives’ theoretical influences and it seems that 
whilst there is common ground, the differences between them are significant. This chapter 
focuses on two contrasting sets of beliefs and methods from within the wider context of 
Christian education, and from which a philosophical appraisal of ideas prepares the ground for 
the proposal of a new pedagogical perspective.  
           In both expressions of teaching and learning, the aim of inspiring individuals to an authentic 
and continuing life of faith 11 is the primary concern. For example, the aims of one para-church 
organisation are: 
           to make God's Good News known to children, young people and families, and to 
encourage people of all ages to meet God daily through the Bible and prayer so that 
they may come to personal faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, grow in Christian maturity, 
and become both committed church members and servants of a world in need (Hews, 
2000: 169).  
           Another church-based movement states: ‘facilitating children’s growing fluency in religious 
understanding is seen as enriching the spiritual life they already enjoy’ with worship, teaching, 
Bible reading and prayer being ‘spiritually-focused’ practices that aid individuals on their 
journey of faith (Nye, 2009: xiii).  
           Whilst one might identify a common aim, differences in the guiding beliefs of each are 
evident. The a priori nature of an individual’s spiritual life highlighted in the second quote 
takes precedent over the ‘Good News’ (Hews, 2000: 169) that as in the first quote, must be 
made known. In the first example, a life of faith depends on repentance and trust in the risen 
Christ (Hews, 2000: 170), yet this notion is missing from the spiritually complete religious 
identity otherwise described. Writing in response to advocates of the first example, Rebecca 
Nye argues that a ‘spirituality-neglecting mind-set can set up long-lasting misunderstandings 
                                                          
            11 Chapters Three and Five present an investigation into the notion of Faith; how this applies to the 
primary research question will be considered in Chapter Six.  
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about faith’ and that an idea of faith that is ‘mostly about having lots of efficiently categorised 
religious knowledge,’ is a ‘dangerous course to follow’ (Nye, 2009: 13). 
            It might be argued then that each example presented here represents a different priority for 
Christian education and therefore a different position. In particular, there appears to be a 
disparity of views regarding epistemology, pedagogy and the ontological spiritual status of the 
learner. Also, as evidenced by Nye’s statement above (Nye, 2009: 13), these views are often 
posited as opposites, thus evidencing a dichotomy. Whilst the advocates of a ‘spirituality’ led 
pedagogy negate a doctrinally based ethos, spiritual immediacy is negated by others. 
Proponents of this alternate position argue for example that an a priori religious spirituality is 
without theological grounding. This is reflected by Christian educationalist Andrew Wright 
who writes:  
                       authentic faith is rooted not in self-reflection leading to an unmediated experience of a 
Unitarian God but in a relationship with the Trinitarian God dependent on the 
mediation of revelation through scripture and ecclesiastical tradition (Wright, 1998: 72). 
            It is the conjecture of this thesis then that an authentic expression of Christianity does not 
pertain to one or the other. Such a dichotomy is illusory and must be critiqued. To that end, 
the primary research question asks: 
How can a new perspective of Christian education inspire learners to an authentic life of faith?          
           Following a critical exploration of theory relating to ontology, pedagogy and epistemology in 
each position, this chapter considers the problems of positing before critiquing two methods 
for handling such positings that are evident in practice today. A notion of relation that extends 
beyond the dichotomy is also highlighted and themes such as the relation of learning and the 
learner, the relation of learning and the teacher, and the roles of immediacy or objectivity in 
relation to truth, are all considered. As already noted, it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
criticise the content or values of Christianity. However, as ontology, pedagogy and 
epistemology form the basis of the overall argument, and throughout the wider thesis a 
philosophical exegesis of these themes provides a foundation for the development of further 
theory, their role in each expression of Christian education is explored.  
            It is suggested here that the positions introduced above represent two paradigms of learning. 
From this point, they will be referred to as Paradigm One and Paradigm Two respectively.12 
                                                          
12 A range of methods, models and ideas are evident within Christian education; however, those 
presented here within two contrasting positions serve to illustrate the dichotomy that this thesis seeks 
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The principal perspectives of each paradigm will be explored in some detail, providing a 
platform for the philosophical examination of their key ideas in the chapters that follow as 
well as affording the inspiration for critique. 
           0.2 Overview of Paradigm One 
           Further to the aims of encouraging personal faith and Christian maturity on the part of its 
participants, one of the working principles of the organisation that represents Paradigm One 
states that it is ‘committed to teaching Christian truths’ to ‘encourage children to follow 
Christ’ (Hews, 2000: 127). Indeed, a recently published magazine encourages supporters and 
participants to pray that ‘children will respond to what they hear’ (Scripture Union, 2016: 9). 
This reflects an epistemological priority by which coming to faith13 pertains to what learners 
(or in this context children) hear and know. It also concerns their willingness and ability to 
make appropriate responses. In this paradigm, the Christian religious tradition provides the 
framework placed around the learner (Dallow, 2002: 80) and knowledge drawn from the 
tradition affords the theological impetus to inspire learners to commit personally to the 
Christian faith. 
            In this context, there is a claim to truth. Christian education here aims to encourage 
individuals to accept agreed truths in order to inform their choice to commit; therefore, 
learning involves a movement on the part of an individual towards agreement with these 
truths. These ‘truths’14 have recently been summarised as ‘The Four Points’ and learners are 
encouraged to understand and accept the following claims in relation to their spiritual state: 
‘God loves me; I have sinned; Jesus died for me; I need to decide to live for God’ (Griffiths, 
2009: 146). ‘The Four Points’ have also been popularised as a sub-genre within churches and 
now, with a logo and visual symbols, they provide a straightforward means of understanding 
and articulating a certain theological stance.15 
           The ontological supposition here is of an a priori separation from God. The epistemological 
supposition is that individuals should accept and believe these theological points in order for 
the separation to be bridged. This bridging is traditionally known as ‘conversion’ and as 
                                                          
to address. The two paradigms to be presented here have therefore been identified for the purpose of 
this thesis. To that end they are identified as paradigms One and Two. 
13 ‘Coming to faith’ is a term regularly utilised in the rhetoric of Paradigm One. 
14 The use of inverted commas here serves to signify the provisional assessment of truth, as promoted 
later in the thesis by scholars in Paradigm Two. A more substantial exploration of ‘truth’ in relation to 
learning and the learner features in Chapter Five. 
15 www.the4points.com accessed 23/03/2016 
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Francis Bridger writes: ‘conversion is concerned with an event or moment in the life of an 
individual child, when he or she makes a decision to turn to Christ and to accept him’ (Bridger, 
2000: 139). He suggests that it is at this point that a child’s relationship with God begins. In a 
book that outlines the history of the Sunday School movement, church leader Mark Griffiths 
outlines the significance of conversion to Christianity in this paradigm and argues that the 
emphasis on leading children towards a life of faith is placed on a rational and outwardly 
recognised decision (Griffiths, 2009: 145). He also points out that conversion concerns 
ontology as well as epistemology and he turns to the Augustinian theory of sin and salvation 
to illustrate his observations.  
           Griffiths notes that the influence of St. Augustine has extended across more than one and a 
half millennia and is still ‘embedded within modern theology’ (Griffiths, 2009: 148). Drawing 
on the New Testament verse in Romans 5:12,16 this theology states that sin, being passed 
down from Adam through all generations, is intrinsic to the human spiritual state and clouds 
man’s17 ability to recognise God. This idea is commonly known as ‘original sin’ (Pridmore, 
2009: 188). It is only through the grace of Christ as liberator from sin that the God-man 
relationship is restored (Newell, 1997: 381). Being inherited, the sinful nature is present in all 
peoples thus presenting the need for educational work that secures their salvation. 
           This theology might be described simply as a re-ordering. Nigel Tubbs identifies key themes in 
Augustine’s doctrine such as opposition and error and describes how through re-ordering 
these are overcome. For example, sinful man is in error in opposition to a holy God (Tubbs, 
2009: 45) and death is error in opposition to eternal life (Tubbs, 2009: 46). In the process 
leading to conversion, the realisation of error (sin) leads to confession and this error is 
overcome when the self is reunited with God (Tubbs, 2009: 48). As a result, the former 
sinner’s spiritual life becomes real and meaningful whilst eternal salvation is also secured 
(Griffiths, 2009: 155). Therefore, in this paradigm learners are encouraged to live a life in 
relationship with God in the here and now but the ultimate telos is the life which goes beyond 
death. This re-ordering, the result of which is conversion to Christianity, is highlighted by 
Bridger in relation to the Greek origin of the word epistrepho and described as a turning 
                                                          
16‘Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man and death through sin, and in this way 
death came to all people, because all sinned...’ (Romans 5 vs 12; New International Version). 
17 The term ‘man’ is used here in relation to the rhetoric of Augustinian theology and does not 
represent any gender bias. A similar usage will also be evident in relation to philosophical texts where 
‘man’ presents as a generic term that represents humankind.  
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around (Bridger, 2000: 154). As a result of confession and the overcoming of sin, a new life is 
gained and lived in union with Christ.18  
           This is illustrated by Griffiths who in one of his earlier books writes that in Christian work with 
children, ‘giving them a clear opportunity to respond the gospel message is plainly one of the 
most important aspects of our work’ (Griffiths, 2003: 51). This indicates that an authentic 
decision is reflected in a ‘change of heart’ (Griffiths, 2003: 51). He also continues to describe 
how children can come to know more ‘about God’ (Griffiths, 2003: 52). Griffiths outlines (with 
the aid of child-friendly illustrations) how humans are separated from God by sin until they 
accept his forgiveness, made readily available through the death and resurrection of Christ 
(Griffiths, 2003: 53). This again represents an ontology of separation and error, with the 
agreed truth claims providing the primary means of re-ordering one’s spiritual life. 
            For others (for example, Lamont, 2007: 58; Herdman and Semans Smith, 2015: 51-4), the 
movement towards conversion is represented more by a linear trajectory19 than a re-ordering. 
This trajectory represents a process of faith development that engages learners as individuals 
and prepares them for the moment when the decision to accept the truth of Christianity is 
made. The linear movement is illustrated more fully by faith development theorist J. W. 
Westerhoff. Westerhoff’s theory describes four sequential ‘styles’ of faith that lead one to the 
‘owned faith’ that epitomises conversion. For Westerhoff, owned faith ‘often appears as a 
great illumination or enlightenment but in any case, can be witnessed in our actions and new 
deeds’ (Westerhoff, 1976: 98). Having a more personal starting point, learners themselves 
participate in the conversion process and the status of owned faith comes about as a result of 
immersion in the three previous styles. 
           In Westerhoff’s theory, the foundational ‘experienced faith’ involves the learner witnessing 
and experiencing the life of faith through words and actions (Westerhoff, 1976: 91-3). This 
includes exploration, imagination, reaction and imitation. ‘Experienced faith’ expands to 
‘affiliative faith’ which prioritises community and participation, including a sense of history 
and tradition. Westerhoff proposes that in this style ‘religious affections’ might be enhanced 
(Westerhoff, 1976: 94-5). The existential ‘searching’ phase that follows is ‘the religion of the 
head’ (Westerhoff, 1976: 96); this involves doubting and questioning but as Westerhoff 
suggests, this must be in place before learners can understand about faith for themselves 
                                                          
18 This is illustrated in the following Bible verse: ‘Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, the new creation has 
come: the old has gone, the new is here’ (1 Corinthians 5 vs 17; New International Version).  
19 The linear movement of faith is examined philosophically in Chapter Five. 
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(Westerhoff, 1976: 96). The final stage, ‘owned faith,’ which is reached after the expansion of 
the others, is a conversion. Conversion here involves a ‘change in a person’s feeling, thinking 
and willing – in short in their total behaviour’ (Westerhoff, 1976: 98). Learners who own their 
faith put it into action and stand up for what they believe.  
            In Westerhoff’s theory, learners experience a faith context, ask questions and take part in the 
wider experience of Christian community before making a decision. However, a decision must 
be made. This decision is cognitive and involves learners accepting agreed doctrine so that 
they might own their faith. It seems that albeit personally active in their own faith 
development, learners are ultimately only able to authentically live a life of faith when they 
have all the facts sorted out. This concerns learners expressing a personal faith within an 
epistemological framework, delivered externally and laden with significant assumptions.20 
           The external delivery of objective ideas therefore highlights a pedagogical priority within 
Paradigm One. Griffiths places this paradigm within the ‘Evangelical’ tradition, the etymology 
of which suggests an announcing or proclamation of the ‘Good News’ that the self and God 
can be reunited. Reflecting his assertions presented above, this involves a sharing of the 
Christian story through presentational methods (e.g. preaching or teaching). Knowledge is 
transmitted and a response is made (Griffiths, 2009: 156). In many cases, entertaining styles 
of presentation (or proclamation) engage learners; practitioners utilise visual imagery such as 
drama, video and puppetry as well as high energy activity such as singing and interactive 
games in order to inspire effective participation in learning.21 The presentation of Christian 
beliefs and values is reinforced by practices such as Bible reading, prayer and worship. Small 
group discussions and a more recently produced online game22 are also promoted as a means 
of engaging with the message, as is an interactive website including Biblical passages with 
commentary, Christian music and a blog.23  A training article featured in a resource magazine, 
highlights methods that educators might draw on in order to provide interesting teaching and 
learning experiences for all ages. For example, the instructor uses visual aids, slides or videos, 
                                                          
20 As will be highlighted in due course, for some Christian scholars this is problematic. Truth here is 
presented from a position of objectivity; yet as will be examined in later chapters and particularly 
through the work of Kierkegaard, this position must be re-evaluated. 
21 At this stage of the thesis it might be suggested that these methods are effective in so far as they 
engage learner’s imaginations and allow for participation in what is being presented. Without any 
empirical data to support this suggestion, it might be argued that this is somewhat erroneous. 
However, the effectiveness of learning in terms of inspiring an authentic life of faith is questionable and 
this forms a part of the inspiration for the major research question.  
22 www.guardiansofancora.com accessed 23/03/2016 
23 www.wordlive.org accessed 23/03/2016  
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conveys facts, gives interpretations and expands on contemporary meaning regarding Bible 
stories24 (Wills, 2002: i). The explorer encourages discussion and allows learners to research 
the Bible for themselves, utilising creative methods such as role play, writing, making music 
and large-scale art work (Wills, 2002: iii). Meanwhile the storyteller presents the story in a fun 
way, engaging the learner’s imaginations and helping them to apply it to their own lives (Wills, 
2002: ii). Two further educational principles are deemed important in this paradigm: 
relationship building and role modelling. In the popular resource book Going Bananas, Sue 
Clutterham proposes that Christian educators adopt a three-fold strategy for faith 
development that includes ‘proclaiming Christian truth, building quality relationships and 
embodying Christian lifestyle’ (Clutterham, 1997: 10). It is proposed that each principle is 
regarded in equal measure and together they promote authentic learning.  
           To that end a number of residential activities25 are often organised. These aim to provide a 
safe and creative setting in which adults might work alongside children so they might, as 
Donal Dorr suggests, ‘find a deeper meaning in the bits and pieces of their everyday lives, and 
ensure that their activities are carried out in the presence of God’ (Dorr, 2000: 98). Regular 
attendance and service at residential activities is encouraged; furthermore, training and 
mentoring are made available and a long-term commitment to groups and individuals remains 
a priority. Role modelling, positive relationships and the quality of care given to learners, as 
well as good quality creative activities, all serve to encourage individuals to embark on a life of 
faith whilst strengthening the faith of those who already believe. 
           In summary, it is suggested that in Paradigm One, a belief in the ontological separation of the 
individual from God is reflected in the epistemological priority of objective ‘truth’; this 
highlights an initial separation of the learner from what is to be learnt. As written and spoken 
words are held in esteem and teaching involves the transmission of information, it might be 
argued that a learner’s own Being 26 is largely ignored and that spiritual authority belongs to 
the teacher. In critiquing the guiding beliefs and practices of this paradigm, one might 
question whether they actually allow for an authentic mode of learning to take place and lead 
the questioner to consider the need for a more learner-centred approach.  
                                                          
24 Such Bible stories might include the ‘I am’ sayings in the Gospel of John, or the Ten Commandments 
in Exodus.  
25 http://www.scriptureunion.org.uk/ScriptureUnionHolidays/AboutSUHolidays/64175.id and 
https://www.ventures.org.uk/ accessed 23/03/2016 
26The capitalisation here reflects the Heideggerian presentation of the notion of Being. This is outlined 
more explicitly in Chapter One.  
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            In the following section, certain aspects of these beliefs and practices are problematized. 
Whilst still locating the critique within the Christian spiritual tradition, the following views 
serve to review the ontological, epistemological and pedagogical perspectives of Paradigm 
One in order to pave the way for the introduction of new priorities. The critique therefore 
signposts Paradigm Two and provides a rationale for the inclusion of an alternate paradigm in 
this chapter.  
            0.3 Critique of Paradigm One 
            As already stated, it is not the intention of this thesis to critically assess Christianity per se. 
Nevertheless, two Christian thinkers, John Pridmore (2009) and Francis Bridger (2000), whilst 
locating their own theory and practice within Paradigm One, raise concerns with some of the 
perspectives presented above. The first pertains to ontology and the Augustinian notion of 
original sin.  
           Pridmore argues that the Western theological issue of original sin has done damage to the 
spiritual lives of many, including children (Pridmore, 2009: 187). He illuminates two images 
that he argues have influenced Christian attitudes towards children: that of a child who is 
‘lost’ and the other of a guilty sinner convicted. He describes these images as shocking 
(Pridmore, 2009: 190). For Pridmore, a paradigm that is founded on the notion that children 
are lost before they are found as well as guilty therefore convicted (of sin) before they are 
saved, is a concern. He also considers the view that salvation involves a cognitive response to 
an understanding of the cosmic separation of humanity and God as erroneous (Pridmore, 
2009: 190).  
           For Pridmore this view is at odds with his understanding of children’s salvific status. His 
assertion is that ‘salvation means wholeness’ (Pridmore, 2009: 199). A child’s relationship with 
God is already complete (Pridmore, 2009: 197). He argues that children are not ‘saved’ or 
‘unsaved’ (Pridmore, 2009: 193). Rather, their Christian experience unfolds throughout the 
different moments of their life, each moment marking another milestone of salvation in a 
‘continuous now’ (Pridmore, 2009: 197).  Pridmore’s ideas do not negate either the 
significance of sin or the need to nurture a relationship with God. However, his ontological 
priority reverses the notion of separation and the need to ‘win children to Christ’ (Pridmore, 
2009:194), instead accepting ‘salvation now’ (Pridmore, 2009: 199). 
           Bridger also evaluates the significance of sin and asserts that the ‘problem of sin and 
accountability’ has ‘preoccupied children’s evangelists for so long’ (Bridger, 2000: 117). 
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However, in considering the role of sin in an individual’s coming to faith, he takes a 
psychological view. Whilst describing sin as an original human state (Bridger, 2000: 124), 
Bridger is less concerned about one’s salvific status in relation to sin than its outworking in 
real life. He equates sin to self-centredness which has an impact on inter-personal 
relationships: it involves a lack of respect for others and their rights (Bridger, 2000: 125). He 
also suggests it might also imply a lack of respect for God, choosing one’s own path in life and 
prioritising one’s own ‘route to personal advancement’ (Bridger, 2000: 125). In response to 
this, he suggests that the capacity to understand self-centredness comes with maturity. The 
idea of overcoming separation cited above therefore also becomes erroneous since not all 
children have the means of understanding sin and making a considered cognitive response is 
not possible for everyone. 
           Furthermore, what might be commonly agreed sinful practice, when considered contextually 
might need to be reconsidered. For example, Bridger questions if a child from a low economic 
environment who steals food to survive, as such becomes a sinner (Bridger, 2000: 150). He 
outlines what he feels is the priority of Romans 5:12;27 rather than emphasising the 
consequence of opposition and error, he highlights that the Epistle writer Paul understands a 
relationship with Christ as one of freedom (Bridger, 2000: 150). As a result, it deals with the 
person and not the sin. 
            In addition to ontology, problems concerning pedagogy in Paradigm One are highlighted. 
These include the concept of authority. Pridmore considers that a transmissional 
methodology, which he describes as an ‘adult schemata of salvation,’ reflects power and 
control (Pridmore, 2009: 193).28 Here, those in leadership decide in advance the ‘truths’ to be 
learned. His reference to ‘beach mission theology’ in which the ‘evangelist may well elicit from 
some young children the faith response deemed necessary’ (Pridmore, 2009: 193-4), also 
reflects his notion that the authority in spiritual learning is commanded by (adult) teachers. In 
principle, the individual learns in response to the direct and indirect methods of 
communicating agreed truths. Although utilising more egalitarian and interactive methods of 
learning as described above, written and spoken words are held in esteem and a cognitive 
priority is in evidence.  
                                                          
27 This is the Biblical text that is purported to introduce the idea of original sin, initially cited on page 8.  
28 The issue of power in education is addressed in Chapter Four.  
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           This methodology is reflective of Paulo Freire’s ‘banking concept’ of pedagogy, which is an 
example of mastery.29 According to the way in which ‘the teacher knows everything and the 
student knows nothing,’ the learner is expected to passively adopt the truths that the teacher 
conveys (Freire, 1970: 54). Furthermore, ‘the teacher thinks and the students are thought 
about.’ As such: ‘the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his or her own 
professional authority which she and he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students’ 
(Freire, 1970: 54). Therefore, the subjectivity of the individual learner is denied and what the 
teacher claims to be true, must also be deemed as true.  
           This idea is similarly problematized by Pridmore and Bridger. According to the former author, 
in this paradigm the authority for defining what truth is and what it means lies with the 
provider (Pridmore, 2009: 194). Bridger concurs and alluding to models such as ‘The Four 
Points’ (Griffiths, 2009: 146), he suggests that a seemingly formulaic approach to Christian 
teaching might be ‘too simplistic.’ Additionally, this approach evokes a response that is based 
on ‘adult-decision making’ (Bridger, 2000: 140) rather than the contingent experience and 
understanding of the learning individual.30 The external application and subsequent 
acceptance of these doctrinal points is considered final yet without any reference to 
subjectivity. 
           It might be argued then that, without reference to the personal nature of the learning 
individual and indeed without providing space for the opportunity to debate or question the 
presentation of these points, authenticity within the learning process might potentially be 
minimised. In the light of the research question, it must also be questioned whether a 
paradigm with an epistemological priority can inspire spiritual learning. Furthermore, one 
even might consider whether the ethics of mastery are acceptable for a contemporary context 
                                                          
29 It might be suggested that in this learning situation the teacher acts as a master. Tubbs explains that 
in a paradigm of mastery, the teacher knows on the student’s behalf what must be learnt (Tubbs, 2005: 
69). He or she therefore has authority and as such the epistemological upper hand. 




(Theissen, 2011: 8) 31 and if in the era of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,32  the role of the Christian teacher as an adult authority figure is any longer credible. 
           At this point a similar outline of the principal perspectives in a second paradigm is presented. 
Again with critique, the issues raised pave the way for the consideration of a new perspective 
of Christian education. 
           0.4 Overview of Paradigm Two 
           In Paradigm Two, the idea of ‘children’s spirituality’ presents as the ontological starting point 
for Christian education.33 This is evidenced in a number of publications that aim to support 
Christian educators in inspiring spiritual growth in children and young people (Ratcliffe, 2004; 
Yust, 2004; Copsey, 2005; Nye, 2009; Privett and Richards, 2009; Csinos, 2011; Beckwith and 
Csinos, 2013). 
           Rebecca Nye writes that ‘children’s spirituality is initially an innate capacity for the awareness 
of the scared quality to life experiences’ and proposes that an encounter with ‘transcendence 
can happen in specific experiences or moments as well as through imaginative or reflective 
activity’ (Nye, 2009: 6). For American Christian educators Beckwith and Csinos, a spiritual 
consciousness as an inherent aspect of the human condition allows learners to gain a full 
awareness of their immediate connection with God 34 and the world around (Beckwith and 
Csinos, 2013: 41), and rather than uncritically accepting objective knowledge, they posit that 
the individual can experience transcendence and the transcendent throughout the on-going 
processes of life (Beckwith and Csinos, 2013: 42). Reflecting Pridmore’s ontological priority, 
                                                          
31 In his book The Ethics of Evangelism, Thiessen considers whether it is morally right to engage in 
proselytising and investigates whether it is possible to distinguish between ethical and unethical 
methods (Theissen, 2011: 8). He does not consider a paradigm which includes epistemological certainty 
and adult authority as unethical; rather he cites agents of this paradigm as arrogant (Theissen, 2011: 
59-62), against which he objects. His premise is that ethics includes conduct; therefore, an ethical 
approach should give consideration to dignity, coercion and tolerance (Theissen, 2011: 234-6).   
32 Articles 12 to 14 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in particular make 
reference to the rights of children having their own views, including regarding religious beliefs, and 
their right to express these views. 
http://www.unicef.org.uk/Documents/Publications/Child_friendly_CRC_summary_final.pdf accessed 
23/03/2016 
33 In most publications within this discipline, ‘children’s spirituality’ serves as a generic term for the 
spirituality of young people from birth age to early adulthood. However, in the context of this thesis, it 
serves to represent the spiritual lives of learning individuals of any age.  
34 The term God is presented as such in the context of the texts cited. When it is denoted ‘God,’ the 
provisional nature of the term on the part of the author is assumed. 
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these ideas have clear implications for epistemology and pedagogy and will be explored in due 
course. 
           ‘Children’s spirituality’ as a concept has gained popularity over the past twenty years. Whilst it 
has been suggested that to define spirituality is antithetical to its nature (Priestley, 2008),35 it 
has been described in terms of expressions such as: ‘meaning and purpose, expressions of 
relatedness, transcendence, immanence, ultimate values, integrity, identity, a connection to 
something greater, and awareness’ (Hyde, 2008: 11). Since 1999, the International Journal of 
Children’s Spirituality has included a number of significant articles authored by educators, 
psychologists, health care practitioners and pastoral workers that draw attention to these 
principles. Furthermore, as ‘spiritual development’ is also highlighted in the revised guidelines 
for the leadership and inspection of schools (Office for Standards in Education, Children’s 
Services and Skills, 2015: 36), there is evidence that the rhetoric of spirituality is prevalent 
within the mainstream as well as the church. 
           As an accepted aspect of humanity, ‘children’s spirituality’ is considered to be a universally 
innate phenomenon and human predisposition. With it is the a priori assumption of an 
ontological connectedness with others and God. From a Biblical starting point, one might 
make the claim that as Beings made in the image of God (Genesis 1:27),36 all people have an a 
priori capacity to experience the transcendent in all aspects of life as well as in a life of faith; 
religion therefore is not the exclusive domain of spirituality nor are spirituality and religion 
inextricably linked (Hyde, 2008: 24). 
           This is underlined by the theology of Pelagius, a fourth century Celt who saw God as present 
within all of life. His belief that the goodness of God is within each human marked him out 
from St. Augustine whose theology emphasised the pervasiveness of wrongdoing in the world 
as well as the separation of the sacred from the natural (Newell, 1997: 14). Pelagius’ view that 
all of creation is connected allows one to consider both nature and scripture as means of 
revealing one’s relation with (rather than separation from) God. For Pelagius, the role of the 
church (or Christian educator) is to encourage individuals to explore what is already in their 
                                                          
35 This idea is taken from Priestley, J., (2008), A Brief Introduction to the Notion of the Spiritual; it is 
published as a statement from the President of the International Association for Children’s Spirituality, 
posted on the website www.childrenspirituality.org and accessed on 23/03/2016. 
36 ‘So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them’ (Genesis 1 vs 27; 
New International Version) 
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hearts (Newell, 1997: 10-11). Consequently, redemption is not an overcoming of separation 
but the releasing of ‘what we essentially are’ (Newell, 1997: 15). 
           This is given further attention by Urs von Balthasar who, in his text Unless You Become Like 
This Child, theologically explores the spiritual nature of a child. For von Balthasar, a child’s 
spirituality is considered in relation to humanity’s original pristine state. By linking Jesus’ 
words ‘whoever does not receive the kingdom of God like a child will not enter into it’ to the 
dialogue between Jesus and Nicodemus concerning spiritual birth,37 he interprets ‘spiritual 
childhood’ as an original dimension into which all humanity is born (von Balthasar, 1991: 16). 
Although they might move away from this original pristine state as life continues, children are 
also able to re-imagine this innate relationship with God through inductive acts of discovery 
and illumination (von Balthasar, 1991: 16). This also highlights a pedagogical template for the 
spiritual Christian educator.38 
           According to Catholic theologian Karl Rahner, the natural spiritual life concerns immediacy39 
(Rahner, 1971: 37) and openness toward the divine (Rahner, 1971: 36). It is his conjecture that 
this relation is available to all persons and in Volume Eight of Theological Investigations, he 
specifically makes reference to children. He maintains that childhood represents a direct 
relationship with God (Rahner, 1971: 36) and that as full human beings, God is already present 
within each individual (Rahner, 1971: 38). Rather than their moving towards an appreciation 
and experience of the spiritual as they develop and grow (Rahner, 1971: 36), children’s natural 
relation toward God continues to be a part of their lives as developing individuals. As such the 
life of each individual is ‘related with absolute immediacy to God himself, to his original 
creative and inalienable design for him’ (Rahner, 1971: 37). This concerns an understanding of 
existence.40 Here the individual’s a priori existence includes a relationship with God. 
Therefore, this existential spirituality is a gift: not something ‘appended to’ but that which is 
‘accepted and lived through freely’ by all (Rahner, 1971: 35). To allow for this requires 
                                                          
37 John 3 vs 1-16; New International Version. 
38 For educators such as Nye, Beckwith and Csinos, the role of the educator is to facilitate the ongoing 
relationship between the child and God, rather than establish a means of overcoming a relation of 
separation.  
39 Immediacy is a theme explored widely in this thesis, particularly in Chapter Two in the light of 
Hegelian philosophy. 
40 The notion of ‘existence’ is considered more fully in terms of Heideggerian philosophy in Chapter One 
and the Kierkegaardian idea of faith is explored in Chapter Five. 
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intentionality: an intentionality that allows childhood to remain open and for the child’s 
natural spiritual state to bear upon life as a whole.41 
           However, Rahner also acknowledges that there is more to consider here than the child’s 
natural state and his ideas provide signposts for themes to be explored in later chapters of 
this thesis. First, he notes that humanity lives in freedom. This freedom ensures that 
subjectivity plays a role in determining the present identity and meaning of the experiences of 
the individual. This sits in contrast to the idea within Paradigm One that a Christian identity is 
defined by acceptance of ‘The Four Points.’ In Paradigm Two, subjectivity is a primary concern, 
reflecting Rahner’s assertion that ‘what is already present in the child still has to be realised, 
to become actual in experience’ (Rahner, 1971: 38-9). Here it is the subjective experience of   
the child that determines learning and meaning-making, not what is imposed.42 
           A second theme is contingency. This reflects Rahner’s view of original sin. He considers 
childhood in two senses: whilst the child’s prior ontological state expresses an immediate 
relation with God, he or she is also born into a pre-existing context that is historically 
conditioned. No child will continue to develop spiritually in a pure state of existence, 
unaffected by the implications of the past or their current context. As such they will 
experience original sin – however the sin in this context is brought about not through 
humanity, but history.43 For Rahner, contingency is mediated by the child. Being the example 
of God’s grace that saves all mankind, the Christian sees nature and grace united in childhood 
(Rahner, 1971: 38). Whilst already exposed to the influence of the world, the Christian is also 
always living under grace so that whilst paradoxical, it is possible to be sinful yet redeemed. 
           The final theme is also a paradox. This paradox highlights the nature of an absolute God who is 
both mysterious and present (Rahner, 1971: 42) in relation to the life of the subjective 
individual. As Rahner considers the ineffability of the divine and the autonomy of the 
individual, he explores more fully what it might mean to be a child of God, not in ordinary 
                                                          
41 This reflects the words of Jesus: ‘Truly I tell you, unless you change and 
become like little children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven’ (Matthew 18 vs 3; New 
International Version). 
42 A philosophical appraisal of ‘freedom’ is presented in Chapter Three in the light of Hegel’s Master and 
Slave analogy. Additionally, subjectivity is a key word for Kierkegaard and the educational implication of 
this is examined in Chapters Two and Three.   
43 The suggestion here is that whilst children are not born as sinful human beings, they are born into a 
sinful world. Initiation into this world will inevitably draw all people into sinful behaviour. However, it 
can be assumed that the accountability for sin cannot be taken by human beings whose age or 
cognitive stage of development disallows them from grasping the implications of this behaviour. Their 
status under grace secures their salvation.                                                                                                                                                                            
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terms but as a theological discourse (Rahner, 1971: 42-3). Although the current thesis gives 
only a little attention to theology, these themes are later explored philosophically through 
engagement with Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments and Stages on Life’s Way. 
           In the theological positions described here, there is no evidence of the overcoming of 
opposition. Rather, an innate and complete relationship between an individual and God is 
presented, albeit mediated by an historical context, on the basis of which he or she is able to 
develop in spiritual maturity. Consequently, it relates to Being and contains possibility and 
potentiality; as such it affords agency. Agency is another key theme in this Paradigm and is 
highlighted particularly for education by Australian scholar Brendan Hyde. As a pedagogical 
tool, agency sits in contrast to the practice of information transmission outlined above.  
           Hyde asserts that due to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, individuals 
are now in a position to shape their own learning more than ever before (Hyde, 2010: 93). He 
describes agency as ‘the ability of children to understand their world and act upon it’ and 
highlights how through engagement with the artefacts of their lives, learners are able to 
‘influence learning and construct meaning for themselves’ within their own cultural contexts 
(Hyde, 2010: 94). This is reminiscent of Freire’s praxis-based learning which involves reflection 
on the world and action in order to transform it (Freire, 1970:  106). For Hyde, this idea 
includes accepting children as human beings not human ‘becomings’ (Hyde, 2010: 93), able to 
influence their own learning and make meaning for themselves. 
           Agency has an ontological basis and this is reflected in the writings of Marian de Souza who 
suggests that it might ‘enhance spiritual expression through intuitive, imaginative and creative 
responses that stem from deep within the individual’ (de Souza, 2010: 35). Agency is also 
reflected by Adams, Hyde and Woolley who propose that this idea is effective in allowing 
learners to take risks, share their views and describe their experiences so to empower and 
raise self-esteem (Adams, Hyde and Woolley, 2008: 38-9). Their intention in education is to 
prioritise the voices of children that have in their view been ‘silenced’ by formal educational 
practices (Adams, Hyde and Woolley, 2008: 31), religious beliefs (Adams, Hyde and Woolley, 
2008: 33) and cultural taboos (Adams, Hyde and Woolley, 2008: 34). They seek to reclaim the 
political nature of children’s spirituality, allowing learners to be able to form their own views, 
29 
 
have a voice (Adams, Hyde and Woolley, 2008: 37) and take action for change (Adams, Hyde 
and Woolley, 2008: 107-9).44 
           An understanding of the learner as an agent then scrutinises the viability of an approach that 
does not start with the child. As Nye points out, the challenge for Christian educators, 
particularly in the light of these ideas, is not to exert external influence but to learn about 
spirituality from individuals in their Being (Nye, 2009: 80). She claims that this alternate 
position challenges the ‘old thinking’ of the previous paradigm (Nye, 2009: 80). In Paradigm 
Two, adult authority in the presentation of Christianity does not claim exclusivity in 
determining the meaning and direction of a learner’s spiritual life. Furthermore, as Pridmore 
argues, ‘the child does not have to wait to be born again to be a child of God’ (Pridmore, 
2009: 194). Therefore, it could be claimed that fixed knowledge is not a pre-requisite for a 
relationship with God or indeed an authentic life of faith. 
           This has implications for epistemology. For educators in the field of children’s spirituality, 
meaning and truth are not just objective perspectives but arise through the awareness of a 
‘new dimension of understanding, meaning and experience’ (Hay and Nye, 2006: 109). This 
dimension is the child’s own personal spiritual life. Affective knowledge gained from spiritual 
experience rather than cognition provides the foundation for learning. This pertains to the 
corporeal and expressive dimension of life described by Hay and Nye as the ‘meta-cognition’ 
(Hay and Nye, 2006: 109). Meaning-making then takes the form of both verbal and non-verbal 
articulations expressed by the learner who is the locus of subjective truth (Hay and Nye, 2006: 
109).  
           Whilst the proposed audience of Nye’s text Children’s Spirituality: what it is and why it matters 
(2009) comprises church leaders and Christian children’s workers within the Anglican church, 
her ideas regarding a new paradigm signal a departure from a model of Christian education 
that has a rigorous theological basis. Rather, Nye’s approach places the external presentation 
of theological doctrine as the secondary element in nurturing faith. An historical foundation 
                                                          
44 The political nature of children as agents is illustrated by Antony Swift in the book Children for social 
change. Here the author describes the activities of liberation undertaken by children and early 
adolescents in a Brazilian street community. In keeping with the principle of the child as the subject of 
his/her own development, (Swift, 1997: 150), the young people in partnership with the local priest and 
other church members were able to effect changes such as developing arts projects, a girls group and 
employment opportunities as well as lead the way in establishing the ethos and curriculum of the local 
school (Swift, 1997: 163-180).                    
30 
 
for her ideas is provided by William James, a significant author in religious philosophy and, it 
might be argued, the inspiration for the movement that represents Paradigm Two.   
           In his 1902 text The Varieties of Religious Experience, James advocates the importance of 
personal experience in learning and this is described as the a priori of religious belief and 
activity. Not negating formal religion, he instead changes the priority and writes: ‘we must 
make search for the original experiences which were the pattern setters to all (the) mass of 
suggested feeling and imitated conduct’ (James, 1982: 6). Personal experience is recognised as 
primary and what he terms the ‘institutional branch’ is secondary. The former concerns the 
‘inner dispositions of man himself’ and ‘the relation goes direct from heart to heart, from soul 
to soul, between man and his maker’ (James, 1982: 28). This claim is indeed summarised by 
Nye as such: ‘God’s ways of being with children and children’s ways of being with God’ (Nye, 
2009: 5). 
           In the light of this, pedagogy therefore can no longer involve merely the transmission of 
information. Canadian scholar Tobin Hart claims that as spiritual knowledge concerns the 
affective dimension of life, it should not be proclaimed but rather drawn out (Hart, 2003: 
229). As Nye’s assertions marked a departure from Christian education with a theological 
basis, the ideas of Catholic educators such as Hart and Hyde depart from the idea of 
‘presentation’ in learning. A Rumour of Angels by Peter Berger introduces the idea of ‘signals 
of transcendence’ (Berger, 1969: 70) in religious45 education and this text similarly highlights 
an historical influence.  
           Berger suggests that being fully human involves having an ‘intrinsic impulse’ which 
corresponds to and trusts an order beyond the immediate. He suggests that religious learning 
takes place when experience comes to consciousness. Through his inductive pedagogy, he 
suggests that it is within everyday activities (such as play) that spiritual experience becomes a 
reality (Berger, 1969: 74-5). This experience then encourages personal meaning making. From 
a theological perspective, Berger’s notion of ‘inductive faith’ incites an ontological relationship 
as the inspiration that moves one from experiencing God to being able to express statements 
about God (Berger, 1969: 76). Therefore, assertions about God are not inspired by Scripture or 
liturgy, but by everyday occurrences.  
           The idea highlights a movement away from any inherited or agreed notions of God. Rather 
than referring to the Trinitarian God, who as argued by Wright is revealed through Scripture 
                                                          
45 Berger’s text is not religion-specific.  
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and Ecclesiastical tradition (Wright, 1998: 72), Hyde for example prefers to draw on the 
concept of ‘transcendent Other’ (Hyde, 2008: 90). Akin to Berger, Hyde suggests that through 
everyday experiences, learners might perhaps encounter ‘something of the presence of God’ 
(Hyde, 2008: 90), but the representation of God is provisional. Alternative rhetoric such as 
‘Ultimate Unitary Being’ (Hyde, 2008: 34) allows for the construction of a personal notion of 
such a being that is more inclusive and universal. Thus, whilst it allows for a Judeo-Christian 
representation, this is not exclusive within personal learning. Furthermore, Hyde’s idea of 
‘ontological knowing’ considers learning as a perception rather than an understanding. 
Therefore, starting with an holistic experience of mind, body and soul (Hyde, 2008: 89), he 
suggests that one might journey towards the perception of a ‘transcendent Other’ (Hyde, 
2008: 34) but this does not represent conversion, or indeed the claiming of any belief about 
the transcendent as truth.  
           In summary, the principal perspectives of Paradigm Two are exemplified in the work of 
Christian scholars such as John Fisher who propose that spirituality is for the here and now 
and concerned with well-being and wholeness (Fisher, 1999: 30-31). Ontology is widely 
accepted as the precursor to epistemology and the process of gaining knowledge starts with 
the individual who comes into an awareness of spiritual and religious matters through 
ordinary experiences. In this paradigm ‘knowing’ pertains more to a resonance than an 
actualisation of thought and as reflected by John Dewey in Experience and Nature, the 
existential qualities of intuition, sense, feelings and perception that contribute to spiritual 
learning exist in a dimension other than thought consciousness (Dewey, 2008: 235).46 
Therefore, it must be noted that Paradigm Two presents a significantly different position to 
Paradigm One in terms of ontology, epistemology and pedagogy. It might also be argued that 
although the ideas of Nye and Hyde in particular are popular amongst church-based 
practitioners, the paradigm’s priority pertains to ‘spiritual education’ rather than ‘Christian 
education,’ with spiritual nurture rather than faith development as its telos. 
                                                          
46 Concerning ‘knowing,’ Dewey differentiates between consciousness and mind. Whereas the mind 
involves ‘a whole system of meanings’ (Dewey, 2008: 229), consciousness is concerned more with 
awareness or the perception of meanings. These meanings are for the here and now; they might be 
intermittent, vague and certainly not immediately actualised in language (Dewey, 2008: 230). 
Awareness and perception, following a continuum of meaning making, lead the individual contribute to 
the transformation of agreed meanings and attitudes (Dewey, 2008: 239).                                                                                                                                                 
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           These ideas are all underlined in the text The Spirit of the Child (Hay and Nye, 1998; 2006). This 
publication has been an influential factor in the formation of a contemporary theory regarding 
children’s spirituality and serves to further underline the premise of Paradigm Two.  
           0.5 The Spirit of the Child 
           First published in 1998 and revised in 2006, David Hay and Rebecca Nye’s book The Spirit of 
the Child offers ontological, epistemological and pedagogical assertions about the nature and 
role of spirituality in children’s lives. Whilst coming from Christian faith perspectives (Hay, 
2000: 3; Nye, 2004: 90), the authors nevertheless highlight the human dimension of 
spirituality first and foremost. In this text, little reference is made to the tradition or beliefs of 
the Christian faith. Yet the influence of their thesis has extended throughout the church 
internationally, contributing to the development of church-based spiritual pedagogy, 
particularly through the publications of a range of authors involved in promoting Christian 
education.47 
           Hay and Nye’s proposition is based on empirical data and endorses the recognition that 
spirituality is innate (Hay and Nye, 2006: 92), originating within but going beyond the ordinary 
(Hay and Nye, 2006: 59-60). Drawing on the work of zoologist Alister Hardy and noting how 
spirituality is biologically natural to all human beings inclusive of all ages from birth, Hay and 
Nye claim that spirituality is intrinsic to humanity and essential for human survival (Hay and 
Nye, 2006: 22-4). To be human is to be spiritual; therefore, it is also universal – for all peoples. 
It transcends doctrine and ideology as well as culture and creed, and is concerned with 
personal and communal awareness and perception (Hay and Nye, 2006: 63). 
           Hay and Nye promote the notion of a meta-human dimension of experience which takes 
spiritual learning away from what is known epistemologically to what is inspired ontologically 
(Hay and Nye, 2006: 109). Reflecting an idea from Rudolph Otto that an experience of the holy 
can come into consciousness (Otto, 1976: 15), affective categories such as flow (Hay and Nye, 
2006: 68-9), tuning (Hay and Nye, 2006: 68), the felt sense (Hay and Nye, 2006: 70), wonder 
and awe (Hay and Nye, 2006: 71-2), and imagination (Hay and Nye, 2006: 72-3) all exemplify 
how one’s intrinsic spiritual state, which is the starting point for spiritual growth, might be 
identified and nurtured. For example, the authors write that a young child’s  
                                                          
47 Such authors, previously listed above are: Ratcliffe, 2004; Yust, 2004; Copsey, 2005; Nye, 2009; 
Privett and Richards, 2009; Csinos, 2011; Beckwith and Csinos, 2013.                                                                                                                                             
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           sense of mystery can be awakened by much more down to earth and familiar 
phenomena – simple events such as a flame appearing when a match is struck, or a light 
being switched on, or water coming out of a tap (Hay and Nye, 2006: 72). 
           Hay and Nye’s research also indicates that learners can transcend objective truth claims by 
means of holistic experiences and through these experiences they can explore or ‘test’ 
religious views or perspectives without necessarily needing to embrace them (Hay and Nye, 
2006: 168-171). As a result, children’s own ideas drawn from their personal spiritual 
experiences are valued and accepted as meaningful. Again as an example, it is suggested that 
learners draw on secular language and images in order to more authentically describe their 
spiritual experiences. This they suggest is preferable to retreating to religious language which 
involves learners detaching themselves from what is personal and more ‘real’ (Hay and Nye, 
2006: 132-3).48 
           To that end, Hay and Nye consider personal meaning making as a priority in spiritual 
development, positing that the proponents of a ‘purely cognitive approach’ tend to ignore the 
experiential aspects of spiritual experience (Hay and Nye, 2006: 76). Reflecting Dewey, whose 
assertion is that awareness - sensing is an exception to the norm and therefore cannot be 
standardised (Dewey, 2008: 234), and James who suggests that one might acknowledge a 
mystical state of consciousness which is ineffable, noetic, transient and passive (James, 1982: 
381-3), they argue:  
           cognitive signs of spiritual activity are in many cases the secondary products of spiritual 
stirrings found in awareness-sensing, mystery-sensing and value-sensing (Hay and Nye, 
2006: 77). 
           A significant part of The Spirit of the Child pertains to a description of Hay and Nye’s theory of 
‘relational consciousness.’ This has become a popular way of describing spirituality (Wills 
2005; Johnson, 2006; Pearmain, 2007; Hyde, 2008) and is presented in the text as ‘an unusual 
plane of consciousness or perceptiveness’ (Hay and Nye, 2006: 109). Furthermore, it describes 
an ontological connection between an individual and four categories of ‘other’ in dialogical 
partnerships. Whilst one category relates to a transcendent other referred to as God (albeit 
not defined in any specific terms), the dimensions of the world, community and the self are 
also described as foundations of spirituality, often providing a bridge to an experience of 
                                                          
48 Accordingly, the MA research of the current author indicates that the children’s responses to 
everyday experiences, when described in non-religious language, seem to be more authentic therefore 
more meaningful (Wills, 2005: 56-7). A further consideration of what is ‘real’ is considered in later 
chapters through the writing of Kierkegaard. 
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God49 (Hay and Nye, 2006: 116). Therefore, the role of relational consciousness is not to 
overcome the opposition between the child and God but to allow the child to gain a 
heightened awareness of their a priori union. The ontological supposition is that there is 
spiritual potentiality in every child, no matter what their context might be.  
           Allusions to Being in terms of ontology are underpinned by references to the work of German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger. Hay and Nye’s assertion that spirituality as an ‘ever- present 
aspect of being human’ is ‘separate from and prior to the discursive intellect’ (Hay and Nye, 
2006: 134), is Heideggerian in nature, as is the notion that it cannot concern facts or rules. 
Again reflective of Heideggerian rhetoric, Hay and Nye claim that spiritual learning involves 
the ‘disclosure that we are already immersed in Being’ (Hay and Nye, 2006: 134). Relational 
consciousness, which pre-dates ‘knowingness’ as well as language and learning (Hay and Nye, 
2006: 135), reinforces the suggestion that the spiritual life is only and already, Being. This 
allows learners to embrace the possibility and potentiality that is offered by their primal 
human state and therefore engage in authentic learning.50 This leads the spiritual educator to 
focus more on Being than on doctrine (Hay and Nye, 2006: 135) and explored more fully in 
Chapter One, presents an existential ethos of education. 
           As the supposition here is of an a priori child-faith connection, this places at odds the notion 
that an authentic Christian education and therefore a life of faith is related to cognition and 
creed (Hay and Nye, 2006: 77) and as such indicates the movement away from the religious 
dimension of spirituality. This positing is noted as a dualism and, as highlighted at the 
beginning of this chapter, it is problematic for this thesis. 
           0.6 Dualism 
           At the outset of The Spirit of the Child, Hay and Nye refer to religion as having an exterior 
identity made manifest through churches, prayer books, weddings and Bibles. Allegedly 
associated with boredom, bigotry and persecution, they also argue that organised religion for 
many is ‘firmly caught up in the cold brutalities of history’ (Hay and Nye, 2006: 19). Therefore, 
along with inciting fanaticism and narrow-mindedness, a negative image of religion is 
portrayed (Hay and Nye, 2006: 19). This is dualistically positioned against the ‘warmer’ 
spirituality which is associated with ‘love, inspiration, wholeness, depth, mystery and personal 
                                                          
49 In Hay and Nye’s text, term God is presented without inverted commas. 
50 Hay and Nye’s ideas here signpost Chapter One. In this chapter, the ideas of Being, possibility, 
potentiality an authenticity are all outlined in detail. 
35 
 
devotions’ (Hay and Nye, 2006: 19). Described as a journey rather than an end result, and a 
tree root whose life-giving water serves to support growth and blossoming (Hay and Nye, 
2006: 20), spirituality is highlighted as holistic and having value for all, rather than narrow and 
only for a few.  
           A similar distinction is made by David Tacey who albeit a Catholic Tertiary educator, considers 
tradition and religion to be inadequate for spiritual religious education. His text The 
Spirituality Revolution (2004) assesses the role of the spiritual in the lives of students, noting 
how organised religion plays little part. He writes about what religion ‘is’ and lists several 
negative attributes such as patriarchal and masculinist, an archaic vision of reality, wholly 
implausible and unattractive to modern understanding, hierarchical and elitist, and dogmatic 
and external to our lives (Tacey, 2004: 36-7). In response he then presents his own dualism, 
suggesting what spirituality ‘is.’ This includes the view that spirituality is universal, concerned 
with connectedness and relatedness, democratic and non-hierarchical (Tacey, 2004: 38-9). 
           Tacey goes on to say that as spirituality is concerned with connectedness, nature and the holy, 
the personal spiritual life looks inward. As it begins in human experience (Tacey, 2004: 38) 
rather than being an obstacle to God as in Augustinian theology, the self actually becomes the 
channel to God who is already considered to be within, through the grace of creation.51  It 
seems that Tacey’s students must make a choice. In this case they choose to choose, and in so 
doing, they choose their own freedom – freedom from the constraints of an externally 
influenced formal expression of religion to a more dynamic, inward and personal spirituality. 
           In the light of these views, the dichotomy between paradigms noted at the beginning of this 
chapter is evident. As already indicated, scholars who practice Christian education with the 
more ontological spiritual priority of Paradigm Two, position themselves away from the more 
‘evangelical’ position of Paradigm One, this having an epistemological priority and involving 
claims to doctrinal truth. It seems then that church-based practitioners are also encouraged to 
choose. Their option, whilst still remaining within the Christian church context, is to choose 
the ‘warmer’ method of nurturing spirituality (Hay and Nye, 2006: 19) albeit without a 
rigorous theological foundation, or remain committed to the ‘dogmatic and external’ (Tacey, 
2004: 3-7) approach that aims to secure faith and belief for a telos of salvation.   
                                                          
51 Further thinking on this comes from Matthew Fox whose creation theology, whilst not negating that 
of Augustine as cited above, suggests that all peoples are part of God’s creative flow (Fox, 1983: 38). 
Therefore, when one seeks God one finds that (s)he is already there (Fox, 1983: 44).                                                                   
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           This is further evidenced in literature authored by Tobin Hart and Clive Erricker, each for 
whom the choice is illustrated through liberationist rhetoric. For Hart, truth is personal, 
provisional and located in experience. Subsequently spiritual education must liberate 
individuals from inherited forms and dogmas. He argues that being inherited, therefore also 
offensive to the postmodern sensibility, the religious is only ever in a concentric relationship 
with the spirit (Hart, 2003: 214). Spirituality thus separates itself from that which is illusory 
and with which it is uneasy.52  Here the objective is negated in favour of liberationist practice 
and dualism is again in evidence. This idea is also reflected by Clive Erricker.53  Erricker’s thesis 
promotes the liberation of spirituality from the perceived hegemony of religious tradition. For 
example, he criticises the inclusion of Christian groups in schools (2007), the ‘faith schooling’ 
offered by Faith schools, and ‘religious education’ provision in state schools in the UK 
(Erricker, 2007: 51). His argument is that in all cases, the paradoxical notion of faith (Erricker, 
2007: 52) is reduced to catechesis and doctrine, which is presented as truth to become the 
arbiter of ‘beliefs, values and behaviour’ (Erricker, 2007: 51). He considers the religion-faith 
relation to be untenable (Erricker, 2007: 52), and questions whether formal religion is actually 
necessary for a life of faith.54 
           Erricker also critiques Christian pedagogy. In his view, catechetical methods illuminate 
mastery. In the text Reconstructing Religious, Spiritual and Moral Education (2000), co-
authored with Jane Erricker, he illustrates his view by arguing that religious education 
perpetuates beliefs that have become institutionalised, understood in terms of ‘a particular 
model of conceptualisation and representation’ (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 30). Emphasising 
how ‘metanarrical status is oppressive rather than liberating’ (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 67), 
Erricker and Erricker consequently encourage readers away from this educative model. They 
emphasise ‘the importance of the process of pedagogy rather than the inculcation of 
knowledge’ (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 69) and highlight the importance of drawing on 
emotions as an example of moving away from these ‘fixed points’ (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 
71). 
                                                          
52 As will be proposed later in the thesis, Hart’s negation of the illusion of objective truth is also illusion; 
hence it is argued that it is the negation of the negation that affords real truth.                                                                     
53 Unlike previous authors cited, Erricker locates himself outside of a Christian context; however, his 
ideas are influential within Paradigm Two, so his thinking is included here. 
54 Erricker also in a later article suggests that religion might no longer be a ‘bastion’ against spiritual 
neglect in society ‘if it ever was’ (Erricker, 2002: 238). 
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           As their thesis is that spirituality begins and ends with the human spirit and that any form of 
knowledge is temporary, Erricker and Erricker suggest that spiritual pedagogy should trade 
the certainty of metanarratives for the personal and local (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 47). 
They posit that the spiritual teacher should avoid mastery by allowing students the freedom 
to deconstruct and reconstruct given narratives. This is reminiscent of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s 
postmodern argument that the certainty of the metanarrative should be deconstructed in 
favour of the personal and local (Lyotard, 1997: xxiv). This teacher listens to the students to 
assist them in constructing their own worldviews that are based on their personal 
experiences. In that way, they gain ownership of their beliefs by self-construction rather than 
imposed dogma (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 159) and it is their agency that allows for 
authentic spiritual learning. Learners now lead the way and, involving the whole self, they 
take responsibility for the creation of meanings that are realistic and authentic.  
           At this point, it becomes evident that there are also concerns regarding perspectives within 
Paradigm Two, not least with the dichotomy that results from dualistic positing. These 
concerns also prepare the ground for the philosophical exegesis that takes place in 
forthcoming chapters and they are highlighted in the section that follows.   
           0.7 Critique    
           Whilst the more explicit liberationist rhetoric of Erricker and Erricker which is rooted in a non-
religious context and takes a humanistic position is potentially unsettling to the Christian 
educator, one might note that the seemingly innocuous views of Hay and Nye, Tacey, Hart and 
Hyde, present a similar scenario. Misrecognising their own illusions,55 their idea of subjective 
learning is reflective of the overcoming of the ‘error’ of objective truth presented earlier. It 
might be suggested then that these priorities diminish the authority of the Christian tradition 
of which they are a part and signify a move away from any knowledge that is deemed to be 
true. As stated at the outset of this chapter, both paradigms are concerned with promoting an 
authentic and continuing life of faith. Even so, it might be argued that the well-intentioned 
idea of placing individuals at the centre of learning in Paradigm Two might actually destabilize 
the Christian ethos within which is it located so to establish other forms of ‘truth.’  
           When considered philosophically, the divorce of subjective knowledge from objective truth 
claims is a concern. As identified by Nigel Tubbs in his text The Philosophy of the Teacher 
(2005), whilst the critical spiritual position of subjectivity and liberation is ‘attractive to those 
                                                          
55 Both misrecognition and illusion are considered educationally in Chapter Two.  
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who wish to combat the seemingly closed and totalising narrative of the enlightenment 
model’ (Tubbs, 2005: 133), the spiritual teacher in rejecting objective truth and mastery, 
actually determines his or her own truth in equal measure to the master and facilitates this on 
behalf of the learners. This makes the position groundless and the teacher becomes another 
master in turn. 
           Furthermore, albeit intentional in utilising agency as a spiritual learning tool, it might be 
suggested that Hay and Nye et al minimise the value of any teacher who presents objective 
knowledge as true. When ‘relational consciousness’ takes the place of knowledge, teaching is 
inductive and meaning making is purely subjective. It must be questioned then how teachers 
might help learners to create their own truths from subjective meanings that are ethical and 
authentic to the Christian tradition.56 Although the ontological and epistemological 
suppositions of Paradigm Two serve to validate the movement away from agreed truth57 and 
those who present these truths, it is suggested that for authentic Christian education, these 
suppositions must be scrutinised.  
           First, one must also consider telos. It might be questioned to where, without any foundation 
of tradition and belief, spiritual emancipation might lead and one might wonder what learners 
are freed to. Educators must consider the result of emancipation and evaluate how far 
learners should consider the liberated experiential knowledge as ‘true,’ having already evaded 
all claims to truth. This paradigm encourages learners to construct truths from subjective 
meanings. But it might be argued that pure subjectivism, whilst promoting well-being, has 
only temporary worth. Issuing from an ontological foundation, the motivation of this position 
in some cases is to promote self- fulfilment and personal happiness (Hart, 2003: 48; Hyde, 
2008: 100). Yet there is little sense that such spiritual nurture affects long term change; 
therefore, its claim to authenticity must also be evaluated.  
           The points considered here are underlined by Andrew Wright, cited at the outset of this 
chapter.58  In the article ‘Dancing in the fire,’ he responds to Clive Erricker’s view of religious 
education as outlined in his article ‘Shall we dance?’ (Erricker, 2001: 20-35). Wright suggests 
that Erricker’s refusal to differentiate the absolute from the contingent is problematic and 
that in proposing absolute freedom, he perpetuates the metanarrative he sought to negate 
(Wright, 2001: 121). Wright suggests that it is possible to devise ‘linguistic models of reality 
                                                          
56 This evaluation takes place in Chapter One through the lens of the Heideggerian philosophy that has 
not least influenced Hay and Nye’s concept of Being. 
57  This movement will be critiqued more fully in forthcoming chapters. 
58 Andrew Wright is first introduced on page 15.   
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that claim legitimacy on the grounds of their convergence with a realistic world beyond the 
fictions of the imagination’ (Wright, 2001: 122), thus proposing that the mediation which 
comes from the contingency of religious traditions might contribute to education rather than 
become an obstacle.  
           Wright proposes that his own notion of critical pedagogy aims to allow students to embrace 
ambiguity (Wright, 2001:133). In so doing the paradox of the perpetuating metanarrative is 
identified and evaluated, allowing for the critique of all sides. Nonetheless, as Wright’s 
proposition is framed by ‘the disciplines of religious and theological study’ (Wright, 2001:132), 
it might be argued that his position is only critical within a certain doctrinal boundary and 
therefore it must be questioned how individuals make meaning without having to succumb to 
epistemological hegemony. Additionally, one might consider that Wright, writing in response 
to Erricker indeed establishes his own dichotomy and as such this must be also critiqued.  
           The points raised here will all be explored more fully in the chapters that follow. However, this 
critique also highlights the significance of the current thesis. To this point, the discussion has 
identified the movement of Paradigm Two away from the perceived illusions (errors) of 
objective truth, mastery and cognition, recognising that it is this movement that establishes 
the dichotomy of dualistic positing. In this thesis however, dualism is considered illusory itself. 
In the following chapters, as the perceived illusions of each paradigm are explored 
philosophically through the philosophies of Heidegger and Hegel respectively, the illusion of 
dualism is also uncovered. In subsequent chapters these illusions will be revisited and 
reimagined in the light of more contemporary philosophy. Contributing to the development of 
a new educational perspective in Christian education, this thesis also proposes that it is not 
the overcoming of illusion, but recognition of the illusion of the illusion that provides the 
starting point for learning, and this will be outlined in detail in chapters Two and Three.  
           Later in the thesis, the movement itself will be considered in depth. In Chapter Three, 
examining the movement of faith in terms of Kierkegaardian philosophy, its educative 
significance is highlighted.  Moreover, it recognises education as Spirit.  The educational 
movement in this new perspective is not one of overcoming or moving away, hence it does 
not require that educators choose. Rather it re-imagines the relation between two paradigms, 
or learning partners. As such, the discussion reconsiders the relations of learning and the 
learner, the relation of learning and the teacher, and the roles of immediacy or objectivity in 
relation to truth; these serve to underpin the proposal of a new educational perspective that 
embraces each in an interplay of ideas rather than as opposites. 
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           As will be presented in detail in Chapter Six, the educational movement of ‘Bildung’ serves to 
promote the idea of learning as a movement and outlines the idea of interplay in the 
relationship of self and other. At this point however, the dichotomy is critiqued, paving the 
way for conclusions in this chapter and signposting the wider thesis. 
           0.8 Overcoming the dichotomy 
           In an article reflecting dichotomies within religious education in Latvia, Anta Filipsone alludes 
to the positing of one paradigm against another as unhelpful and unnecessary. Highlighting 
the strong resistance of a growing atheist population towards religion and an equally strong 
resistance towards any ‘critical reflection on the issues of faith’ on the part of the mainstream 
church (Filipsone, 2009: 122), she questions if a critical conversation between the two can 
ever be possible (Filipsone, 2009: 122). Filipsone locates her question within the discourse of 
spiritual education and similarly expands on the contrasting views of two paradigms. She 
considers the priority of each paradigm - in her first paradigm the priority is ‘religious literacy’ 
and in the second, ‘spiritual awareness’ (Filipsone, 2009: 123) - and in so doing identifies each 
paradigm with an author, that is, Andrew Wright and David Hay respectively.  
           Filipsone summarises Wright and Hay’s views as such: 
 
           Wright warns against anti-intellectualism, individualism, subjectivism, and emotivism, 
whilst Hay concentrates on the problem of oppressive hegemony of secularised reason 
and modern secular society (Filipsone, 2009: 123).  
 
           However, she argues that such differences in priority lead to fragmentation, which in turn 
leads to a lack of balance in religious education. She also criticises each scholar’s rhetoric 
regarding conversation and debate whilst openly attacking the other in publications, 
identifying how each leaves the debate to be had at practitioner level (Filipsone, 2009: 123). 
 
            It is Filipsone’s conjecture that each approach is responsive to the perceived danger of the 
other. She also argues that by avoiding danger, only a one-sided view of the world is possible, 
perpetuating the hegemony that is deemed to be evaded (Filipsone, 2009: 123). As Filipsone 
notes, dualistic positing suggests a relationship that cannot be reconciled (Filipsone, 2009: 
125). In terms of the current discussion therefore, the idea of a personal spirituality that exists 
a priori is in opposition to that with a salvific imperative. Being irreconcilable, a tension for the 
Christian educator with an interest in spirituality becomes evident and it seems that one must 
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choose. Avoiding danger and tension seems to be the main objective; yet as will be indicated 
particularly in Chapter Three, both danger and tension serve as educational tools.59 
 
           To that end it might be argued that to move forward, educators might consider how to accept 
the risk that comes with embracing rather separating from the other. As Filipsone argues, 
without any co-operation and critical reflection between the two positions, religious 
education will never be holistic, or indeed both academic (religious) and spiritual (Filipsone, 
2009: 125). Or, without an acknowledgement of the dangers cited above, education is 
groundless and cannot move forward towards authenticity. Filipsone’s assertion that the 
dichotomy between paradigms might be addressed through co-operation and critical 
reflection suggests the need for both a dialogue and a dialectic. Her ideal also includes 
mutuality and a sense of recognising one in the other (Filipsone, 2009: 123; 125).  
           An example of dialogical practice is Godly Play. Devised by American scholar Jerome Berryman 
and based on the wondering questions of the Jewish faith, Godly Play is an hermeneutical 
method of Christian education that reflects the mutual relationship between the spiritual and 
religious as reflective of the relationship of the child and God. It embraces each in an holistic 
manner. Godly Play provides a way of sharing Biblical texts with children in a way, it is 
proposed, that does not impose an adult model but rather shares and nurtures a child’s 
spiritual life (Lamont, 2007: 86). 
           Godly Play advocate Peter Privett points out that in this method ‘the starting point is the 
child’s agenda’ and there are no given outcomes (Privett, 2009: 115). Through visual stimuli, 
an egalitarian positioning of adults and children on floor space, a series of ‘wondering’ 
questions, and the opportunity to respond through creative activities, children are 
encouraged to engage with Bible stories for themselves and embrace it internally (Lamont, 
2007: 90). Thus, the child’s own personal life is the starting point for learning; however, as this 
method uses the language of the Christian faith, which as in Berryman’s rhetoric is the tool by 
which inner spiritual concepts are developed and personal images of God are created 
(Berryman, 1991: 148-9), the two are mutually held in balance. The Godly Play founder writes: 
‘religious language is the way we make meaning at the limits of being and knowing’ and 
continues: ‘the ultimate standpoint is at the edge of our existence where we sense the 
presence of God’ (Berryman, 1991: 149).  
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           In this method children are not expected to evaluate the concept of God, but accept the 
dialogical and ontological relationship between themselves and God as the starting point for 
spiritual learning. Thus, Privett proposes that this kind of play might afford salvation (Privett, 
2009: 107). This is not salvation from error as described above; neither does it expect a simple 
either/or response. Here salvation represents a more complex, multi-dimensional viewpoint 
of God, doctrine and the Bible and Privett describes this as constructive theology. He writes: 
‘who cares where the sin is’ and suggests that salvation comes about through the 
development of the child in response to the open questions and imagination of the Godly Play 
method (Privett, 2009: 109). The adult formulated theology of right and wrong is 
deconstructed in favour of an approach which considers as Jesus did: ‘anyone who will not 
receive the kingdom of God like a little child will never enter it’ (Privett, 2009: 110).60  
 
            It might be argued however that while space is created for personal discovery and flexible 
reactions to learning (Privett, 2009: 109), less space is created in Godly Play for embracing the 
danger introduced by Filipsone above. In this model, as the ontological supposition is of the 
prior relationship with God, questioning assists storytelling rather than embracing existential 
questioning; furthermore, creativity reflects a personal response rather than any wrestling 
with ideas and concepts. The riskier methods here promote uncertainty and doubt. Yet as 
Tillich proposes, doubt is essential for faith (Tillich, 2001: 25). 
 
           As Godly Play is located in the Judeo-Christian tradition, it might also be argued that the aim of 
the Christian practitioner will always be to encourage children and young people towards 
beliefs and lifestyle choices based on this faith; tradition will always have the upper hand. 
Conversely as already noted, the teacher such as Privett poses a risk to the tradition when the 
individual learner is considered the starting point for meaning making. Subjectivity is afforded 
a higher value than the tradition itself and it seems that he, whilst encouraging children to 
draw on religious language, actually negates the authority of the tradition, minimising its 
importance and misconstruing its place in promoting an authentic life of faith. Philosophically 
then, this is misrecognition.61 Without the recognition of the other as a broken half of the self 
(Tubbs, 2005: 15), each partner is illusory and unfulfilled. Therefore, a dialectical approach 
must be considered. 
                                                          
60 Mark 10 vs 15; New International Version.   
61 The terms mutual recognition and misrecognition pertain to Hegelian thought and are explored 
further in Chapter Two.  
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           A dialectical approach is proposed by Ana Maria Rizzuto (Rizzuto, 1979: 209). Her idea of a 
middle ground created between two positions recognises and accepts the danger and tension 
already introduced. As a clinical researcher and practitioner in psychological and pastoral care, 
Rizzuto’s research project The birth of the living God focuses on people’s images of God. 
Grounded in the lives of patients who revealed concepts of God that changed and evolved 
according to their life experiences, she considers one’s relationship with or image of God as a 
transitional object relation (Rizzuto, 1979: 177). In this respect the truth of an image of ‘God’ 
lies in the space between the personal and the traditional. 
           Whilst the image of God as fait accompli might be considered illusory to some, she argues for 
a subjective reality. In fact, even if the God object might be rejected, experiences such as the 
death of a loved one, or personal rejection, might inspire a return (Rizzuto, 1979: 179). This 
has significance for the relationship between the learner and the tradition in Christian 
education. It suggests that one’s image or view of ‘God’ or transcendent ‘Other’ will adapt and 
evolve in the light of one’s personal context, experience and encounters with others (Rizzuto, 
1979: 209). She suggests that there are as many shapes for God as there are people (Rizzuto, 
1979: 180), therefore one agreed or accepted form is impossible. The Judeo- Christian 
representation of God is thus one illustration of the transitional object but other forms 
influenced by family, culture, class and the sub-culture of organised religion are also valid. 
           Rizzuto warns against the transmission of one view of God, noting this as potentially 
detrimental to the learner’s own psychic state. She notes that when the gap forms between 
the individual’s own representation and that which is taught, ‘our words will confuse, frighten 
or even make them close their ears’ (Rizzuto, 1979: 211). However, the space that exists 
between an individual and God represents the nexus of inner and outer realities. In this space 
truth is illusory. But it is also the space where the learner ‘finds the full relevance of his 
objects and meaning for himself’ (Rizzuto, 1979: 209). Here reality and illusion are not 
contradictory but must be embraced. 
           This is underlined by Canadian scholar Joyce Bellous, who as a Christian educator with an 
interest in children’s spirituality, advocates a pedagogy that recognises the transitional space. 
For Bellous, the space is the starting point from which learners can make meaning. For 
example, the transitional object ‘God’ might be explored in this space; equally Christian truths 
in the light of one’s own personal contingency might also be considered. Meaning making 
here does not involve inhering given truths or indeed learners constructing their own truths. 
Rather in the space, learners test the images formed from their own subjective experiences as 
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well as those transmitted to them. In critiquing and testing, Bellous suggests that these 
images become more authentic to the individual and thus have a longer lasting impact. She 
argues that the role of the Christian educator is to pay attention to both the learner and 
tradition, and to encourage authentic education in the middle space (Bellous, 2006: 207). 
           It might be argued then that this alternative situation acknowledges the difficulty in 
ascertaining mutuality and accepts that there is no ultimate solution.62 It accepts the 
provisionality of the God-concept and notes that this is subject to change in the light of 
context, contingency and the experiences of life. However, when constructed away from the 
Biblical description of the Trinitarian God, it has the potential for groundlessness and illusion. 
Tubbs proposes that educators should reconsider how they manage the dichotomy of the two 
positions. Teachers and learners do not need to choose one or the other, or seek the unity of 
one with the other. Rather as each position relates to the other as the self-reflection of 
oppositions experienced in this middle space (Rose, 1992: xii; Tubbs, 2005: 12-16), the 
dichotomy becomes an error. However, the relational space becomes significant as a learning 
tool and this will be outlined more fully in due course.  
0.9 Concluding remarks 
           This Literature Review, which presents the major research question and context for this 
project, also provides a template for the overall thesis. Written in response to perceived 
problems regarding ontology, epistemology and pedagogy in two distinct yet influential 
paradigms of Christian education, critical appraisal of these problems has served to identify 
the need to embrace perspectives in learning that pertain to uncertainty, danger and doubt, 
rather than certainty or safety. It is suggested that pedagogy with epistemological certainty as 
promoted in Paradigm One is open to critique when one considers the perceived error of 
truth in-itself. Furthermore, transmissional methods must be re-evaluated in the light of a 
consideration of power in learning relationships. These issues are extensively outlined by 
Hegel in his text Phenomenology of Spirit; to that end, an Hegelian analysis in Chapter Two will 
underline further the problems regarding authenticity in education and raise questions that 
highlight the need for the proposed new perspective.  
           It is also suggested that the safer approach of Paradigm Two that aims to avoid the error of 
certainty and determine more personal truths, is itself an error. It might be argued that the 
                                                          
62 The ideas of Rizzuto and Bellous described here do not form part of the critique but signpost later             
chapters in which the difficulty of learning about God is explored. 
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ontological foundation of learning, liberating itself from doctrinal frameworks, puts both the 
learners and their faith at risk when it is not grounded in a context of tradition and belief. The 
work of Kierkegaard, highlighted in Chapter Three, provides a more rigorous explanation of 
the dangers of liberation and presents an alternative movement that is the leap of faith. This 
chapter also signposts the idea of the middle space and paves the way for the second half of 
the thesis.  
           In the Literature Review, concepts such as the dialectic, illusion, tension and misrecognition 
have been introduced. These all have a philosophical connotation and as well as underlining 
difficulties with the paradigms explored, they highlight ideas that contribute to new theory. It 
is later proposed that each has educative significance; hence how each inspires the proposal 
of a new perspective in Christian education is outlined. It is suggested here that not only does 
this thesis signal originality in terms of the new perspective: it illuminates issues within 
Christian education that are broader than a critique of methods, materials or even theological 
points of view.  
           At the outset of the philosophical exposition in this thesis, a deeper consideration of the 
nature of the learner is presented. From the early stages of the Literature Review and 
throughout, the significance of the Being of the learning individual has been highlighted as 
well as its relationship to what is learnt. This underlines the quest for authenticity in learning 
and for a meaningful life of faith. Furthermore, as already indicated, this thesis considers 
learning as Spirit, thus suggesting an existential basis for learning. Through an Heideggerian 
analysis of Being and existence, the following chapter evaluates the relation of the learner to 
both learning and the learning environment and critically considers if an existential 
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CHAPTER ONE: BEING  
1.1 Introduction 
In Paradigm Two, the ontological foundation of learning identified as the learner’s a priori 
spiritual state is considered a pedagogical priority. The learner is at the centre of all learning. 
Therefore, epistemology and more significantly truth gained from external sources are placed 
as secondary. As such, meaning making is personalised and truths are constructed in the light 
of the learners’ own personal spiritual experience and awareness. In the Literature Review 
this is evidenced particularly in the thinking of Brendan Hyde (2008) and Rebecca Nye (2009), 
each of whom write in response to the more historical assertions of religious philosophers 
such as William James.63  Furthermore, the co-authored work of David Hay with Rebecca Nye 
evidences the influence of Twentieth Century German philosopher Martin Heidegger (Hay and 
Nye, 2006: 134). Hay and Nye consider that spiritual education uncovers the ontological 
dimension that is already present in learners’ lives and they identify this dimension as Being.64 
Therefore, in this perspective of Christian education, the educator first serves to identify the 
learner’s prior spiritual state and from this, promote personal learning that is inspired by 
Being.  
           In Heideggerian philosophy, when Being is considered as the starting point for learning, not 
only is education concerned with meaning, it is also concerned with the meaning of the 
learner who is indeed the meaning of Being. This is an existential perspective, the principles of 
which it is argued, must be understood before being applied as a perspective in Christian 
education.65 The current chapter aims to undertake this task.66 Through an outline of 
Heidegger’s philosophy of Being as presented in the text Being and Time (1962), the nature of 
the learning individual is explored. Furthermore, the themes of existence, possibility and 
authenticity are addressed in terms of the relation of learning to the learner as well as the 
process of learning. The discussion here also reflects on how Being provides the opportunity 
for the priority of potentiality, and critically assesses the role of the world and others in a 
learning individual’s existential education. 
                                                          
63 See page 30. 
64 See page 34. 
65 This is the case in several examples within Paradigm Two.  
66 The aim of this chapter is to underpin the recognition within Paradigm Two, of Being as an     




           It is important to note that Heidegger’s philosophy not only concerns Being as an ontological 
state, but the question of the meaning of Being that belongs to all entities (Heidegger, 1962: 
38). Thus, whilst it also has implications for epistemology, moreover it implies that meaning 
and truth are already within Being. In this chapter, it is noted how this is problematic for an 
educational context that aims to nurture learners in a Christian life of faith and the discussion 
highlights several issues that have not necessarily been recognised by the Christian scholars 
who promote such a perspective. This further underlines the assertion made earlier that the 
seemingly innocuous method of placing of a learner centre stage might illuminate 
philosophical problems. To that end the inadequacies of some Paradigm Two perspectives are 
highlighted, indicating the need for a new perspective and therefore the outcomes of this 
thesis.  
           1.2 Background  
           For Heidegger, all learning is concerned with the meaning of existence (Heidegger, 1962: 25). 
Existence begins and ends with the Being that belongs to entities (Heidegger, 1962: 29). 
Spiritual education then is authentic when it takes place through the Being that belongs to the 
learner. In the context of the basic state of what Heidegger names Being-in-the-world 
(Heidegger, 1962: 90), authentic learners are never separated from their own potentiality-for-
Being (Heidegger, 1962: 167), or possibility. As a state of openness, potentiality-for-Being is 
always ahead of itself; however, to ensure that learning is personal and not standardised, it 
simultaneously comes back to its own potentiality-for-Being within temporality (Heidegger, 
1962: 388). 
           To that end, there is no ‘other.’ Indeed, here the influence of other pertains to inauthenticity 
and is rejected (Heidegger, 1962: 154). As learning is a movement of Being, there is no 
relation to investigate. There is no gap to overcome; neither is there any middle space in 
which to explore the mediation of knowledge and knower.67 Learning rather takes place 
through the inquiry into the meaning of Being. As learners consider the meaning of their Being 
as inquirers (Heidegger, 1962: 26-7), they simultaneously are the Being of the inquiry and the 
meaning of Being. 
           These propositions will be explained more fully later in this chapter; nevertheless, it is 
important to note at the outset that Heidegger’s philosophy is neither dialogical nor dialectical 
therefore does not seek any solution to the issue of dualism. It does not look outside of Being 
                                                          
67 This is a concept explored more fully in Chapter Three onwards. 
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for truth. This is illuminated further by a consideration of the historical context of Heidegger’s 
work: therefore, a brief overview is provided now in order to contextualise the philosophical 
ideas presented later in this chapter. 
           1.3 Context 
           Heidegger’s early writings range from papers written in the period of the First World War to 
the text significant to the current discussion: Being and Time. Although it is a substantial work, 
Being and Time was developed behind the scenes over a number of years through lectures 
and seminars and was produced almost ‘on demand’ in 1927 (Krell, 1978: 16-7). This text 
includes the proposal that philosophy requires a new method of inquiry. This inquiry into how 
human Being is perceived and understood has re-imagined philosophy. For example, his 
publications include a critique of the knowledge-theory paradigm of Descartes and those of 
his ‘school’ (Krell, 1978: 9) that prevalent at the time, concerned subjective representation. 
Although Heidegger claims that in the light of the maxim ‘cogito ergo sum,’68 Descartes ‘is 
credited with the departure point of modern philosophical inquiry,’ he nevertheless calls for a 
new priority for the ‘I’ that thinks and argues that it is not until the nature of Being has been 
determined that subjectivity can claim authenticity (Heidegger, 1962: 72). 
           Re-imagining the meaning of phenomenology, already understood in Hegelian terms as the 
means of coming to absolute subjectivity, Heidegger proposes that phenomenal methodology 
should proceed not ‘to’ an end result but take place within ‘the immediate awareness of 
existence’ (Gelven, 1970: 35). He also challenges Hegel whose systematisation of Spirit is 
antithetical to his view that Spirit is multi-various and incomplete (Krell, 1978: 11). Writing in 
opposition to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology (albeit having been mentored by 
Husserl), Heidegger rejects the notion that the individual mind contains a priori symbols, 
contents and attributes that are directed at objects in order to make meaning (Dreyfus, 1991: 
3). Additionally, in reaction to neo-Kantian ideas, he posits that it is human existence that 
provides meaning rather than knowledge and intuition, transcendence or categories of 
thought. 
           Rejecting epistemology as the foundation of learning, the problems of logic for Heidegger 
must be dealt with not in the mind but in a trans-logical context (Krell, 1978: 11). In a 
commentary entitled Being-in-the-world (1991), Hubert Dreyfus describes Heidegger’s stance 
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more specifically. He identifies how Being and Time highlights the deficiencies of the 
philosophers of thought, claiming that they ‘misdescribed and misinterpreted human Being’ 
(Dreyfus 1991: 1). For Heidegger, there is no such thing as ‘coming to know’ 69 and any 
approach to knowledge such as the Hegelian system that accepts division or circularity 
(Heidegger, 1962: 27), begins from a false premise. To put it simply, (and as also reflected in 
perspectives within Paradigm Two), rational objective truth is in error. 
           Heidegger’s alternate proposition claims that knowledge of an entity or phenomenon is 
already manifest as its possibility (Heidegger, 1962: 33). Possibility is otherwise termed 
potentiality-for-Being (Heidegger, 1962: 136). In order to make sense of things, learners must 
consider pre-ontology which involves ‘asking about the nature of this understanding of Being 
that we do not know’ (Dreyfus, 1991: 3). When learning takes place through the Being of the 
learner, knowledge equates to Being. This then avoids the means by which the learner might 
‘fall’ into the world of definition (Heidegger, 1962: 219). Instead Beings learn through their 
own potentiality-for-Being that is existentially Being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1962: 78). 
           Epistemological divisions concerning the relation of the knower and known are thus rendered 
as inauthentic. Tubbs suggests that the attraction of Heidegger’s thinking for education is its 
opposition to any project that ‘knows in advance the ends or truths it must achieve’ (Tubbs, 
2005: 132). For the teacher who values open-endedness in learning, this position combats the 
‘seemingly closed and totalising narrative of the Enlightenment model’ and their philosophies 
of thought (Tubbs, 2005: 133). Learning through awareness rather than ascertaining absolute 
knowledge becomes the most appropriate form of education and this is certainly resonant of 
the literature of Paradigm Two.70 
           From this historical starting point, the philosophical notion Being as presented in Being and 
Time is now outlined to address the issue of authenticity included in the primary research 
question.71 Key themes such as essence, potentiality, possibility, ontology and authenticity are 
considered philosophically and their influence within the Christian spiritual education of 
Paradigm Two is noted. 
           1.4 Being 
                                                          
69 This phrase is resonant of ‘coming to faith’ first introduced on page 16. 
70 See pages 29-33. 
71 The primary research question is: How can a new perspective of Christian education inspire learners 
to an authentic life of faith? 
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           The entity who ‘is’ at the centre of educational inquiry is the learner. Yet for Heidegger, the 
task of defining authentically what is meant by ‘is,’ is an impossible task. The more significant 
undertaking, as has already been identified, is to give an ontological answer not only to the 
question of what the Being of the learner might be but also to the question of the meaning of 
the Being which belongs to all (Heidegger, 1962: 27). In this way Being equates to authenticity 
in education and inspires a perspective that considers how learners become transparent in 
their own Being. 
           In the first place Being is designated as essence or Being-as-it-is. It therefore cannot be 
defined or described (Heidegger, 1962: 67). It is the prior and uncontingent state of Being that 
belongs to all humans. Negating the need to be brought into form (Heidegger, 1978: 220) or 
subjective representation, essence provides the starting point for the existential analytic 
which moves the inquiry forward. The manner of Being which the learner possesses is termed 
Dasein (Heidegger, 1962: 32). Dasein, which etymologically means ‘being there’ (Heidegger, 
1962: 27) is the a priori condition of humanity. Being primordial it exists before one’s 
understanding of one’s self as an entity. It also understands itself as its own possibility for 
existence; possibility ensures it has no definition, does not include fixed ideas, and neither 
requests nor offers any desirable outcomes. Indeed, there are no limits to what it can 
become. Since it includes Being (essence), its hallmark is its ‘Being to be’ (Heidegger, 1962: 
33). As such, the way in which each Dasein exists establishes the foundation for an authentic 
understanding of self which is reflective of one’s own essential state and the possibility of the 
self that it inspires. 
           Heidegger asserts that Dasein is the possibility of all ontologies (Heidegger, 1962: 34). It is 
therefore pre-ontological. With this he promotes a wider view of ontology than that offered in 
Paradigm Two. For instance, Brendan Hyde describes ontological spirituality as a ‘reality’ that 
‘belongs to every human Being’ (Hyde, 2008: 14). This notion of ‘reality’ however is 
antithetical to Heidegger’s position of possibility. From an Heideggerian perspective, ‘reality’ 
suggests that whilst a priori, ontology also exists in the realm of consciousness and thus is 
‘ready to hand’ (Heidegger, 1962: 225). This is both inauthentic and closed to possibility. 
           Acknowledging pre-ontological Dasein as possibility rather than reality provides the 
foundation for the identification of Being as a state, rather than ‘a being’ as an entity. As each 
Dasein is distinctive and to each individual learner, when expressed, the learner becomes 
resolute as a unique and therefore authentic demonstration of Being. Accordingly, the 
possibility that Dasein expresses from its essential state ensures that the learner does not 
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become a determinate entity, but Being towards his or her own potentiality-for-Being 
(Heidegger, 1962: 236). As Heidegger writes, ‘we have no right to resort to dogmatic 
constructions and to apply just any idea to Being and actuality to this entity’ (Heidegger, 1962: 
37). 
           As Dasein contains the possibility of Being as it ‘chooses’ itself (Heidegger, 1962: 68), it is 
therefore inclusive and has no boundaries in terms of how a human Being can develop 
(Heidegger, 1962: 34) or indeed learn. This is important for pedagogy. In colloquial terms, the 
learner’s essence is a blank canvas from which Dasein issues forth its potentialities. Thus, 
spiritual learning involves the continuation of learners’ own potentialities in what they create, 
understand or become. Dasein represents one’s understanding of learning reflected 
ontologically upon the way it is interpreted (Heidegger, 1962: 303) and as such gives 
philosophical validation to the open-ended educational methods promoted by scholars in 
Paradigm Two. Spiritual education concerns who learners can be instead of what information 
or knowledge they can gain (Heidegger, 1962: 236). 
           The basic state of Being is revealed as Being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1962: 78). This state is 
prior to Dasein but locates Being in a wider context, considering the Dasein of others and 
acknowledging its own place in history. As stated earlier, Heidegger’s philosophy does not 
acknowledge a gap between self and other; the ‘world’ as presented here is not a defined 
space nor is it concerned with corporeality and physical encounter (Heidegger, 1962: 79). 
Rather the ‘world’ and therefore the Dasein of others, is understood as the open-ness of 
Being (Heidegger, 1978: 252). This is a non-physical realm which allows for entities to dwell 
alongside each other (Heidegger, 1962: 80). It also allows Dasein’s potentiality to become 
manifest: not spatially but factically (Heidegger, 1962: 82).72 However ‘Being- in -the-world’ is 
a state of Dasein which is necessary a priori but not sufficient for completely determining 
Dasein’s Being (Heidegger, 1962: 79). 
           When founded on Being-in-the-world, Dasein is free for its own possibility: it has a choice. This 
choice might be aligned with the choice required by Tacey’s students presented earlier.73 In 
Heidegger’s phenomenology, Dasein can be authentic or inauthentic. One choice is to be ‘in’ 
the world tangibly; with this choice Dasein positions itself ‘towards the world’ and in turn 
relates to it in its ‘everydayness’ (Heidegger, 1962: 86). It can come to ‘know’ entities in the 
                                                          
72 Facticity is an Heideggerian term describing knowledge of the self as grounded in Being (Heidegger, 
1962: 82).                                                                                                                                                                                           
73 See page 35. 
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world as facts and objects but these are not experienced ontologically (Heidegger, 1962: 84): 
rather they are provided externally. ‘Knowing’ the world factically then establishes a 
relationship between knower and known which subsequently leads to separation (Heidegger, 
1962: 114-19). Heidegger posits that when boundaries between entities are established, the 
interpretations of knowledge provided do not necessarily represent existentially the meaning 
of the Being of the entity but include the mediation of knowledge which leads to error. 
           When conforming to the world in such a way that it evades its self, Dasein becomes 
inauthentic. According to Heidegger, such an entity has ‘fallen’ (Heidegger, 1962: 220). 
‘Falling’ occurs when Dasein is ‘not itself’ (Heidegger, 1962: 151). Having chosen to ‘know,’ 
Dasein loses its possibility and is cut off from its primordial relationship of Being-in-the-world. 
It is then considered as Being-towards-the-world, rather than Being-in-the-world. Heidegger 
embraces what these terms mean in the phrase ‘average everydayness’ (Heidegger, 1962: 
225). In everydayness, inauthenticity adheres to others in a way that does not represent true 
Dasein. Here Dasein has fallen away from itself; it is no longer about Being but is an entity that 
has become. It is also about being ‘enlightened about oneself' and concerning the fixed and 
definite rather than possible and potential, it pertains to ‘knowing it all’ (Heidegger, 1962: 
222). 
           The others who compromise Being’s authentic state are named ‘the they’ and represent all 
that is public and ‘average.’ They make Being manifest as ‘average everydayness’ (Heidegger, 
1962: 225); that is in relation to 'the they,' what is revealed as an entity or as knowledge 
becomes a thrown projection of Being that exists without Dasein’s ‘Being to be’ (Heidegger, 
1962: 33). It might be argued that 'the they' are made manifest as corporate organisations, 
religious or political movements, or indeed the participants of Paradigm One. However, 
Heidegger notes that ‘the ‘they’ cannot necessarily be described or correlated with specific 
peoples or organisations (Heidegger, 1962: 165-6). The entities or knowledge they reveal are 
those which are seen, accepted, interpreted and understood in the realm of public discourse. 
Being is no longer possibility but conformity; all entities look and behave the same and aspire 
to the same levels of success (Heidegger, 1962: 164). 
           On the other hand, when Dasein chooses to acknowledge Being-in-the-world ‘as it is’ 
(Heidegger, 1962: 84), existence becomes an open question (Heidegger, 1978: 238). This 
choice is for authenticity: the authentic character of Dasein is grounded a priori upon the state 
of Being which is Being-in-the-world. The world then is not a place for definitive ways to be or 
behave, or beliefs to be held. Any projection of Dasein takes place in the open space between 
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Beings in a shared existence: not in a subject/object separation. Therefore, identity and 
relationships are not factual or present-at-hand but understand all Beings as entities with 
their own potentiality (Heidegger, 1962: 87). 
           The notion of ‘falling’ is illustrated in a more contemporary context by Clive Erricker. In his 
early chapter in the text Reconstructing Religious, Spiritual and Moral Education, Erricker 
equates ‘falling’ with error in his appraisal of traditional religious education methodology. He 
criticises teachers who draw on the objectivity of doctrinal claims to establish truth and 
argues that whilst they purport to ratify them as authentic by locating them in an historical 
and theological context (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 47), this actually equates to 
inauthenticity.74 He argues that this method, which involves bypassing the Being of the 
individual in the process of learning, ‘puts the idea of spiritual education in great danger’ 
(Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 47.) The potentiality of the learner’s Being is halted by the 
universality of what he or she is to come to know. By presenting an alternative non-
indoctrinatory pedagogy that places the individual at the centre of learning, Erricker seeks to 
prevent learners from falling into the error of accepting objective truth claims (Erricker and 
Erricker, 2000: 47). He also aims to devolve control in learning. 
           As described by Jack Priestley in the introduction to same text, both Clive and Jane Erricker 
represent ‘a long thin line of minority protest’ against spirituality ‘delivered as abstract 
knowledge’ (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: x). Priestley, on behalf of Erricker and Erricker notes 
that for children, such education is ‘no help to them in living out their personal lives’ and 
proposes that ‘children are perfectly capable of being active participants in their own social 
and spiritual education (Priestley, 2000: x).  Erricker continues with the claim that ‘the 
epistemological framework we adopt tends to be determined by the outcomes we wish to 
achieve’ (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 47). Therefore, he suggests that when objective 
knowledge is embraced by individuals and pertains to that which is accepted, unquestioned 
and publicly interpreted, control is maintained on the part of educators.75 His mission is to 
address the error of such a method which (in Heideggerian terms) reflects the ‘falling’ of 
spirituality as potentiality, into ‘the they.’ 
           In a second example, David Tacey similarly criticises ‘educational authority’ where methods of 
teaching involve the transmission of information rather than the transformation of the learner 
                                                          
74 Erricker and Erricker argue that Christian educators such as Andrew Wright are guilty of inspiring 
spiritual ‘falling’ and might be described as examples of ‘the they’ (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 47). 
75 The issues of power and control in education are explored more fully in Chapter Four.  
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(Tacey, 2004: 59). Again, religious education systems are cited as the others who allow 
authenticity to be divorced from the learning process. In his research, he ascertains that 
young people consider that spiritual education should be a ‘journey into hidden depths and 
self-discovery’ (Tacey, 2004: 59). However, he points out that for many, religious education 
conceals their own spiritual identity and in this way they experience ‘falling.’ He writes: 
‘religion is dogmatic and external to our lives. It imposes laws and rules upon us without 
enquiring into the nature of the self that it is transforming’ (Tacey, 2004: 37). He also argues 
that religious education cares less for the lives of the learners and their ‘little stories’ (Tacey, 
2004: 37) than maintaining its own ‘eternal validity’ (Tacey, 2004: 33). Instead he proposes 
that education should draw out what is within, fusing the Being of the learner with the 
learning process and that spirit, also integral to the learning process, be free for its own 
possibility: ‘diverse, plural and manifold’ (Tacey, 2004: 38). 
 
           Instead, a pedagogy that is founded on the learner’s own self and discovers ways of 
empowering the ‘deeply felt impulse that is the innate spirituality of children’ (Hart, 2003: 
173), allows educators ‘to let their authentic or spiritual voices be heard’ (Bosacki, 2001:163). 
Here the authentic learner does not look outside of Being for its truth. The truth of meaning 
begins and ends with the Being that belongs to the self. The authenticity of the learner is a key 
theme and is explored further now. 
           1.5 Authenticity 
           As described in the Literature Review, both paradigms address the issue of separation. For 
educators rooted in the Augustinian tradition, the ontological separation between God and 
man brought about by sin is overcome through repentance and redemption; these actions 
signal the beginning of a life of faith. Epistemologically, thought is in opposition to truth 
(Tubbs, 2009: 42). Hence knowledge of God is gained only when one overcomes the claiming 
of self, the material and the physical as sources of truth. Turning to accept the meta-physical 
God as truth (Tubbs, 2009: 47), the gap between the material and non-material is transcended 
and the location of spiritual truth is identified as beyond that which can be rationalised 
empirically or corporeally. Therefore, practices such as prayer and meditation are encouraged 
to allow the learner to enter this spiritual dimension. 
           For existential scholars, the situation is reversed. As the ontological supposition is of 
connectedness, there is no need for overcoming. As noted above, the theory of ‘relational 
consciousness’ prioritises the child’s innate spiritual sensibilities (Hay and Nye, 2006: 114) to 
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inspire a ‘new dimension of understanding, meaning and experience’ (Hay and Nye, 2006: 
109). This begins with the self. For other scholars such as Hyde, spiritual understanding is self- 
constructed and is posited in contrast to forms of learning that require a transformation of 
mind and soul. Being is brought to, and is integral within, the learning process (Hyde, 2008: 
74). 
           Whilst the notion of ontology as recognised above is important in this second paradigm, 
Heidegger throws more light on this philosophically and identifies how Being cannot be fully 
understood or drawn into learning until the question of its meaning is asked. He writes: ‘To 
work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity, the inquirer, transparent 
in his own Being’ (Heidegger, 1962: 27). This concerns the authenticity of the learner. The 
question of Being then begins with the entity who has Being (Heidegger, 1962: 25). Inquiry 
into Being is the behaviour of the questioner who has his or her own character of Being. 
Dasein is the way in which Being is accessible to the learner and is the possibility of what he or 
she can become. As potentiality-for-Being, it is also the possibility of the outcome of 
questioning. As stated above, it expresses the possibilities that issue from its essential state. 
The Being of the learner is both the possibility of the question which is the meaning of the 
Being of existence and of the outcome which is the possibility this affords. 
           In educational terms, the teacher not only creates the conditions in which the individual’s 
Dasein allows for existential inquiry but also promotes the possibility of truths that shape the 
beliefs and values that he or she comes to live by. The answer to the question of the meaning 
of Being is the Being of that individual in his or her own potentiality. As learning inspired by 
Dasein pertains to Being, it negates the need for external authority figures; in fact, these 
figures are considered an infringement on the individual’s rights to autonomy and voice 
(Hyde, 2008: 120). This notion is problematic for Christian spiritual education and a 
consideration of concerns will be outlined later in this chapter.  
           The idea of the self-construction of truth is reflected in Jane Erricker’s contribution to Erricker 
and Erricker’s co-authored text. Here she posits that true knowledge is not something ‘out 
there’ but a personal narrative gained ‘as a result of the stories we tell ourselves about our 
experiences’ (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 108). To that end pedagogy should not be a process 
that is enforced onto learners but one that is defined by themselves. As her argument is that 
in spiritual and moral development there is no ‘end’ point, it can only be the self in relation 
with the self of others that can uncover and construct spiritual truth (Erricker and Erricker, 
2000: 110-11). This relationship is similar to that described by Heidegger as ‘Being-in-the-
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world’ (Heidegger, 1962: 78). ‘In’ does not concern a relation of proximity (Heidegger, 1962: 
79) but an existential state of encounter. As self and other are not ‘alongside’ each other 
ontically but ‘in-the-world’ together existentially, there are no borders and consequently no 
separation. Potentiality-for-Being is constantly outstanding (Heidegger, 1962: 373) and as 
learner and meaning are never clarified it pertains to the issue of the ‘not yet.’.   
           Jane Erricker proposes the idea that spiritual education should allow individuals to construct 
their own biographies in an open-ended way. Her method of ‘narrative involvement’ pertains 
to reflexivity, thinking and expressing oneself in the light of moral rules or imperatives 
(Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 139). Meaning which is made in the light of experience is never 
completed. Thus ‘others’ (or ‘the they’) can never have the upper hand. This idea of 
incompleteness in learning, as well as the nature of the learner, is reflected in Heidegger’s 
notion of ‘care.’ 
           1.6 Care 
           From its essence and acknowledging Being-in-the-world as its basic state, Dasein’s Being is 
revealed authentically through ‘care.’ It might be suggested that care is the form of Dasein 
that reveals who a person is. However, it is not ‘reality’ as Hyde suggests nor does it reflect 
any representation of Dasein made manifest externally. Heidegger writes that care is that 
which possesses the shape of ‘man’ 76 (Heidegger, 1962: 241) and ‘that to which human 
Dasein belongs for its lifetime’ (Heidegger, 1962: 243). 
           In care, the learner has potentiality for the sake of Dasein as it is. But it is also self- projective 
and when Dasein is described as being ‘ahead of itself in care,’ the individual becomes Being 
towards his or her own potentiality-for-Being (Heidegger, 1962: 236). Again, this does not 
reflect a determinate entity but in this case it is possibility a priori; that is, it is embraced as 
possibility before the recognition of its projected self. Furthermore, as a totality it is ahead-of-
itself-in-Being-already-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1962: 237). The thrown projection of man in 
care might be considered to represent the learner who is ‘I’; nevertheless, this expression of 
self is not an inauthentic representation of one who has ‘fallen’ but one whose Dasein is 
authentically ahead of itself. 
 
           Care is also the existential-ontological condition of the self which is free for authentic 
existential possibilities. It is the self that is constantly in a state of ‘not yet’ and this underlies 
                                                          
76 The specific designation of gender reflects Heideggerian usage rather than any priority on the part of 
the current author.  
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all actions and phenomena, both pertaining to learning and personal growth. Dasein is 
constantly outstanding therefore sustained in its own temporality it concerns ‘becoming’ (as a 
continuous verb) rather than a fulfilling of the present (or what one becomes). It is always 
already ahead of itself. In fact, it is only death that makes Dasein manifest in its own self. In 
Being-towards-death, this possibility discloses to Dasein its ultimate potentiality (Heidegger, 
1962: 374). 
 
           When Dasein reveals itself as care, disclosure occurs. Disclosure is also described as Dasein 
being ‘cleared,’ in which Being becomes an issue for the entity in its ‘there.’ In care, Dasein is 
disclosed to its own authentic Being and becomes available to itself. In so doing it ‘breaks 
down the disguises which bar Dasein’s own Being’ and draws on its own pre-ontological way 
of interpreting Being (Heidegger, 1962: 168). Thus, the disclosure represents an authentic 
expression of Dasein. Authentic disclosure is also described as ‘resoluteness’ which is the 
truth of Dasein (Heidegger, 1962: 343). In this respect it equates with freedom. Dasein ‘frees 
itself for its world’ and so is allowed to become its own potentiality-for-Being; it also allows 
others to realise their potential which is co-disclosed primordially (Heidegger, 1962: 344). 
Dasein projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown. Being ‘resolute’ avoids 
‘falling’ into ‘the they’ and while such disclosedness cannot avoid ‘actuality,’ it ensures that 
Dasein discloses what is factically possible (Heidegger, 1962: 346). 
 
           Disclosure reveals entities as discovered already: entities here refer to both the learner and 
learning who are simultaneously in existence. What is disclosed is what is learnt through the 
existence of the learner. This then introduces the notion of temporality to Being. Authentic 
disclosedness challenges the way in which the ‘world’ (or knowledge) is discovered. Care is 
always ahead of itself Being already in, and Being alongside. But when care is disclosed, this is 
Dasein as it has been. Having been does not mean ‘before,’ but when Dasein is projected, or 
revealed, existentially it is ‘as it is’ having been already revealed (Heidegger, 1962: 376). 
 
           Dasein is ahead of itself in care. It is free to be projected upon objects of concern (the 
everyday), to be made present and encountered ready-to-hand. Resoluteness, which is the 
truth of Dasein, prevents Dasein from ‘falling;’ it brings Dasein which was ahead of itself in 
care back into its own potentiality-for-Being. Therefore, it is ahead of itself projected but also 
having been, comes back to its a priori state to ensure that care is authentic. This coming back 
is described as a ‘coming-towards-oneself out of the current possibility as which one’s Dasein 
exists’ (Heidegger, 1962: 385). Resoluteness brings Dasein back from ‘falling’ into an authentic 
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expression of how it is revealed in its ‘there’ (Heidegger, 1962: 375). It concerns not the ‘now’ 
of the present but is constantly concerned with its own potentiality. 
 
           As intimated above, care is also concerned with anticipatory resoluteness which is Dasein’s 
Being-towards-its-end. Only in death is resoluteness the authentic disclosure of what it can 
become (Heidegger, 1962: 353). Therefore, Dasein’s primordial potentiality-for-Being is Being-
towards-death, and existence involves the anticipation of this absolute resoluteness. Death is 
the only absolute, the only certainty: the possibility of the impossibility of existence 
(Heidegger, 1962: 354). In death, resoluteness discloses the truth of existence. As will be 
examined in due course, this for Heidegger was an essential belief, which also reveals the 
darker side of his philosophy in which mastery is made manifest as ultimacy.77 
 
          ‘Care’ clarifies the difference between Hyde’s view of reality and Heidegger’s view of existence, 
suggesting what the roles of learner and educator might entail. When the starting point is ‘I’, 
and ‘I’ is taken to be an entity, it is to ‘presuppose too little’ (Heidegger, 1962: 363) about 
Being. On the other hand, when the starting point is existence and the understanding is 
Dasein itself, existentially learning and Dasein are never kept apart. Therefore, there can be 
no presupposition of reality. Throughout the whole learning process existence is present, 
ahead of itself in care and Being-towards its ultimate potentiality in death. ‘Care is therefore 
the condition for the possibility of an existential potentiality-for-Being’ (Heidegger, 1962: 
365). The educator’s task is to provide this condition. 
 
           Within Paradigm Two an example of how this might be put into practice is illustrated by Daniel 
Scott, for whom spiritual education pertains to the ambiguous, uncertain and complex. Like 
Erricker and Erricker, Tacey, Hart and Hyde, he favours de-centring in order for spirituality to 
be open and flexible (Scott, 2001: 120). Drawing on the potentiality of the lives of learners and 
using narrative as a method of allowing for their spiritual expressions, he illustrates how 
educators can provide an ‘indeterminate’ and ‘open’ space for ‘voicing lived experience which 
is not dependent on external evidence or objective detail’ (Scott, 2001: 120). Proposing that 
the unencompassed (possible) remains unencompassed, teachers are warned against making 
their own judgements on learning (Scott, 2001: 112). Instead he proposes that each should 
                                                          
77 This is reflected in the suggestion of Heidegger’s commitment to the Nazi party between 1933 and 
1945 and his view of the resoluteness of Dasein being illustrated in the quest for the freedom of the 
German ‘volk’ (Tubbs, 2005: 134-5) through the death of the other. 
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allow for an understanding which is ‘mutually evolving,’ being willing to ‘attend to something 
in its own right’ (Scott, 2001: 127). 
           This is reflected by Tubbs who in Heideggerian terms, suggests that authentic care takes place 
when the educator allows the learner to develop his or her existential potentiality-for-Being. 
Tubbs suggests that the spiritual educator’s role is ‘not to fill students with knowledge but to 
let them learn, and most importantly, to let them learn learning itself’ (Tubbs, 2005: 132). For 
pedagogy, this considers allowing for the autonomy of the spiritual learner for whom meaning 
is intrinsically determined, as well as acknowledging the provisionality and potentiality of all 
knowledge. The spiritual teacher allows for the uncovering of Dasein and provides the 
conditions in which learning can take place authentically as care. Care comes into its own 
when both teacher and learner devote themselves to learning determined by their own 
Dasein (Tubbs, 2005: 133). The spiritual teacher consequently inspires freedom. 
           1.7 Critique 
           In Heidegger’s philosophy, education is decentralised. His notion of Being-in-the-world 
ensures that learning is local, organic and located within the self. His pedagogy of care 
ensures that the learning process is ongoing, fluid and provisional (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 
109-13), and this allows for potentiality-for Being. Therefore, Being is never separated from 
learning and education takes place ‘from the ground up’ (Copsey, 2005: title page). As has 
already been indicated, resonances can be identified with certain perspectives within 
Paradigm Two, in which scholars prioritise the learner in learning and allow for personal 
meanings to be made.   
           However, it might be argued that problems become evident when scholars adopt 
Heideggerian concepts to frame pedagogy. As noted at the outset, when scholars’ applications 
of these concepts are not fully understood or indeed authentic to the Heideggerian ideals of 
Dasein and care, difficulties occur. Heidegger’s philosophy as presented in Being and Time is 
extremely complex. Without an understanding of the whole thesis, it is easy to take ideas out 
of context and thus offer them in error. Furthermore, as highlighted earlier by Tubbs (Tubbs, 
2005: 132), being attractive to teachers and scholars who aim to evade a totalising 
perspective in education, it is easy to adopt aspects of Heidegger’s theory to support one’s 
own argument. In the critique that follows, concerns regarding the Heideggerian influence on 
perspectives in Paradigm Two are highlighted, not least the proposed misrecognition of this 
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philosophy by scholars and the perceived error of positing such an existential perspective as a 
priority.  
           In the Literature Review it was identified how Hay and Nye make reference to Heidegger in 
order to identify the a priori nature of spirituality in accordance with their own work.78 In The 
Spirit of the Child, they highlight how spiritual learning is primordial, prior to both the 
‘discursive intellect’ and to ‘the disclosure that we are already immersed in Being’ (Hay and 
Nye, 2006: 134). These points highlight the assumption that spirituality is ‘prior to’ other 
aspects of a learner’s life and as such suggest a progression from the state of Being to an 
awareness of spirituality that thus inspires spiritual knowledge. According to Hay and Nye, this 
spiritual knowledge, albeit often corporeal or non-cognitive, is the outcome of an education 
grounded in Being (Hay and Nye, 2006: 134). However, it might be suggested that this process 
is also resonant of the ‘coming to know’ that Heidegger aims to avoid. As highlighted above, 
even intuitive knowledge is deemed inauthentic by Heidegger, thus inspiring the need for an 
existential perspective,79 and as his philosophy does not anticipate any outcome, the results of 
spiritual development pertain to the ‘reality’ that is closed to possibility and is ‘ready to hand’ 
(Heidegger, 1962: 225). 
 
           Furthermore, Hay and Nye do not outline what they mean by Being or indeed describe 
Heidegger’s existential phenomenology in their text. Neither do they recognise that Dasein is 
pre-ontological and therefore requires an inquiry into the meaning of Being before any 
consideration of learning is made. Their progression acknowledges Being’s essential state, but 
fails to recognise that knowledge is always and already manifest in its potentiality-for- Being 
(Heidegger, 1962: 33), rather than the result of the disclosure of Being. For Hay and Nye then, 
there is a telos. For Heidegger however, there is no progression ‘from’ and ‘to’ and 
subsequently there are no outcomes.80 It might be suggested that to promote such a 
progression as posited in The Spirit of the Child is to lead the learner into ‘falling’ and 
therefore inauthenticity.  
 
           Hay and Nye also misrecognise disclosure. In Heideggerian philosophy the disclosure of care 
does not involve the revealing of spiritual ‘knowledge’ that has already involved Being: to 
reveal would also lead Dasein to inauthenticity. Here, knowledge lies in the realm of 
                                                          
78 See page 34. 
79 See pages 48-9. 
80 See page 48.  
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representation 81 and therefore error. It is the disclosure of the Being of the learner that is 
itself the truth. In care, Dasein is disclosed to its own authentic Being and becomes available 
to itself (Heidegger, 1962: 168). To be authentic to this phenomenological philosophy then, 
the scholar must work backwards to locate the manner of Being that is the Being of the 
learner and forwards to identify how this manner as the potentiality for learning manifests 
itself as learning as possibility, not knowledge. The disclosure of Dasein, ahead of itself in care 
does not pertain to an uncovering of what is already there in order to be disclosed as 
meaningful learning. Rather, learning as the disclosure of Dasein is Being.  
 
           Whilst the difference between Heidegger’s philosophy of Being and the notion promoted by 
Hay and Nye is subtle, it is no less significant. As cited above, for Heidegger there is no ‘other.’ 
Dasein is both Being and potentiality-for-Being. In the backwards and forwards movement of 
potentiality and care, the priority of Being eradicates the need for anyone or anything from 
whom it is existentially separate. Hence, the significance of the learning environment is 
minimised, as are both the roles of the teacher and the religious context in which learning 
occurs. As knowledge that is inspired by ‘the they’ pertains to all that is standardised and 
equal (Heidegger, 1962: 165), 82 it is clear that in adopting an Heideggerian pedagogical 
perspective, educators must refrain from any intervention, and likewise direct learners away 
from embracing truths that are commonly presented and agreed.   
 
           Furthermore, when disclosure reveals the simultaneous existence of both the learning and the 
learner, and therefore considers any represented knowledge to be in error, the aim of 
nurturing a spiritual life of faith as considered in this thesis, is irrelevant. As suggested by Hyde 
in the Annual Godly Play annual lecture (2013), in such a situation only the learners know 
what is being unfolded to them through spiritual experience: it is not for the teacher to find 
out. Yet if one is to apply this perspective to Christian education, this idea renders it 
impossible for educators to recognise the development of faith in learner’s personal lives and 
raises the question of what such learning is for.83 
 
           It might be argued then, that in the application of Heideggerian perspectives to their own 
thesis, Hay and Nye misrecognise this existential philosophy; as such their promotion of a 
spiritual pedagogy founded on Being is groundless. One might question in fact whether they 
intend to promote a perspective of education that has no external demonstration (as their 
                                                          
81 Representation is explored more fully in Chapter Four.  
82 See page 52. 
83 This critical point for faith development is considered in more depth in Chapter Five. 
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thesis is drawn from the verbal responses of children) and it must be considered whether the 
disclosure of Being can actually contribute to authentic spiritual learning. It must also be 
considered how such Heideggerian perspectives have value for church leaders and learning 
individuals exploring faith, and particularly in avoiding falling into inauthenticity, one must ask 
if eschewing the influence of ‘the they’ is appropriate or indeed ethical. 
 
           Each of the questions posed above highlight the necessity of scholars and educators in 
Paradigm Two to think more intentionally about the implications of applying an existential 
perspective in Christian spiritual pedagogy. They also highlight again the need for a new 
perspective that is aware of the risk. This idea will be explored in chapters that follow, 
particularly in terms of the notions of faith and learning. Whilst a pedagogical perspective of 
possibility is attractive to the more experiential scholar and practitioner, the implication of the 
loss of ‘other’ for authenticity must also be re-considered; hence the following chapter will 
consider the relationship between the learner and learning as well as the learner and various 
contexts of ‘other.’ Material pertaining to Kierkegaardian philosophy will also address this, 
signposting wider conclusions that re-define the relation of self and other in learning, as well 
as this relation in relation to the absolute.84 
 
           A second example of misrecognition is noted in the writing of Australian scholar Wynn 
Moriarty. As a teacher of religious education and student in the arena of children’s spirituality, 
Moriarty draws on Heidegger to support her claim that learning equates to Being. She 
purports that for this philosopher, Being equates to self-realisation: a reflection on ‘what it 
means to be me’ (Moriarty, 2014: 19). She also refers to the self as a continuing identity who 
is ‘I’ and that it is this ‘I’ who is at the centre of spiritual development. This ‘I’ is a subjective 
learning self. However, again it might be argued that she misrecognises both the role and 
nature of the learner and as such places a definition on Being. As indicated at the beginning of 
this chapter,85 Heidegger’s writing was positioned in response to philosophers who claimed 
the truth of subjectivity; he aimed to avoid definition. In his philosophy, the nature of Being 
must be understood before the learner can be considered as ‘I’ (Heidegger, 1962: 72) and this 
inquiry is missing from Moriarty’s proposition.  
 
           Also, whilst understanding the learner to be a continuing identity in a state of ‘not yet,’ 
Moriarty identifies the student as he or she who is self-sufficient 86 and through the disclosure 
                                                          
84 This material occurs for example in Chapter Five.  
85 See pages 48-9.   
86 Self-sufficiency is explored further in Chapter Three. 
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of self, attains self-realisation. However, this is again antithetical to Heidegger’s premise of 
possibility. Rather, the essence of Dasein is the possibility of its ‘Being-to-be’ (Heidegger, 
1962: 33) and this avoids definition or any form of conclusion. Whilst being an expression of 
one’s Being in possibility, Dasein, does not equate to identity, not least the concept of ‘I.’ 
What is disclosed in care is not a determinate entity representing the individual who learns, 
but the Being who is the meaning of Being. This individual is his or her own potentiality-for-
Being. Without any inquiry into the meaning of the Being of the learner, and how this is made 
manifest ahead of itself in care, one limits the understanding of oneself as the learner and in 
turn the possibility of what can be learnt.  
 
           Additionally, Moriarty’s idea of placing the student in the centre of learning actually separates 
the learner from learning. The ‘I’ who learns is involved in spiritual development but this ‘I’ is 
not the projection of Dasein, but the self-that, through definition, has fallen. Heidegger’s 
learner, who is potentiality-for-Being, is also the potentiality of what is learnt. Learning and 
the learner are the same. What is disclosed in learning is what is learnt through the existence 
of the learner. As Moriarty’s notion of spiritual development also suggests learning as a 
progression rather than the disclosure of Being, she again does not provide an authentic or 
full understanding of care. Continually in a state of potentiality-for-Being, Heidegger’s Dasein 
has no proposed telos. The only realisation of Dasein comes at the point of death.87  
 
           Learning through existence it might be argued then, promotes a perspective that serves to 
validate itself. To that end, there is again no need for ‘other’ and the individual who 
authentically learns, avoids falling into the influence of ‘the they.’ It must again be asked if 
such a perspective is appropriate for Christian education. As suggested in the introduction to 
this thesis, the aim of the current discussion is to explore a new perspective that is authentic 
to both the learning individual and the Christian faith; as an active Catholic practitioner, one 
must wonder if Moriarty actually intends to exclude the influence of the religious tradition in 
the way that Heidegger’s philosophy implies, and one must consider the implications for 
students and teachers who do adopt these suggestions.  
 
           Finally, misrecognition is also illustrated by Brendan Hyde. The way in which he misrecognises 
Heidegger’s thesis is in his equation of essence ‘as it is’ (Heidegger, 1962: 37) with the ‘here 
and now’ of experience (Hyde, 2008: 52). For Hyde, essence equates to immediacy and in his 
text Children and Spirituality (2008), he suggests that this pertains to immediate bodily 
                                                          
87 See page 58. 
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experiences that bypass the intellect and thus inspire spiritual awareness. Spiritual awareness 
inspires personal reflections that lead to the creation of meanings made in the light of the 
experience. To illustrate this, he presents a series of vignettes that describe ordinary 
experiences that might be considered to have spiritual value.88 Hyde suggests that each 
experience such as play, showing empathy and asking questions, heightens the individual’s 
awareness of the affective dimension of Being and thus contributes to spiritual learning 
(Hyde, 2008: 13-4).  
 
           However, corporeal awareness is no consideration for Heidegger.89 His philosophy is more 
concerned with possibility and with essence as the pre-ontological state of Being that is the 
inspiration for Dasein. As stated above, essence is the starting point for the inquiry into the 
meaning of Being and forms the basis for all ontologies and as such, existential education; 
however, it has no definition. Whilst the participants in Hyde’s activities become more aware 
of themselves as the potentiality for spiritual learning, this awareness again includes an 
understanding of the self as a subjective entity. For Hyde, the immediate experience is an 
entity ‘in itself.’ It is personal and has meaning only to the individual. However, meaning 
making based on this experience pertains to the inauthentic disclosure of the entity that is 
subsequently self-realised and thus defined. In Heideggerian terms, anything in-itself limits 
possibility.90 Whilst essence is an undefined and unmediated state of Being, as will be 
explained later, the ‘in itself’ actually pertains to objectivity. It might be argued then that in 
his misrecognition of Heidegger, Hyde promotes a view of learning and truth that he in fact 
aims to avoid.  
 
           Additionally, as highlighted in the article ‘Beyond relation: a critical exploration of ‘relational 
consciousness for spiritual education’ (Wills, 2012: 50-60), published in the International 
Journal of Children’s Spirituality, the notion of immediacy is problematic for existential 
education.  Spiritual immediacy suggests an immediate relation between the individual and 
the experience encountered in the learning environment. However, as the self-realised 
individual is separated from the experience in order to reflect on it, it is no longer immediate 
but mediate, pertaining to representation, and as will be explored in Chapter Two, illusory 
truth (Wills, 2012: 54). In this case, Hyde’s presentation of an Heideggerian perspective is also 
illusory and must be considered critically. In exploring a new perspective of Christian 
                                                          
88One example is the story of a child being ‘in the moment’ as he plays on a swing. 
89 See pages 51-2. 
90 See pages 51-2. 
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education, it is highlighted here that the critical issues raised in this chapter signpost further 
philosophical investigation and the role of mediation in learning is considered in Chapter Two.  
 
           In the light of the critique above, it is argued then that Christian educators must be cautious 
when encouraging the promotion of personal reflections on experiences and deeming them to 
be true. These truths, whilst being created by learning individuals in the context of real life, 
are considered as truth ‘in-itself.’ For the current thesis, this is problematic. In misrecognising 
Heidegger’s thesis, Hay and Nye, Moriarty and Hyde promote perspectives that undervalue 
the Christian tradition and are thus at a tangent to the aim of inspiring a life of faith within 
this tradition. It is the conjecture here that such misrecognition and the lack of criticality 
regarding these views in available literature puts learning as well as the learner in Christian 
education at risk of becoming its own truth. It is suggested that to draw on such a 
philosophical rationale to support an existential perspective in learning without undergoing a 
full and critical exegesis of concepts is both inadequate and problematic.  
 
           For example, problems arise concerning agency and personalised meaning-making. Introduced 
in the Literature Review and reflected in Moriarty’s claim presented above, agency inspires 
individuals to become the directors of their own learning. In Heideggerian terms, the 
potentiality of Dasein opens up the possibility of all ontologies, and in evading the ‘falling’ that 
results from representation, the Being of the learner is disclosed as the authentic meaning of 
Being. The role of the educator then is not to teach but to provide the conditions for this 
disclosure. As identified above, there is no relation of self and other, and as such personal 
learning is self-validated.  
 
           The problem with this is that self-validated meanings, such as those also encouraged by 
Erricker and Erricker as well as Hyde, Nye and Privett, are groundless. The foundation of belief 
within the Christian religious tradition is eluded leaving personal truths deficient of any moral 
or doctrinal framework. Whilst one’s Being is intrinsic to the process of coming to truth, it 
must be acknowledged that for Heidegger, Being is the truth. Being therefore potentially 
allows for the acceptance of meanings that might be unethical. The potentiality of Dasein, 
when having chosen authenticity, allows for creative possibility. However, without an agreed 
moral code or framework for right decision making, one might question by what criteria 
something is determined as ‘right.’ If creative possibility allows for a learner to determine 
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meaning that is for example against British Values,91 or from a Biblical perspective the Ten 
Commandments,92 implicit within this is the potential to cause both good and harm. If 
anything is possible, then the possible can become anything.  
           Another problem concerns the evasion of thought. Hay and Nye, Moriarty and Hyde all 
promote a pedagogical perspective that prioritises non-cognitive spiritual awareness rather 
than the acceptance and application of agreed truths such as ‘The Four Points’ presented in 
the Literature Review.93 As will be outlined in Chapter Two, freeing itself from thought, 
including the evasion of dogma and tradition, self-validated truth in turn creates its own truth. 
Furthermore, eschewing thought consciousness has the potential to inspire learning that is 
nebulous and unclear and this again being groundless has the potential to promote ambiguity, 
uncertainty and insecurity.  
 
           Tubbs reminds his readers that by eschewing the role of thought of consciousness in favour of 
the more authentic Dasein, Heidegger placed the meaning of Being within its own Being and 
its own time. This perceived authenticity was allowed to establish itself in opposition to those 
deemed to be inauthentic, and this is reported to have had unethical consequences.94 This 
illustration reveals the horror of the error of spirit being the Being of the question and the 
question of the Being (Tubbs, 2005: 135). Therefore, there must be a framework to keep this 
in check and at this stage of the thesis, this perceived error highlights the need for a 
perspective that acknowledges a middle space between the learning self and religious or 
moral frameworks.  
 
           The middle space highlights the relation of the learner to the contingent influences such as 
history and tradition deemed by Heidegger as ‘the they’ and accords them educational 
                                                          
91 ‘British Values’ is a term used in schools in England and Wales to define behaviours of tolerance and 
acceptance. The values are: democracy; the rule of law. individual liberty; mutual respect for and 
tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs and for those without faith. 
www.doingsmsc.org.uk/british-values/  
accessed on 11/10/16. 
92 See Exodus 20.  
93 See page 16.  
94 An argument exists that equates Heidegger’s notion of the freedom of Being with support for 
National Socialism in Germany in 1933-45. In his text ‘Martin Heidegger: A Political Life’ (Ott, 1993), 
Hugo Ott suggests that Heidegger’s ideas that ‘the beginning continues to be’ and that Being is revealed 
in its origins, validated the movement of ‘inner truth and greatness’ brought about by the rise of 
National Socialism in the period up to and including World War Two (Ott, 1993: 22). The notion of that 
essence of truth determined from the beginning was disclosed as the inevitable truth of this new era 
justified the claim to authenticity and whilst the activities of this movement are now vilified, it is 
claimed that Heidegger considered this disclosure to be a sense of humanity ‘emerging into a new 
reality’ (Ott, 1993: 23-5).  
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significance. Therefore, and as will be explored in due course, it might be suggested that it is 
relation, rather than Being, that is the starting point for a perspective in Christian education 
that inspires an authentic life of faith. As indicated again in the article ‘Beyond relation,’ it 
must be considered that thought consciousness, in the middle space, cannot be avoided in the 
construction of meaning. As such, the mediation that Heidegger considers leads to error,95 
comes to have an educative role (Wills, 2012: 55).  Although experiential aspects of learning 
seek to transcend thinking, thought consciousness will always play a part in all forms of 
learning and as such must now be embraced.  
 
1.8 Conclusion 
           In conclusion, whilst Heidegger’s philosophy overturned epistemological tables and 
considered the gap between learner and learning to be obsolete, it is proposed that for a 
perspective of Christian education that aims to inspire authentic faith, this is a problem. It is 
argued here that to adopt an Heideggerian perspective, as have a number of scholars in 
Paradigm Two, is actually an error. However, the critique above recognises several 
pedagogical principles that whilst not necessarily existential in the Heideggerian sense, 
highlight aspects of learning that are significant.  
           For example, Hay and Nye, Moriarty and Hyde all present learning as a progression that from 
Being to an awareness of spirituality, stimulates the creation of spiritual knowledge inspired 
by reflection on experience. This reflection, which acknowledges the separation of the learner 
and learning, includes Being as the potentiality of learning but also draws on the contingent 
influences provided by the external world, including wider society and culture.96 This 
separation does not promote the dualistic positing critiqued in the Literature Review; rather it 
concerns the diremption that considers the self to be in a dialectic relation with ‘other’ and 
facilitates the opening up of the middle space within which mediation takes place. As 
suggested above, mediation here does not inspire the creation of truth as error, but allows for 
a dynamic learning relationship of self and ‘other’ to be identified. The progression also 
suggests learning to be an intentional movement. Within this movement there is a telos; the 
telos of the current thesis is the promotion of an authentic life of faith.  
           These points presented above are all resonant of an Hegelian philosophical perspective. 
Whilst Hegel’s ‘system’ has already been highlighted as one example of the philosophers of 
                                                          
95 See page 52. 
96 See Hyde, 2008: 51. 
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thought that Heidegger sought to oppose, his phenomenology represents a movement of 
learning that not only acknowledges the significance of ‘other’ but in fact considers the self to 
be in ‘other.’  Hegel also presents a different view regarding error and deeming the positing of 
both objective and subjective truth to be error (or illusion), his philosophy highlights the 
necessity of an individual recognising the illusion of the illusion. Therefore, the significance of 
Hegel’s work for this thesis is in its view of relation and in turn the idea of the middle space. 
As Hegel presents the idea that there exists a third or middle way in which the other is 
critically acknowledged, the gap between self and other is recognised as the locus of authentic 
learning and this as such renders the existential perspective inadequate.  
           In the following chapter, an exploration of Hegel’s dialectical view of learning assesses how 
relation is important in the consideration of a pedagogical process; in the journey towards 
absolute knowledge, the discussion re-evaluates not only the relation of the individual with 
the Christian tradition, but also highlights the significance of the relations between the learner 
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CHAPTER TWO: SELF AND OTHER 
           2.1 Introduction 
           This chapter, which draws on Hegelian philosophy, presents a deeper assessment of the 
problems raised at the end of Chapter One and considers in more detail the nature of the 
relation of self and other.97 The perspectives presented here draw on a very different 
philosophical system to the one outlined above. Whilst Hegel’s system is included amongst 
those Heidegger was working against, the elements of Hegelian philosophy identified in this 
chapter serve to continue to problematize not only a pedagogy of possibility, but also the 
dualistic positing that inevitably occurs when any context or tradition is negated.  
           Most notably through Hegel’s text Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel, 1977), the significance of 
relation for education is considered. An engagement with this text frames a more detailed 
analysis of the status of self and other in each of the paradigms introduced in the Literature 
Review; within this analysis, the discussion explores the nature of both objectivity and 
subjectivity in learning and highlights the significance of their relation in ‘coming to know.’ 98 
This chapter also features further philosophical reflection on themes already introduced. 
These include illusion 99 and misrecognition,100 immediacy 101 and mastery.102 Considering the 
nature of knowledge and the issues that arise when considering learning as a process,103 the 
thesis also considers the importance of the middle space. Finally, it is acknowledged contra 
Heidegger, that when located within this middle space, contingency and mediation become 
significant factors that contribute to a challenging and life giving process of education that, 
one could argue, pertains more fully to authenticity. 
                                                          
97 In this chapter, the word ‘other’ will not be marked by punctuation. In Chapter One, the use of 
inverted commas indicated the marking out of those who, for scholars in Paradigm Two, do not 
represent an authentic expression of spiritual Being. In Chapter Two, self and other are considered 
equally, therefore do not need further demarcation.  
98 The phrase ‘coming to know’ suggests a process of education that results in represented knowledge. 
Having identified that it is resonant of the term ‘coming to faith’ (see page 16), it is noted here how 
Heideggerian philosophy is antithetical to such a process. In Chapters Four onwards this term will be 
used more frequently, particularly in exploring faith as a movement and considering the nature of 
knowledge in this dynamic process of learning.    
99 See page 39. 
100 See pages 60-4.  
101 See page 64.  
102 See page 23. 
103 This reflects the progress of learning intimated in the writings of Hay and Nye, Moriarty and Hyde, as 
outlined at the end of Chapter One.  
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           An historical introduction to Hegel’s work sets the scene for an exegesis of his Phenomenology 
of Spirit (1807;1997), and highlighting the significance of Hegelian philosophy to the current 
thesis, this chapter identifies key themes for learning. It is important to note however that the 
new perspective of Christian education proposed here is not Hegelian per se. The themes 
addressed in this chapter continue to critique the perspectives of Paradigms One and Two. 
Signposts to later chapters are also presented, and these contribute to the further exploration 
of the nature and roles of self, other and relation in Christian education. In addition to each of 
the paradigms indicated, self and other are considered here primarily in terms of the learner 
and learning, including the relation of the learner with ‘God’ and each of these relations are 
considered in terms of the relation of relation. 
           2.2 Background  
           Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit was first published in 1807. It was considered a ‘voyage of 
discovery’ (Hyppolite, 1974: 3) that along with the text Logic (Hegel, 1830; 1975), presented 
his system of mind. In this system, sense-consciousness, otherwise described as the ‘obvious 
content’ of immediate knowledge (Findlay, 1977: vi), progresses from its essential beginning, 
through a recurring stream of events, towards the ultimate telos that is absolute knowledge 
(Findlay, 1977: v). This thought-advance involves the dialectical movement of two forms of 
self-consciousness; more complex than the progression highlighted at the end of Chapter 
One,104 the events of self-consciousness that lead to absolute knowledge include the loss of 
self to other and the subsequent return to self. Here thought is continually put to work and 
through the movements of negation, mediation and return, each mode of self-consciousness 
undergoes philosophical scrutiny within a cyclic system. 
 
           Through the presentation of a number of shapes and scenarios, this system outlines how one 
learns. Sense-certainty, perception, understanding, reason, ethics, religion and art are all 
examples of the different scenarios and each is considered in turn. As following negation each 
partner returns to the self, consciousness proceeds to the next scenario and the process 
continues. Ultimately, ‘through a completed experience of itself,’ and the awareness of what 
self-consciousness ‘really is in itself’ (Hegel, 1977: 49), the learner comes to absolute 
knowledge. It is important to note that whilst aspects of the Phenomenology might seem 
repetitive, this in fact represents the cyclic process. Here the events of negation and return 
                                                          
104 See page 60. 
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are considered repeatedly, each time outworked in different terms and contexts, until 
knowledge is finally understood as absolute.  
 
           Unlike that of Heidegger, Hegel’s educational process embraces separation: that is, it 
exemplifies the diremption of self-consciousness into self and other. However, it is not 
dualistic. As will be outlined shortly, Hegel’s ideas indeed consider dualism to be both illusion 
and error. The view of self and other as essential entities is also considered illusory. Rather 
than prioritising each mode of self-consciousness as an entity in-itself, the dialectic framework 
allows each to understand the truth of self only in terms of the other.  
 
           The dialectical nature of Hegel’s system places it opposite the view prevalent in Western 
philosophy at the time, that truth is separate from thought. For example, Hegel counteracts 
the Kantian concern that considers cognition as independent knowledge. According to Kant, 
any representations or appearances of such knowledge are contingent on sensible intuition 
(Kant, 1997: 178). Thus, objects of truth when apprehended in space and time, are only 
objects as they appear to the learner (Kant, 1997: 177); therefore, the reality of the object is 
only real as much as it is represented in consciousness. This view suggests that what is to be 
known exists prior to one’s learning of it. Here an object of truth is unconditional: it is devoid 
of content or knowledge and as an entity in itself, is unattainable by human cognition. As the 
identity of the thinking individual represents the negation of objective truth, subjectivity is 
thus perceived as illusory. As well as making a distinction between the learner and the content 
of learning, it is held that truth gained through experience is in fact an error (Tubbs, 2009: 
120).  
           The implication for Christian education is that metaphysical cognitions such as God, freedom 
and immortality exist beyond the sensible world; therefore, what can be taught or learnt 
regarding these is limited to what reason is able to grasp. This pertains to both reductionism 
and illusion. As well as being an illusion of objective truth, sensible intuition in consciousness 
can also deem the object in-itself illusory (Kant, 1997: 183). Hence, representation of truth 
incites error; in that respect, representations of God as presented for example through the 
Four Points of Paradigm One,105 are also illusory, therefore in error.  
           In Logic, Hegel’s educational process locates truth within rather than external to 
consciousness (Hegel, 1975: 4). As such, the absolute is not beyond knowledge but is ‘self- 
knowledge in the knowledge of consciousness’ (Hegel, 1975: 7). What is known as a result of 
                                                          
105 See page 16.  
72 
 
learning is mediated in what is experienced. Knowledge can no longer be considered as 
objective truth in-itself but only true in its relationship with other (Tubbs, 2008: 2).106 Albeit 
within consciousness, Hegel also posits pure subjectivity as illusory. As the Phenomenology 
ensures the recognition of illusion through illusion, illusion is not deemed negative as in the 
Kantian sense: through the dialectic, thought can learn about itself through its own illusion of 
itself. Therefore, it might be proposed that learners might accept the critical partnership of 
illusory truth and thought in order to identify a new way to learn. Explored in more detail later 
in this chapter, this idea illuminates the significance of the current thesis, and considers how a 
new perspective of Christian education might embrace the notion of illusion as a pedagogical 
tool. 
           In addition to Kantian philosophy, the dialectical nature of Hegel’s system places it at odds 
with the perspectives of scholars in Paradigm Two. As already noted, the telos of Hegel’s 
system is the absolute knowledge that evidences the absolute recognition of each mode of 
self-consciousness as complete in the other. However, this telos does not lead to unification; 
it therefore cannot be equated (for example) with the view of Australian educator Marian de 
Souza, introduced above,107 for whom the telos of spiritual education is ultimate unity (de 
Souza, Cartwright and McGilp, 2004: 170). de Souza et al promote the idea that spiritual 
development might be represented as a continuum, inspired by everyday experiences and 
continuing towards ultimate unity with ‘Other.’ She describes such unity as the ability of an 
individual ‘to identify with and feel as one with the Other in Community, in Creation and the 
Cosmos, and perhaps with a Transcendent Other’ (de Souza, Cartwright and McGilp, 2004: 
170). As stated above, this might concern the unity of learning and the learner, including the 
relation of the learner and ‘God.’ However, for Hegel this suggestion is implausible; there 
must be a middle space. It is what is ‘between’ partners that has value for learners.  
           As subjectivity is opposed by Heidegger,108 no expression of self or ‘other’ that is recognised as 
an entity in-itself can be acknowledged as authentic. However, Heidegger does not negate a 
sense of otherness; his sense of otherness is part of the clearing of Being that is Being-in-the-
world (Heidegger, 1962: 78-80). In existential philosophy, expressions of Dasein and relations 
that incite separation from essence are considered to contribute to ‘falling’ into 
inauthenticity; yet within the realm of Being-in-the-world, the open-ness of Being (Heidegger, 
                                                          
106 Examples of ‘other’ might include the tradition or the teacher, or as purported by Hay and Nye’s 
theory of relational consciousness, the categories of world and other people (Hay and Nye, 2006: 116).   
107 See page 28.  
108 See page 48. 
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1978: 252) that exists before the disclosure of Dasein, allows for the Being-alongside of the 
Dasein of others. This means that self and others can correspond. This of course is not the 
ultimate unity of Marian de Souza, but it does signify that in the open-ness of Being, there are 
no boundaries between entities.110 The open-ness is more a spiritual resonance than a 
relation, and might be considered reflective of Martin Buber’s notion of I-Thou (Buber, 
1970),111 or the four categories of ‘relational consciousness’ (Hay and Nye, 2006: 109).112 
           Nevertheless, Hegel is explicit that his phenomenology is not ontological or even pre-
ontological. There is no Being without relation: anything that exists without relation is 
‘reduced to vacuity’ (Hegel, 1977: 9). Therefore, to claim that learning and the learner are 
one, is an error (Hegel, 1977: 14-5). Rather, Hegel’s interest is in the individual’s relation with 
the object of knowledge as a universal; in a bid to move beyond self-sufficiency and 
individualism, he transcends subjectivity. In this way, he avoids limiting authenticity in 
learning to what is experienced by the individual.  
           He also considers Spirit, the means by which learners learn, to be beyond the immediacy of 
faith (Hegel, 1977: 4). Spirit is thus more than simply a dimension found within every human 
being (Hay and Nye, 2006: 63), or an ‘ontological reality for human beings’ (Hyde, 2008: 29); 
for Hegel, the role of Spirit is to give ‘insight into what knowing is’ (Hegel, 1977: 17).  As the 
self has truth only in relationship with the other, Spirit is epitomised in the work of each in the      
cyclic movement of negation, loss and return. As a consequence, Spirit might be considered 
the third partner in learning. This idea also has implications for new theory and will be 
outlined in later chapters of the current thesis.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                          
110 This might concern a lack of boundaries between learning and the learner or even the teacher and 
learner. 
111 Buber’s I- Thou (1970) was written in contrast to the ‘modern mode of individualism brought about 
by the alienation of the self from its primarily ontological dialogical situation (Rotenstreich, 1991: 26). 
In this text, the self is signified by two relationships: between I-Thou and I-it. The ‘it’ world is concerned 
with experience therefore limited by time and space, objects and form (Buber, 1970: 61). On the other 
hand, I-Thou, existing between the self and other i.e. other humans, nature and spiritual beings (Buber, 
1970: 56) ‘has no borders’ (Buber, 1970:55). Being non-objectified it can only be spoken with one’s 
whole being (Buber, 1970: 54). As a spiritual relationship presented as one of giving and receiving, it is 
not defined or understood. It can neither be thought or described.   
112 In The Spirit of the Child, Hay and Nye use the same patterning as Buber in order to describe each 
context of relation. For example, they identify an ‘I-God’ relation (Hay and Nye, 2006: 109). The use of 
the hyphen signifies the child’s awareness of him or herself as subject in relation to ‘other’ but it also 
illuminates the non-cognitive element of spiritual relation, in which learners are able to perceive the 
world in relational terms. The self is not an entity in-itself. It only has value in relation. This relation, 
they propose, is the ‘core of children’s spirituality, out of which can arise meaningful aesthetic 
experience, religious experience’ (Hay and Nye, 2006: 109).  
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           The aim of Hegel’s philosophy then might be to describe how Spirit as an instrument of 
learning brings one to come to know an object or entity in question as absolute. It is within 
the process of learning that Spirit acts. In the light of the research question, which considers 
how an individual might learn authentically, it is necessary to retrieve the relevant aspects of 
this complex theory in order to address the issues of knowledge and truth in a Christian 
context, and in particular consider again the role of the individual in relation to learning. 
Hegel’s system takes the form of a dialectical movement of consciousness and this is outlined 
now, initially in the light of Science of Logic and subsequently Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Secondary sources written by Nigel Tubbs and Gillian Rose also identify key themes for 
contemporary education and further critique highlights again the necessity of a new 
perspective for Christian education.   
           2.3 Consciousness: objectivity 
           Hegel’s philosophy explores the movement of loss and return between two modes of self-
consciousness.113 This is presented initially in the early part of the Phenomenology, in the 
section entitled ‘Sense-certainty.’ It is not the content of knowledge that is significant here, 
but the nature of knowledge and the means by which it is attained. The first mode of 
consciousness is that which is in-itself and considered to be unconditional truth. It is 
knowledge which is ‘as it is.’ It is objective, universal and pure. The other is that which is for 
itself: the natural self-consciousness or individual. This consciousness strives for self-
actualisation and concerns one coming to know truth subjectively and within experience 
(Hegel, 1977: 61; 64). 
           As stated above, in metaphysical philosophy any entity, notion or truth posited in-itself is an 
abstract universality. In Science of Logic, Hegel highlights how this Universal114 has knowledge 
of Spirit and knowledge of itself as Spirit but is not known in its purest form outside of itself 
(Hegel, 1969: 70). He writes: ‘it is the unity of being and nothing’ (Hegel, 1969: 73). This 
Universal however is an absolute beginning (Hegel, 1969: 67; 70) and it is from this beginning 
that consciousness embarks on the learning cycle. Hegel proposes that in the journey to 
absolute knowledge there must be other. Knowledge is not for itself but for the learning 
                                                          
113 It is possible to draw parallels between each mode of consciousness and each paradigm presented in 
the Literature Review. In the current chapter, both paradigms are critiqued in the light of Hegelian 
philosophy.  
114 The use of the capital ‘U’ in the word ‘universal’ pertains to the designation of the term as an entity 
(e.g. a Universal or the Universal). When the lower case is used, this designates ‘universal’ as a 
description or concept. It is its designation as an entity that in this thesis is considered illusory.  
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individual in relation to it. As soon as the relationship of truth and thought (or learning and 
the learner) is established, the truth of the Universal is alienated from itself and brought into 
negativity (Hegel, 1969: 71-2). It is this negation that constitutes the loss: loss of pure 
objectivity and therefore the loss of the power of the in-itself. The Universal becomes posited 
immediately, meaning that it becomes ‘known.’ It is no longer in-itself, but ‘at one with its 
self-alienation’ (Hegel, 1969: 69).  
           Self is lost to the other. It now becomes both truth for consciousness and consciousness of 
itself. In its negativity, knowledge becomes contingent on the knower and as Tubbs suggests, 
‘self has exported its vulnerability’ (Tubbs, 2008: 29). But rather than perceiving negativity as 
problematic, this promotes the value of negation for education. Whilst the truth is the 
opposite of the truth the Universal assumed for itself, negation lays the ground for authentic 
learning (Tubbs, 2008: 29). Tubbs writes: ‘the self is indebted to this other for his own 
identity’ (Tubbs, 2008: 30). This will be considered again later in this chapter.  
           This new identity results from mediation. Since the individual is in relation with the Universal 
(Hegel, 1969: 68-72), the consciousness of the individual mediates for its truth. Yet still 
existent as Universal, knowledge of it is reflected back. When reflected back to self, it is not 
the truth of the Universal ‘as it is’ that is apprehended: rather it is the mediated truth (Hegel, 
1977: 58-61). Hegel writes: ‘knowledge of the Universal only comes to us through the world of 
appearance which has mediated it’ (Hegel, 1977: 89), highlighting mediation as facilitating a 
revised version of truth. The return ensures that the subjective truth is also negated; thus, 
knowledge of the Universal is not eschewed but re-evaluated.  
           As well as through mediation, the pure state of the Universal is negated in the light of the 
contingent dimension of the learning individual. Contingent truth is truth as ‘I’ know it (Hegel, 
1977: 61). Hegel asserts that contingent truth is ‘untruth in perceiving it’ (Hegel, 1977: 70) and 
as Tubbs points out: ‘truth itself is compromised by its contingency upon social and political 
preconditions’ (Tubbs, 2005: 83). Therefore, contingency allows for both interpretation and 
misinterpretation in the light of the learner’s own personal history and context. These become 
the lenses through which the object of truth is apprehended and as it is an object for 
consciousness, it becomes ‘my meaning’ that is reflected back. The Universal which is ‘for us’ 
does not surmount to knowledge of the universal reflected into itself, but the negated 
representation of that which is in-itself reflected back. This does not make the object untrue 
as a universal, but highlights the individual’s apprehension of it as a significant factor in 
learning (Hegel, 1977: 70).  
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           This has implications for Christian pedagogy especially since in the case of Paradigm One, 
representations of truths concerning the Universal are often presented as fait accompli. As 
stated in Chapter One, it is not the task of this thesis to criticise the Christian faith or its 
framework of belief. Nevertheless, the issue here is to do with how knowledge of ‘God’ as a 
Universal for example is represented and attained. In the light of what has been presented of 
Hegelian philosophy so far, it might be suggested that any representation that does not take 
into account the contingent life of the learning individual, might in fact surmount to 
misrepresentation; furthermore, any truth attained might surmount to untruth.  
           Concerns regarding representation might be raised in the light of the work of, for example, 
Andrew Wright, champion of a doctrinal education grounded in Trinitarian Christian 
Spirituality and a prominent figure in Paradigm One.115 For Wright, the truth of the Christian 
tradition is unquestionable and fixed. The story of God is presented through the infallible 
metanarrative of doctrine and scripture; authentic faith is found not through self-reflection on 
a God who is within, but in dependence on a God who through Christian tradition is revealed 
as truth (Wright, 1998: 72). Wright argues: 
           The affirmations of the creeds give a systematic formulation to a realistic narrative story 
grounded in the objectivity of the divine reality and of God’s providential plan for 
humanity through creation, redemption and reconciliation (Wright, 1998: 74). 
           Additionally, Mark Griffiths, also introduced in Chapter One,116 describes the story of salvation 
for children’s workers. Outlining how, in contrast to a pure and loving God humans are sinful 
and deserving of eternal punishment, he explains how educators might bring children to the 
point of accepting a life of faith. However, it might be argued that a life of faith here concerns 
the apprehension and acceptance of his own representations of truth. He emphasises that 
through Christ who took the punishment on himself, all are able to receive forgiveness for sin. 
Therefore, he encourages them to respond to this ‘good news’ in order to become Christ’s 
followers (Griffiths, 2003: 51-5). Yet the implication for learners is that in order to become a 
Christian they must follow a pre-ordained set of instructions and images. The response is of 
the head and seemingly bypasses the child as a learning individual.  
           It is suggested then that the perspectives of Christian education highlighted, which facilitate 
this pre-ordained trajectory, serve as agents of reductionism and potentially limit the means 
by which learners come to faith.  In this case, it is only the learner in relation with the model 
                                                          
115 See pages 15 and 30. 
116 See page 17. 
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or method that encourages faith development and salvation rather than, as will be explored 
later in this thesis, the absolute. Models vary across denominations and agencies but in many 
cases, they follow a similar pattern: learners hear a message and are given a chance to 
respond. Examples of models include beach missions, holiday clubs, and school groups 117 as 
well as Sunday Clubs and Messy Church.118   
           As much as the thinking of Wright and Griffiths presented here pertains more to ideology than 
methodology,119 their ideas are applicable to these models. Both apply a pre-determined label 
and means of interpretation to a universal concept. Representation of this concept is 
contingent on the assumptions of the teacher and this is passed on to the student. Biblical 
hermeneutics also reflect a Western and therefore linear mode of learning and as located 
within a specific time and space, such a perspective can engender culturally specific 
responses. The journey to salvation as described above and represented by the Four Points 
outlined in Chapter One,120 reflects the formulaic response to the Christian story that has 
become an accepted part of Christian rhetoric. Yet the story of the Bible is not limited to a 
simple formula. For critical scholars such as John Pridmore, the formulaic approach cannot 
become the singular means of any learning individual experiencing a life of faith. As 
highlighted above, for Pridmore, the life of faith pertains to a ‘continuous now’ (Pridmore, 
2009: 197).121 
           From a Hegelian perspective, it might be argued then that the perspectives highlighted here, 
whilst purporting to present objective truth, only reflect the truth as the teacher has taught it; 
understanding also pertains only to the learner’s acceptance of what has been taught (Hegel, 
1969: 75). In this case, it might be suggested that such a description of God is not a 
manifestation of God’s essence but a representational positing: it is an external depiction and 
a mere name. As noted through Rizzuto’s work in the Literature Review, to provide a ‘one size 
fits all’ image of God to learners without taking into account their own image might be to set 
up an unhelpful division.122 Hyde also goes as far to suggest that this does violence to learner’s 
own ideas and is an infringement on their rights (Hyde, 2008: 120).  
                                                          
117 www.scriptureunion.org.uk and www.urbansaints.org  accessed on 10/10/2106. 
118 www.messychurch.org accessed 10/10/2016. 
119 Neither Wright nor Griffiths write with a particular model in mind. Wright’s ideas are more 
concerned with ethos in education, whilst Griffiths presents educational principles to be worked out in 
general practice.  
120 See page 16 www.the4points.com/uk accessed on 23/03/2016 
121 See page 21. 
122 See page 43.  
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           Furthermore, the mystery of the Gospel story that concerns the redemption of all people here 
is reduced to a linear conceptualisation that must be grasped cognitively and empirically. As 
will be outlined in Chapter Five, this conceptualisation is antithetical to the means by which 
Kierkegaard for example considers both the representation of the absolute and the 
experience of the life of faith. This idea also signposts new theory and highlights the need for 
a new perspective that whilst remaining authentic to the Christian faith tradition, is not 
limited by a formula or illusory conceptualisations. This idea will be considered in more detail 
in Chapter Three.  
           In summary, without acknowledging the contingent ‘I’ of each learner, or the consideration of 
culture and context as key factors in learning, educators misrecognise the reality they seek to 
present. As already suggested, the presentation of this ‘reality’ or universal is not the reality 
as it is in-itself, but a mediated reflection contingent on the individual and therefore an 
illusion. A further illusion is the immediate consciousness of the learning individual, and this is 
considered critically in the following sub-section.  
           2.4 Consciousness: immediacy 
           Hegel posits immediacy as the ‘poorest truth’ (Hegel, 1977: 58). Here immediate knowledge 
amounts to Being and as an object in its entirety, its truth is the truth of its being and nothing 
more. Therefore, it can only be apprehended - not comprehended (Hegel, 1977: 58). This 
notion is reminiscent of the existential analytic presented in Chapter Two (Heidegger, 1962: 
27) and certainly scholars in Paradigm Two would concur with this suggestion. For example, 
Rebecca Nye’s idea of ‘God’s ways of being with children and children’s ways of being with 
God’ (Nye, 2009: 5) is highlighted as an immediate expression of ‘I – God’ (Hay and Nye, 2006: 
109) that having an ontological foundation, is also apprehended – not comprehended. Yet not 
being comprehended, this immediate knowledge might be deemed as groundless. Bypassing 
thought-consciousness, it has resonance with the learning individual but nothing more, thus 
questioning the aim of such an assertion in the promotion of a life of faith.  
           However, the significance of Hegel’s perspective here is in the role of thought - consciousness. 
As highlighted above, as soon as one thinks, a separation is established between Being and 
consciousness. The thought dimension of self-consciousness alienates itself from immediacy 
in order to recognise and come to know itself. Through the presence of this consciousness 
which is other, the negation of Being and the mediation of immediacy then become a 
necessity. In this cycle of negation, mediation and return to self, truth is presented as a 
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property of consciousness (Hegel, 1977: 61) and not within Being. Drawing on Nye’s example 
of an immediate apprehension of God, as soon as consciousness becomes alienated from 
Being, this apprehension becomes illusory. The relation is no longer immediate and therefore 
is also illusory.  However, as has already been noted, in a new perspective of learning, illusion 
might become a pedagogical tool.123 
           When considered immediate, only a limited idea of God is perceived. ‘God’ is only God in 
relation to the immediate apprehension. This, it might be argued, has political power as the 
truth it conceives is removed from any absolute truth and so can be used to undermine any 
dogma or truth considered externally. Furthermore, the idea of immediacy is reductionist. The 
effect of placing the Universal (i.e. God) in the realm of the individual promotes an immediate 
universality. As will be illustrated in more detail later, when the universal is negated in favour 
of the individual, the individual takes on its own universality. Thus, the image of God is truth 
for the individual learner, but puts the individual at odds with the object in-itself that was 
negated, and consequently the religious framework of which it is a part.124 
           By negating the inherited image of God, Nye as a Christian educator increases the likelihood 
highlighted in Chapter One, of possibility becoming its own truth. It might also be suggested 
that this notion is antithetical to Christian education. It becomes clear that the child’s 
recognition of God is actually a misrecognition of the Universal and true only for self. This 
differs from individual to individual but when reflected back to the immediacy of the relation 
it can become accepted as universal truth. Thus, it is not only immediacy here that is 
questionable but also the learner in relation to learning that is under suspicion. 
           It is clear therefore that in each form of consciousness and thus both paradigms, the 
representation of truth and the means by which truth is established are open to critique. Due 
to the relation, immediate knowledge of the Universal becomes mediated knowledge and 
cannot be represented truthfully; objective truth can neither be accepted as fait accompli 
without a consideration of the contingent ‘I’ who establishes the thought relation. The value 
of mediation and contingency however is significant to the new perspective and as will be 
explained later, in the middle space between learning partners, both contribute to the 
individual’s education. 
                                                          
123 It might be considered that the space occupied by consciousness is the place of creativity, 
imagination and emotion. 
124 This idea will be explored further later in the thesis in terms of Kierkegaard’s idea of faith, and a 
more detailed appraisal of ‘representation’ is featured in the final chapters.  
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           Without an understanding of the significance of each in relation to other, each scenario 
reinforces the folly of Being without relation. What is required then is an educative relation in 
which both the objective and immediate have a role. When Spirit, between the antithesis of 
learner and learning, is granted permission to work, that is educate, learning can begin to 
have authenticity. Tubbs notes that education in Hegel is not concerned with learning of the 
truth but with truth as learning (Tubbs, 2008: 3). Thus, Spirit resides in the middle space and 
this is where education takes place. This point will be reinforced in conclusion to the current 
chapter. 
           2.5 Illusion 
           In summary of the discussion so far it might be stated that both objectivity and immediacy on 
their own terms raise the issue of truth as illusion. In illusion, each partner holds an uncritical 
view of itself. Later in Hegel’s Phenomenology, these illusory states are illustrated historically.  
           The first is exemplified by Hegel in terms of the historical Stoicism that represents the unity of 
being-in-itself and being for-itself; it is independent and self- assured (Hegel, 1977: 120). It is 
also a consciousness that thinks. It ‘holds something to be essentially important, or true and 
good only in so far as it thinks it to be such’ (Hegel, 1977: 121). This is the illusion of 
independence on the part of an illusory being.125 According to Harris, as a mode of 
consciousness, Stoicism becomes determinate as the Imperial power of Rome, emerging out 
of the Hellenistic world (Harris, 1995: 41), and having its independence confirmed by its many 
dependents. The Stoic for Hegel is illusory: there is no objective knowledge and everything is a 
shadow of truth (Tubbs, 2005: 82). Although its truth lies in the beyond, it can only come to 
understanding through the mediation of appearance which posits truth ‘for it’ (Hegel, 1977: 
88-89). Arising from spiritual autonomy and any lack of recognition of the other, this is error 
(Hegel, 1977: 111). 
           For Hegel, the antithesis of Stoicism is Scepticism. This mode of consciousness recognises the 
illusion of essentiality. Suspicious of anything that is immutable, immediate or fixed, and being 
in fear of recognising or representing the universal as truth in error, it establishes itself in 
opposition to the truth of the ‘in-itself.’ Allen Wood views the ‘transition from the culture of 
Greek city-states to that of the Roman Empire as involving a loss of community and along with 
it, a sense of self’ (Wood, 1998: 305). Furthermore, Harris notes that this independence is 
freedom from reality (Harris, 1995: 41). For the Sceptic, (determined as the Greek cities of 
                                                          
125 The idea of ‘illusory being’ is Hegelian and features in the text Science of Logic.  
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Eteocles and Polyneices who struggled against Imperial Rome), there can be no knowledge 
other than that gained through personal experience (Harris, 1995: 41). 
           As immediate subjectivity, Scepticism misrecognises itself as illusory. As Tubbs suggests, 
Scepticism is one manifestation of the awareness of the illusion because it ‘believes itself 
unable to think the truth of anything and each thought will be undermined by the 
groundlessness of all thought’ (Tubbs, 2008: 87). For example, in Paradigm Two, Clive Erricker 
whose thesis supports the idea of immediate truth seeking to overcome the error of 
ideological certainty (Erricker and Erricker, 2000: 67), provides an example of educational 
Scepticism. His critical pedagogy evades the presentation of objective truth and promotes 
learning from within.126 
           The problem with the Sceptic is that whilst the self-knowing ‘I’ is recognised as illusory and 
thus negated, the contingent ‘I’ does not accept the other. Having overcome the other, this ‘I’ 
reflects back into its self but in so doing it becomes its own certainty. It deems this certainty 
to be Truth but in fact misrecognises the illusion of its own self-sufficiency.127 Whilst it 
presents itself as the possibility to be something other, when reflected back it becomes 
another form of ‘certainty which is identical with its truth’ (Hegel, 1977: 104).  
           For Hegel, to dispense with thought consciousness completely would only leave a blank space 
and a ‘hazy distinction between an absolute truth and some other kind of truth’ (Hegel, 1977: 
48). Hegel suggests that to do so comes from fear: fear of commitment to an absolute idea. 
Yet Speculative philosophy considers it absurd to reject the possibility of knowing absolute 
truth: hence the ‘Phenomenology’s long progression ‘forward to true knowledge’ (Hegel, 
1977: 49). The path to truth involves self in other. In this case, there is no fear. The 
recognition of illusion takes place through the illusory being that recognises it. 
           A further illusion is that self and other are united. In this scenario, each avoids dependence on 
the other and validates its own position by becoming one with the other. Here distinctives are 
eroded and the lines of separation are blurred. Unification does not involve negation or loss to 
other in order to return to self, but each loses itself to the other and ‘fails to recollect 
otherness in itself’ (Tubbs, 2008: 89). Tubbs notes that this situation transcends simple 
positing so that the aggregate of self and other becomes a transformed being (Tubbs, 2005: 
110) which is more self-assured and has a clearer ownership of personalised learning.  
                                                          
126 See pages 35-6. 
127 Self-sufficiency will be critiqued in later chapters in the light of Kierkegaard’s philosophy.  
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           When the boundaries that separate self and other are blurred and ultimate unity is attained, 
the unified being becomes its own life and its own independence. Furthermore, it becomes its 
own essentiality therefore consciousness in-itself. Hegel writes: ‘self-certainty still has no 
truth, for it would have truth only if its own being-for-self had confronted it as an 
independent object’ (Hegel, 1977: 113). This form of self-certainty is illusory in terms of its 
view of the other, without whom it cannot become truth. The truth of error is misrecognised 
in a situation when error negates error without the recognition of either side. This notion of 
self-certainty is reinforced through Hegel’s illustration of a master and slave relationship 
which serves to illuminate the problems that arise when consciousness aspires to its own 
independence. 
           2.6 The master/slave relation 
           Located later in the Phenomenology, in a section entitled ‘Lordship and Bondage,’ the 
dialectical relation of self and other is illustrated through the struggle between a master and a 
slave.128 The master and slave here each represent a form of self - consciousness, that in the 
light of the current discussion, equate to objectivity and immediacy, therefore the nature of 
truth in each paradigm or more specifically, the learning individual and ‘God.’ The struggle 
occurs as each seeks to attain self-actualisation.  
           Independent consciousness this time, is characterised by a master or lord who is self-assured 
and desires autonomy. He also has a slave who he holds in subjection (Hegel, 1977: 115). The 
slave (or ‘bondsman’ as described in Hegel’s text) is the negation of the master. He is 
dependent on the master and his identity and truth are formed by this relationship and his 
work. The slave is the element for which ‘free self-consciousness comes to know itself in the 
many and varied forms of life as a real negativity’ (Hegel, 1977: 123). Yet in his desire to 
establish his own truth, the slave attempts liberation from his master (Hegel, 1977: 113): in 
determining to know the truth of himself, he seeks to overcome the mastery which 
establishes his position as negative (Hegel, 1977: 114). 
           As has already been determined, the relation prevents each from establishing itself as an 
independent consciousness. The master’s truth comes not in his universality but in his 
dependence on the slave. He is a master because he has a slave and needs the negativity of 
himself in order to establish his position. His truth is mediated through this other mode of 
                                                          
128 Again the master and slave might be deemed to illustrate Stoicism and Scepticism, thus Paradigms 
One and Two respectively.  
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consciousness: independently he cannot be known. He ‘achieves his recognition through 
another consciousness’ (Hegel, 1977: 116) but also seeks to retain independence. Similarly, 
the slave can never be free. His truth lies in his relationship with the master and he is only 
able to recognise his own truth in the relation. 
           However, in the bid for autonomy, each seeks the death of the other. The master does this by 
preventing the slave’s bid for freedom; the slave does so through his own liberation from 
other. This results in a struggle between them that causes tension and pain. Yet Hegel argues 
that the struggle involves not just the desired death of the other but the risk of each to his 
own life (Hegel, 1977: 113). Neither the master nor the slave can exist without the relation 
that is to be overcome. As this ‘trial by death’ negates the truth of the other and therefore 
does away with independent truth (Hegel, 1977: 114), to pursue the death of other is also to 
admit to the untruth of one’s own self. Life needs the negativity that is death for its own life. It 
might be suggested then that each mode of consciousness misrecognises its own essentiality. 
           Moreover, when the life and death struggle aims at securing freedom and eschewing 
negativity, the slave himself in turn asserts his mastery (Hegel, 1977: 117). It might be argued 
then that what takes place through the activity of liberation is the establishment of new 
dogmas. In liberation, self-consciousness - the negativity of the self-knowing ‘I’ - is alienated 
from its truth in its difference to become truth for itself. In its attempt to expose and 
overcome error, the slave misrecognises itself as also being in error. Liberation from the 
‘error’ of truth merely sets up another ‘truth’ within a new position (Hegel, 1977: 124). Each 
dogma becomes its own Universal. As Hegel states: ‘it procures for itself the certainty of its 
own freedom and thereby raises it to truth’ (Hegel, 1977: 124). It might be argued then, that 
scholars whose desire is to overcome the mastery of objectivity through liberation, 
subsequently become masters in their own right. For example, in the light of this suggestion, 
Paradigm Two’s Clive Erricker promotes mastery as much as Paradigm One’s Andrew Wright. 
Furthermore, the status of the ‘other’ in each case is misrecognised.  
           The speculative philosopher129 however recognises the illusion of freedom (Hegel, 1977: 111-
5) and the illusion of his or her own immediacy. Additionally, the philosopher who claims to 
‘know’ the Universal recognises the illusion of objectivity on the part of the contingent 
                                                          
129 Speculative philosophy of education, Hegel’s being one example, is presented by Rose as the 
condition of the possibility of experience as the condition of the meaning of experience (Rose, 1981:23) 
and by Tubbs as education that results from learning the truth of itself as learning (Tubbs, 2008: 4). 
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learner. When such recognition occurs, the essential sees itself in its non-essence and the 
Universal sees itself in the individual.  
           This statement marks a significant point in the current thesis as it takes the discussion away 
from perspectives such as either duality or immediacy in the relation of self and other, to that 
which considers the significance of the self in the other. This idea signposts the focus of the 
following chapter as well as the exploration of a new educational shape. As a ‘solution’ to the 
problems of pedagogy in a Christian context, this rationale does not provide an easy option 
and the pain of this position is explored later in the thesis. The movement of overcoming and 
returning is characterised by the life and death struggle which is continually imbalanced. Yet 
with tension always evident, consciousness is itself ‘absolute dialectical unrest’ (Hegel, 1977: 
124) and this movement as Spirit, is the movement of learning. This is epitomised in the 
theory of the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ which is considered in the next part of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit.  
           2.7 The Unhappy Consciousness 
           The Unhappy Consciousness involves the relationship between forms of self-consciousness 
such as the Stoic and Sceptic as well as the master and slave. In terms of the current 
discussion, self and other are now equated with learning and the learner, but ideas presented 
are equally applicable to the relationship of the two paradigms.  
           As described above, the attempt at freedom on the part of an independent consciousness, 
and its subsequent return to self, results in its duplicating its own self-consciousness. What 
was previously represented as the separation of the self and other, ‘is now lodged into one’ 
(Hegel, 1977: 126). For example, the liberated slave misrecognises its own mastery which is 
now duplicated as an independent self- consciousness. As such, he becomes his own 
essentiality. In the struggle and fight for liberation, each now reproduces itself as its opposite. 
The slave becomes another master.  
           Nevertheless, in the ‘Unhappy Consciousness,’ there cannot be two masters. The autonomous 
self as such is driven out ‘at the very moment when it imagines it has successfully attained to 
a peaceful unity with the other’ (Hegel, 1977: 126). It recognises the need for relation to its 
own negativity and so the movement of negation and return, introduced at the outset, 
perpetuates (Hegel, 1977: 127). The movement here is important as it signifies the 
continuation of learning. Although neither partner has yet accepted itself in the other, there is 
now an ‘intermediate position where abstract thinking is in contact with the individuality of 
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consciousness qua individuality’ (Hegel, 1977: 130). This educational process reflects the 
movement of self, loss and return to self, and in the middle, the individual learns. It is Spirit 
that enables each self-consciousness to see the truth of itself in the other, and this learning is 
spiritual. The idea of movement in learning is significant in exploring a new perspective, and 
will be addressed more fully throughout the thesis. 
           Although both Stoic and Sceptic for example profess to ‘know’ their own version of truth, the 
Unhappy Consciousness deems this impossible. The negation highlighted above disallows each 
consciousness from knowing itself as a universal. But what it does know is relation. The 
Unhappy Consciousness as a single consciousness is in relation with the relation of each 
partner and therefore knows itself as the negative of each. Thus, it might be described, albeit 
a contradiction, as the relation of relations (Tubbs, 2005: 157). Again, in terms of its 
significance for the current thesis, the relation of relations allows educators and learners to 
reconsider their position, understanding the value of the negative, and reflecting on relation 
through relation. In later chapters, this notion is highlighted as a template for learning; it 
establishes learning relationships that do not seek unity or duality, but recognise the 
importance of relation with relation. 
           However, this does not present an easy answer to the research question. The two parts of the 
Unhappy Consciousness relate together in a dialectic of unrest. This means that there is a 
contradiction in the self who learns. Yet, this contradiction is significant as it prevents 
essentiality from becoming its own truth. Furthermore, the movement of the Unhappy 
Consciousness keeps the relationship of self and other open. Contradictions and oppositions 
are therefore not to be overcome but to be recognised. This idea again signposts ideas 
pertaining to the new perspective. Tubbs writes: ‘the recognition of misrecognition is the 
education of illusion by illusion’ (Tubbs, 2005: 159). Each only becomes aware of his own truth 
in the other and before coming to know the truth of himself, each must lose himself (Hegel, 
1977: 114).  
           In later chapters of the current thesis, the educational movement of ‘repetition’ is explored; 
this movement includes both the loss of self and a leap of faith to the absolute. It also 
embraces illusion as the starting point for learning and thus considers the recognition of the 
illusion of illusion as the learner’s own education. As a further educational movement, the 
notion of ‘Bildung’ is also explored; this exploration considers again the significance of the 
relation of relations, and identifies how, in the middle space, learning as Spirit might inspire 
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authenticity. This also includes the movement of loss and return, with the learning individual 
central to the educative process. These ideas are outlined in Chapters Six and Seven. 
           Hegel also describes at length how coming to know is not about dealing with error but about 
learning through error. Learning takes place through the struggle in the relation of relations. 
The struggle itself is part of the learning process. Therefore, a spiritual act of education 
involves learning within the relation of relations, learning of the illusion of illusions and 
experiencing the overcoming of overcoming, which in a double negation all finally see self and 
other absolutely.130 
           The separation of self and other remains but it is through the unrest within the middle space 
that learning begins. For the teacher, Tubbs writes: ‘there is meaning and significance not only 
in her struggles as a teacher but also in the way she realises the truth of struggle in the 
education of others’ (Tubbs, 2005: 146). When recognising oneself in the other, one can 
discover a new experience of freedom. Harris explains that this experience of freedom is 
creative: the master gives the orders, but the slave is free to interpret them for himself in the 
light of his own world (Harris, 1995: 40). In this way, he accepts contingency and allows this to 
inspire the creation and re-creation of the free self. Mediation and negation are not 
overcome. Rather, to discover oneself in the other is to achieve freedom of Spirit and, for 
education, to begin the truth of learning. 
           2.8 Learning and the middle space 
           It might be suggested that it is the recognition of the illusion of life gained through 
overcoming the error of death131 that is the beginning of learning. In Education in Hegel, Nigel 
Tubbs explains that spiritual learning involves working with illusion in order to understand the 
illusory re-presentation of the immediate or the in-itself, be it the illusion of self- certainty, 
the illusion of freedom, or the illusion of unity, all described above. He suggests that when 
illusion learns of itself as illusory being, this reflects the truth of illusion known as illusion. This 
is education. It knows the ground of illusion and the negation of the ground of illusion to be 
the same groundlessness: ‘it is their being learned’ (Tubbs, 2008: 87).  
                                                          
130 For this thesis, the dialectical unrest that is the Unhappy Consciousness is significant, in its 
continuous repetition of loss and return that evades drawing conclusions or any claim to truth. 
However as established here, the result of this system is absolute knowledge, in which both the 
individual and universal are unified. For Kierkegaard and his followers, it is the completion of the 
system rather than the dialectical process that is problematic and as will be highlighted in Chapter 
Three, any form of closure regarding knowledge results in inauthenticity, which is deemed as sin.  
131 This is a reference to the master/slave relation outlined above. See pages 82-4.  
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           For Hegel, truth comes in the middle term between two positions. Here the in-itself is brought 
into relation with the learning individual. Spirit, who ‘ministers to each in its dealings with the 
other’ (Hegel, 1977: 136), is the mediator who disallows any one form of individuality from 
becoming its own truth. Spirit ensures that each relate through the middle space. As noted 
above, Spirit is the third partner in learning. Spirit who acts as a mediator, is in relation with 
each position: this is the relation of their relation. In its personified role, Spirit gives advice to 
each (Hegel, 1977: 137). Although it is a single consciousness, Spirit is not abstractly a 
universal: it is surrendered to the relation. Therefore, the learning relation consists of self and 
other that is in relation with the relation of Spirit to each.  
           Spirit embraces the illusions of contingency and mediation which result from the illusion of 
objectivity; learning then has the freedom to re-present the objects of consciousness and 
continue to do so. The experience of the opposition between learning and the learner is 
embraced as Spirit and this space is the middle term in which education takes place. In her 
book of the same name, this space is referred to by the latter Twentieth Century philosopher 
Gillian Rose as the ‘broken middle’ (Rose, 1992: xiv). The same term, following Rose, is also 
utilized by Nigel Tubbs in his text The Philosophy of the teacher (Tubbs, 2005: 12). 
           In the introduction to The Broken Middle, Rose reinforces Hegel’s distrust of essentiality and 
duality and boldly suggests that ‘anti-utopia and anarchy turns into triumphant ecclesiology’ 
(Rose, 1992: viii). Instead she claims that that which separates the two cannot actually be 
overcome: the broken middle explores the truth within and between each one (Rose, 1992: 
xiv). Additionally, she makes the claim that any individual separated from a Universal is 
illusory. For example, she describes the dualism of one position over another in terms of post-
modernity’s attempt to overcome the struggle between universality and particularity; through 
this example she indicates how, when the tension is evaded and each appears as a singular 
object, the result is a ‘sociology of control’ (Rose, 1992: xiii). The ‘broken middle’ however 
investigates the break between the Universal and particular, and it is Spirit in this middle 
space that allows for one to authentically learn (Rose, 1992: xii). 
           In another text, Hegel contra-sociology (1981), Rose likens the Universal and particular to the 
church and state, both of which it is purported, exist as independent entities and as such are 
self-sufficient. However, her argument is that such dualistic thinking is an epistemological 
trap, claiming that the divergences actually ‘rest on an identical framework.’ (Rose, 1981:1). 
She also later argues that the identities of church and the state, although contradictory, are 
also the same (Rose, 1981: 49). 
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           For Rose, the identification of a broken middle not only highlights the importance of the 
relation of relations but also of the difficulties that result. She asserts that without process 
and pain, one cannot come to know. The broken middle cannot and should not be repaired, 
but it can learn its own truth as a contradiction. It is in relation that the work of spiritual 
education is done. Commenting on the ‘broken middle,’ Tubbs writes: ‘the truth of learning is 
where the student learns about himself in relation to the teacher’ (Tubbs, 2008: 168). This 
learning takes place through contradiction and experience: not through overcoming. When 
contradictions are misrecognised, they either require a resolution or are simply evaded. 
Meanwhile, when contradictions are welcomed and the teacher ‘comes to know them 
differently, she can comprehend their truth in and as the philosophy of the teacher’ (Tubbs, 
2005: 168). 
           This is difficult to fathom and just as difficult to put into practice. But Rose suggests that if 
dichotomies are seen as relations, both sides might exist in unity without being unified (Rose, 
1981: 54-5). Therefore, it is the premise of this thesis that spiritual educators can find 
themselves in the broken middle of the relationship between paradigms in a space where 
contradictions find a place to meet. It also suggests that learners might allow illusion to inspire 
learning concerning ‘God,’ that in the middle space, is spiritual. Individuals might be 
encouraged to wrestle with their own personal illusions of ‘God’ against the backdrop of 
inherited or assumed conceptualisations. In the light of the broken middle, these illusions 
serve to create a life giving, dynamic notion of God that does not remain static but grows and 
changes as mediation and contingency continue to influence. Again, this idea is significant in 
the proposal of a new perspective of Christian education and is explored further in later 
chapters of the current thesis.  
           For learning per se, Tubbs also commends the educator to ‘mind the gap.’ This involves being 
‘mindful of the gap’ (Tubbs, 2000: 56) and simply it encourages the individual to think beyond 
any simple subject/object separation. It encourages him or her to acknowledge Spirit as the 
third person of learning, residing in the middle space, and to embrace the struggle and 
tension which exists between positions. It encourages policy makers to avoid attempts to 
close the gap, be it through totalitarianism, liberation or unification. Finally, it encourages all 
to be ‘resigned to the necessity of the gap as dichotomy and separation’ (Tubbs, 2000: 56). 
           In conclusion, in a life-giving spiritual education which is mindful of the middle, pain must 
exist. The unrest must continue. When the teacher retains the tension, recognises each 
position as illusory within the illusion of misrecognition, and teaches from within the middle, 
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then he or she is a philosophically spiritual teacher. Within the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ 
which brings together the assurance of the Stoic and the free thinking of the Sceptic, there 
exists a creative tension from which can emerge the Spirit of education. 
           On the basis of these ideas, the discussion continues. Whilst Hegel’s philosophy presents a 
cyclic system, the telos of which is absolute knowledge, and whilst this chapter has explored 
the relation of the learner and learning in the respect of the individual and ‘God,’ conclusions 
here do not consider the telos of inspiring faith in learners.  Thus, the following chapter 
presents a Kierkegaardian reflection on the notion of relation as it pertains to faith. As well as 
exploring in more depth the ideas of loss and return as well as negation and contingency, 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy also embodies the presence of pain in learning and provides an 
understanding of how this pain might be educative.  As a writer whose ideas transcend 
theology, philosophy and education as specifics, the significance of his personal life to his 
writings will be outlined. Moreover, Kierkegaard is not fearful of the unknown and whilst 
acknowledging relation, also dares to make the leap to what is beyond the known. This is a 
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CHAPTER THREE: TRUTH 
           3.1 Introduction 
           The work of Danish 19th Century thinker Soren Kierkegaard is the main focus of this chapter, 
studied in order to further assess the ideas of relation and the middle space as well as to 
introduce the aporia which comes with unknowing. Several of Kierkegaard’s texts are 
authored pseudonymously and his veiled identity in these, represents the dialectic presented 
in Chapter Two. This chapter also illustrates how Kierkegaard’s thinking, recorded in works 
published from the 1830s onwards, continues the theme of illusion and is thus relevant to the 
current study in its concern of error and truth. As well as highlighting the relationship of a 
learner and teacher, this chapter also considers the nature of knowledge, and particularly in 
the light of his own experience of Christianity, it is noted how Kierkegaard proposes an 
individual might learn for a life of faith.  
           Through an exploration of his texts Either/Or, Fear and Trembling and Philosophical Fragments 
respectively, and supported by secondary sources by Collins (1983), Gardiner (1988), Rose 
(1992), Tubbs (2005; 2009) and Walsh (2009), this chapter provides comment on themes 
presented earlier in the thesis such as dualism, spirit, relation and truth, as well as introducing 
the ideas of unknowing, paradox and despair. As such it paves the way for the deeper 
philosophical analysis of learning to be presented in later chapters and contributes further to 
the exploration of a new perspective of ‘faith’ in Christian education. 
           3.2 Background  
           As a philosopher, the intention of Kierkegaard’s texts is to allow his readers to think for 
themselves. As a theologian, his texts include reflection on Biblical and theological themes 
such as the relationship of the learning individual with God.132 This dual status is reflective of 
the dichotomy of subjectivity and objectivity already investigated in this thesis. However, his 
writing is not necessarily intended for religious use or teaching. The literary aspects of his 
texts deal with the aesthetic, ethical and religious as modes of consciousness (Collins, 1983: 
12) and these are considered as means by which individuals learn.  His writing is often self-
reflective and he addresses these modes in the light of a number of personal issues, including 
the reconciliation with and death of his father, his failure to be accepted into the Danish 
                                                          
132 The absence of quotation marks here reflects Kierkegaard’s use of the word God.  
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Church (Collins, 1983: 8-9) and most notably his broken engagement from Regina Olsen in 
1841 (Collins, 1983: 8-9). 
           One hallmark of his texts is his reticence to accept inherited knowledge of philosophical and 
theological ideas as truth, as was expected in his day (Gardiner, 1988: 35-6). He wrestled with 
those who proposed certainty; for example, doubting the totality of the claim regarding 
Christ’s saving actions, he was ‘unable to realise the universal’ (Collins, 1983: 11). 
Nevertheless, he cannot be aligned with the existential pedagogues of Chapter One or the 
Sceptic of Chapter Two. His doubt does not equate to overcoming or negation: as an 
educational imperative, doubt for Kierkegaard involves a much more complex consideration 
of error and truth.133 Collins states that Kierkegaard ‘had the courage to doubt all things but 
not to know and take possession of all things’ (Collins, 1983: 10). Hence Kierkegaard’s thesis is 
that any claim to understanding is really misunderstanding. For him a life of faith involves a 
leap into the unknown (Kierkegaard, 1974: 53). 
           Kierkegaard’s writing illustrates how any claim to truth is error. Historically, his thinking 
reflects a reaction to the systemisation of knowledge offered by Hegel and an unwillingness to 
accept knowledge as ‘complete.’ In particular, he refutes the suggestion that mutually 
opposed standpoints can be reconciled in a higher level of cognition as does Hegel at the 
climax of his Phenomenology. For Kierkegaard, the incompatibility of two positions (as 
illustrated by the Unhappy Consciousness for example) should be retained (Gardiner, 1988: 
52). Also, uneasy with what he considers the self-sufficiency of the individual involved in the 
system, he suggests that any independence on the part of the learner should be renounced in 
order to gain a relation which lies in subordination to the external (Gardiner, 1988: 56),134 or 
absolute. 
           It is important to note that primarily, Kierkegaard wrote in reaction to the school of Danish 
philosophers who were almost entirely influenced by Hegelian philosophy. He refuted their 
claim that the system could be taught directly and be fully understood (Tubbs, 2005: 214). 
Whilst not attacking Hegel per se, he disagreed with these philosophers’ interpretation of 
Hegel, highlighting their lack of recognition of contingency. He purported that the clear-cut 
                                                          
133 Error and Truth will be explored in more detail in later chapters of the current thesis. 
134 Kierkegaard’s claim here suggests that as it is the consciousness of the learning individual that is the 
participant in Hegel’s system, ultimately education concerns the self-sufficiency of the individual who 
attains absolute truth. However, Kierkegaard’s ideas have theological resonance and here the 
implication is of the relation of the individual in relation to an absolute Other. How this is understood 
will be explored more fully later in the thesis. 
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manner in which their understanding of Hegelian philosophy was presented did not consider 
the individual as a part of history and society. He claimed that this understanding instead 
elevated the individual to a universal rather than a real person. Collins writes: ‘he discovered 
that the system stood in ambiguous relation to the various spheres of life and hence required 
some treatment’ (Collins, 1983: 112). Such a resolute interpretation of the system was an 
anathema to Kierkegaard and he thus sought to illuminate the error of this view.135 As such his 
own ideas are less concerned with the notion of truth as absolute, but rather the movement 
of unknowing to the Absolute.  (Collins, 1983: 19).  
           Opposing the ‘direct’ manner in which dogmatic principles were transmitted in the church for 
example, his interest lay in how learning might be indirect, thereby reaching no conclusions. 
As such, his ‘aesthetic’ texts are authored pseudonymously. Writing under different masks 
and guises he addresses the reader indirectly, distancing himself from what is presented so to 
allow the reader to draw his or her own conclusions regarding what is written and 
subsequently how it should be applied (Gardiner, 1998: 44). This again illustrates the 
diremption of self and other that is vital in learning. Additionally, the pseudonyms also 
highlight the relation of error and truth. Kierkegaard cannot speak directly in truth as himself, 
as his truth is not fully presented or understood. Rose notes that Kierkegaard’s pseudonymity 
also addresses the issue of illusion. Suspicious of any claim to truth, he sought to ‘dramatize 
illusion’ by presenting himself as an illusion of himself (Rose, 1992: 10). So through the 
disguise of ‘Climacus’ or ‘de Silentio’ for example, he embodies error in relation to truth.136  
           This also highlights the illusory being of any learner who claims to know independent truth. In 
Kierkegaard’s view, in themselves, both author and pseudonym are in error. Through 
indirectness however, he allows himself and his pseudonymous identity to be the negation of 
each other in their error (Tubbs, 2008: 134), highlighting the illusion of the illusion introduced 
in Chapter Two. Furthermore, the reader is posited in relation to this relation. The relation of 
relations,137 again introduced above, is thus established. Truth for both the author and the 
reader is not only in the negation of the objective self, but in the negation of this negation. 
This is a dialectic such as that introduced at the end of the previous chapter; hence there is 
                                                          
135 It is the interpretation of Hegel rather than Hegel’s philosophy per se that is placed under scrutiny. 
In The Broken Middle, Gillian Rose explores the nature of the relationship between Hegelian and 
Kierkegaardian ideas, and proposes that their relation might also be considered dialectically (Rose, 
1992: 18). 
136 ‘Climacus’ is the pseudonym applied in the work Philosophical Fragments, with ‘de Silentio’ being 
the pseudonymous author of Fear and Trembling. 
137 The ‘relation of relations’ was introduced on page 85. 
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now not just one singular truth - the proposed truth comes through the individuals’ relation 
with the relation of truth and error. 
           Illusion accordingly marks the path towards unknowing. For instance, under the guise of 
Johannes de Silentio in Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard outlines how in suspending his own 
identity as an author, he is reduced to silence. This allows readers the opportunity to also 
suspend their own certainties in relation to their understanding of the text. In turn, the voices 
of philosophers and theologians are silenced as readers are encouraged to avoid ‘resting’ on 
inherited belief systems and take the risk of venturing into the unknown (Kierkegaard, 1992: 
12). Again, signposting a new perspective of Christian education, it might be considered that 
such learning might also suspend certainty regarding Biblical texts and principles, also taking 
the risk of venturing into the unknown. It is important to note however that ‘suspending’ does 
not equate to negation, and this will be highlighted further in due course.  
           Tubbs points out that such indirect communication also has relevance for the student-teacher 
relationship. As Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous identity allows the reader to ‘go his own way’ 
(Tubbs, 2005: 216), an indirect teacher does not interfere with the learning of the student. 
Such teachers are able to provide the conditions for learning based on the concern and unrest 
of the unknown. The ‘what’ of learning is placed in subordination to the ‘how,’ signifying more 
of a focus on ‘process’ than on ‘product’ (Tubbs, 2005: 216).138  This is another significant 
theme for the current thesis and through the educational notion of ‘Bildung,’ considered more 
fully in Chapter Six, the idea of learning as a process is highlighted. 
          Tubbs continues to note that the asymmetrical relation between the teacher and student is 
reflective of the unequal relation between man139 and God. As was highlighted in Chapter Two 
and will be explored later in this chapter, God as a Universal cannot be known essentially: to 
reduce God to a ‘what’ is to be idolatrous. However, to retain the openness and imbalance of 
indirect communication, or the relation of relations, is to retain the substance and truth of the 
subject-object relation (Tubbs, 2005: 216-7). In this relational shape, each partner still exists 
and both contribute to authentic learning.140  
                                                          
138 This is resonant of experiential spiritual education, notably the Godly Play model, where the 
intentional process of learning allows children to construct their own meanings albeit within the 
framework of the Christian Tradition (e.g. Matthews, Mercer and Waltz, 2004: 262, 265; Lamont, 2007: 
84-5; Hyde, 2008: 165). However, in the light of Kierkegaard, the relation between the individual 
learner and the tradition becomes open to critique. This will be expressed more fully later in the thesis. 
139 The male denotation again here is resonant with Kierkegaardian rhetoric and does not represent any 
priority regarding the gender of the learner.  
140 This idea is an important feature in Chapter Seven. 
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           Thus, to consider Christian education in Kierkegaardian terms does not deny the existence of 
God nor undermine the value of the learning individual; rather, what is highlighted is the error 
of each assuming to know self and other in their entirety. As Tubbs writes: ‘the absolute in 
Kierkegaard as in Hegel is inequality known to itself as torn halves of a relation that does not 
add up to itself’ (Tubbs, 2005: 218). The inequality incites brokenness and in turn recognises 
the middle term. Truth is then known in the brokenness between the two partners.141 Again 
this highlights the notion of pedagogical uncertainty and in terms of a new perspective, this 
idea of brokenness will be explored in later chapters. The idea of a middle space is as 
important for Kierkegaard as it is for Hegel but here the learning partners view themselves in 
terms of a relation of difference. It is in the light of this relation that the significance of the 
three Kierkegaardian texts is explored. This exploration begins with Either/Or. 
           3.3 The subject-object relation: Either/Or 
           Either/Or is the first of Kierkegaard’s ‘aesthetic’ texts. In this text, Kierkegaard proposes contra 
Hegel, that subject-object oppositions must always exist. Furthermore, he argues that a choice 
as to how they are managed must be made. The text presents a reflection on his failed 
relationship with Regina Olsen, and thus equates choice in education with the choice required 
to leave the immediate state of romance and enter into the state of marriage. His failure to 
make this choice illuminated existential difficulties in his personal life, therefore, these 
difficulties might also be translated by the reader into the epistemological problems that arise 
when no choice is made. For example, he reflects on the necessity for romantic love to be 
transfigured, initially by doubt, into religious love. This religious state provides for its 
durability and certainty (Kierkegaard, 1974: 25) and as such, authenticity. But the reader must 
choose to choose religious love. Not to choose is to fall into sin (Kierkegaard, 1974: 142).142 
           Each subject - object position is presented in the form of papers and letters. This is intentional, 
allowing the recipients of the letters and therefore the reader, to react to each in the light of 
his or her own personal contingency. As it is claimed that there is ‘no didacticism’ in this work 
(Gardiner, 1988: 47), the readers of Either/Or are exhorted, in response to the letters, to 
choose one position to guide their way of life. The first position is represented by the 
                                                          
141 Learning partners might be exemplified as the individual and universal, the indirect and direct, the 
process and the product, the author and pseudonym or finally, Kierkegaard and his readers. 
142 The movement from the immediate to the religious state forms a key theme in the latter half of the 
current thesis. Either/Or does not fully explore the religious state, yet the movement described in this 
text introduces the movement from the aesthetic to ethical states as a precursor to the move towards 
the religious.   
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aesthetic man. This man is concerned with sensuous immediacy - living for the moment and 
holding fast to pleasure (Kierkegaard, 1974: 21).  
           In the aesthetic position, Spirit is determined as immediacy. This concerns what one is and 
what one lives for (Kierkegaard, 1974: 161). It concerns personality, beauty, sensuousness, 
transient romantic love and enjoyment (Kierkegaard, 1974: 18-21). It is for the here and now 
(Kierkegaard, 1974: 140). Liberated from everything established by divine and human law, all 
moments appear temporary, attachments are loose, and there is no certainty. This amounts 
to self-satisfaction which however seemingly attractive, promotes a fatalistic outlook leading 
to sorrow (Kierkegaard, 1974: 22). This has been interpreted elsewhere as a description of 19th 
Century hedonism (Gardiner, 1988: 46-7) but might also be equated with Heidegger’s notion 
of Being as well as the ideas of scholars in Paradigm Two that deem spirituality as pertaining 
to the ‘here and now’ (Hay and Nye, 2006: 66-8; Hyde, 2008: 52). 
           In the aesthetic state, there initially is no movement beyond the immediate. Choices made are 
made for the moment only (Kierkegaard, 1974: 141). The pseudonymous author of the papers 
and letters suggests that for the aesthetic man, life is an illusion (Kierkegaard, 1974: 135). 
Living behind a mask of pleasure, his true self is not revealed. He does not know himself in 
truth. There is a separation between who he really is and who he is supposed to be. But a 
further illusion is that there is no separation. As with pseudonymity, immediacy is his mask 
and he lives in untruth. 
           In Chapter Two, immediacy was considered in terms of the relationship ‘I - God’ (Hay and Nye, 
2006: 109). Reflecting the aesthetic position, it is now also possible to consider immediacy in 
terms of spiritual knowledge. In his text The Secret Spiritual world of Children, Tobin Hart 
posits examples of spiritual immediacy such as wonder and awe (Hart, 2003: 61), relationality 
(Hart, 2003: 69) and empathy (Hart, 2003:76) as ‘sacred qualities.’ His proposition that these 
have meaning within temporal existence validates the idea that spiritual authenticity lies 
within the ‘here and now.’ There is no need for external intervention or any movement away 
from the immediate. Thus, as an aesthetic teacher, and extrapolating himself from inherited 
forms of spiritual understanding, it might be suggested that he veils himself in order to allow 
for personalised learning. Spiritual pedagogy, he proposes, liberates children from the illusion 
of objectivity and allows them to be free in the present moment. He writes: ‘The basic 
premise of a spiritual worldview is that all things, including us, are sacred and are infused with 
or part of spirit’ (Hart, 2003: 9). 
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           The ethical man on the other hand, represents the transfigured romantic who, having negated 
immediacy, knows himself as absolute in his eternal validity (Kierkegaard, 1974: 159). His 
knowledge is based on self-reflection which as Spirit, moves beyond the here and now. The 
ethical man also makes a choice. He chooses negation and this becomes his truth. In so doing, 
he acknowledges the gap between the Universal and the immediate, and as such becomes 
aware of himself posited against the absolute. He also recognises the illusion of the mask (or 
veil) which when revealed, allows for recognition of the absolute. His choice is made within 
the laws of necessity such as history and morality (Kierkegaard, 1974: 148), therefore has 
contingent influence, and as he accepts that this choice will include loss, it will also involve 
pain. Yet in this choice, the ethical man is transformed (Kierkegaard, 1974: 149). Kierkegaard 
writes: 
           for the choice being made with the whole inwardness of his personality, his nature is 
purified and he himself is brought into immediate relation to the eternal power whose 
omnipresence penetrates the whole of existence. This transformation, this higher 
consecration, is never attained by that man who chooses merely aesthetically 
(Kierkegaard, 1974: 141). 
           In a secondary source, Gardiner notes that ethical learners supersede the immediate; through 
self-realisation, self-knowledge and self-acceptance (Gardiner, 1988: 53), they choose the 
truth. It is important to note that ethical learners make the choice within the moral and 
intelligible frameworks provided by the practices and institutions of society, so this truth is 
aware of contingency. In the light of this, the learner fulfils his or her ‘potentialities as a free 
and purposive being’ (Gardiner, 1988: 56), yet posited in negative relation to the Universal.   
           Although at the end of Chapter Two the significance of contradiction for education was 
highlighted, Kierkegaard claims that the attainment of absolute knowledge is actually 
‘contradiction annulled’ (Kierkegaard, 1974: 144). Through the negation, mediation and return 
of Hegel’s system, history and the individual are transcended and fused in a higher unity. As 
each is one in the other, the need for choice is eradicated. But Kierkegaard argues that for 
authenticity, and before the negation, mediation and return, there must be a recognition of 
separation.  
           The choice to move to the ethical is based on the acceptance of this separation (Kierkegaard, 
1974: 144-7). Kierkegaard argues that each individual has a dual existence - history and 
contingency - and that each should be held apart in an imperfect relational shape. This does 
not signify a return to the dichotomous positing of paradigms as outlined in the Literature 
Review. However, this does re-evaluate relation, ensuring that the truth of the learning 
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individual never becomes self-identical and therefore in error. This idea is significant for the 
current thesis and will be explored in more depth in later chapters. The movement of learning 
is also significant and this will be explored in later chapters in terms of the educational notions 
of ‘Repetition’ and ‘Bildung.’  
           Another example of the importance of Kierkegaard’s movement from the aesthetic to the 
ethical for a new perspective of Christian education, is personal transformation. As an 
immediate state, the aesthetic is melancholy (Kierkegaard, 1974: 158). Melancholy is later 
presented as despair (Kierkegaard, 1974: 158) which arises when the aesthetic becomes 
dissatisfied with finiteness but has not yet chosen the infinite.143 This individual ‘from a true 
and sincere love for mankind cast himself in the ocean of despair till he found the absolute’ 
(Kierkegaard, 1974: 176). However, despair is not doubt and in this context neither despair 
nor doubt are problematic. Despair is a result of immediacy’s reflection into awareness of the 
infinite (Kierkegaard, 1974: 176) and is the manifestation of the tension that arises when one 
desires to move beyond immediacy but without yet having recognised the absolute. This is an 
unhappy state and one to be overcome. Unlike Hegel’s ‘Unhappy Consciousness,’ where the 
movement of overcoming and return to self is continuous until each consciousness finds itself 
in the other, this state of unhappiness needs to be sorted out. 
           The despair of melancholy leads to the transformation that comes with choosing the absolute 
(Kierkegaard, 1974: 179).  Gardiner writes: ‘the ethical does not annihilate the aesthetical but 
transfigures it’ (Gardiner, 1988: 52). The progression leads through the melancholy of the 
immediate, continues in the despair of the separation, and arrives at the choice which posits 
the self in relation to the absolute. Kierkegaard asserts that to make the ethical choice is to 
choose repentance regarding immediacy (Kierkegaard, 1974: 183), and this is an imperative 
for the Christian life.  
           In this context, Spirit is the transforming force in the life of the individual who chooses 
repentance. In Paradigm One, repentance is a key theme 144 and it might be suggested that 
the movement from one state to the other and the transformation that ensues, could be 
equated with conversion. For scholars such as Wright and Griffiths, conversion involves the 
individual making a personal response to the Christian story as summarised for example in the 
Four Points.145 As indicated in the Literature Review, this involves the overcoming of the 
                                                          
143 In this chapter, the terms infinite, universal and absolute are interchangeable. In later chapters, the 
term ‘Absolute’ will represent them all.  
144 See page 14.  
145 See page 16. 
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separation of the individual and God, and concerns the re-ordering of one’s spiritual life. As 
indicated here, for Kierkegaard however, separations must still exist. Transformation takes 
place as Spirit engages in the process of loss and return; therefore, it involves much more than 
a cognitive acceptance of facts. It includes loss and pain. The transformed individual returns to 
the contingent world; thus, rather than promoting re-ordering, Spirit inspires a new relation 
to both the absolute and the world.  
           In Paradigm Two, which avoids notions such as sin and salvation, there is no consideration of 
repentance. Conversion however, involves the continuation of the a priori relationship of the 
learner with God. For example, in his motto: ‘who cares where the sin is’ (Privett, 2009: 
109),146 Privett argues that transformation occurs as the individual explores, questions and 
learns spiritually. Kierkegaard’s ideas regarding transformation however are again much more 
complex than the promotion of ontological enquiry presented here. The movement of 
repentance, which transcends immediacy and self-sufficiency and allows the individual to 
know God, is for Kierkegaard, a paradox. Knowledge of God here also applies a different 
meaning to that of Hegel’s absolute knowing. Here it concerns the paradox of absolute 
subjectivity.  
           The idea of the paradox is given more attention later through the text Philosophical 
Fragments. However, in her text Thinking Christianly about Kierkegaard (Walsh, 2009) Sylvia 
Walsh wrestles with this issue. She proposes that to have knowledge of ‘God’ is to relate 
objectively to the self in self-reflection and subjectively to others including the transcendent 
other, who is ‘pure subjectivity’ (Walsh, 2009: 54). This knowledge is not unified and ‘the 
absolute can only be for the absolute’ (Walsh, 1974: 178); however, it is in the middle space 
that knowledge comes to have a more personal meaning.  
           David Tacey concurs. He acknowledges that ‘the self can only come to know itself in 
relationship with an ‘other’ and without a personified absolute other the self lacks identity, 
definition and form’ (Tacey, 2004: 156). He acknowledges that the perceived illusion of ‘God’ 
is actually also illusory and does not need to have a fixed identity for its truth. Tacey calls for 
the mystery of God to once more come into spiritual awareness (Tacey, 2004: 154). 
Additionally, he suggests the idea of God should not be constrained by human limitations but 
stretched to its full capacity embracing the contingency of the world, other people and 
personal history (Tacey, 2004: 156) in relation to its traditional form. The idea of 
                                                          
146 See page 41. 
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representation, particularly in terms of a notion of ‘God’ is an important consideration for the 
proposed new perspective of Christian education and is be explored more fully in chapters Six 
and Seven.  
           This epistemological conundrum signifies then that the move to the ethical as described in 
Either/Or, is not the end of the movement or indeed the consideration of the Christian life of 
faith. Although the theological resonances of conversion through the notions of sin and 
repentance are evident in Either/Or, and whilst man’s eternal status in relation to the 
absolute is ascertained, this text does not provide a complete response to the research 
question, which considers authenticity in terms of a life of faith. In Kierkegaard’s Fear and 
Trembling (1985), one of the most significant themes is the suspension of the ethical in 
coming to faith, and this leads this discussion onwards. Hence this text which is explored now, 
highlights the themes of knowing, unknowing and error, and continues to further identify 
themes for new perspective in Christian education. 
           3.4 The leap of faith: Fear and Trembling 
           As a religious theme, ‘faith’ adds a new dimension to the current discussion. Introduced briefly 
in Chapter One in terms of the two paradigms,147 including reference to faith development 
theory,148 faith also constitutes the aim of the primary research question: to consider how a 
new perspective of Christian education might inspire learners to an authentic life of faith. In 
the light of the previous three chapters, a Kierkegaardian consideration of ‘faith’ now re-
imagines the individual’s connection with the Universal. It also looks forward to Chapter Five, 
in which faith will be explored more fully in terms of practice within Christian education. 
           Faith takes one away from cognitive choice to experience. Concerning a dimension beyond 
both ontology and epistemology, it supersedes dualism. As Spirit, it becomes the third partner 
in learning relationships.149 As the third partner, rather than acting as mediator 150 between 
the knower and knowing,151 faith surpasses knowledge. As it is not mediated, it involves the 
                                                          
147 See page 16-7.  
148 See page 18-9.   
149 The current thesis so far has explored the duality of two paradigms, reflected in the relation 
between the learner and teacher as well as learning and the learner. The introduction of the notion of 
faith changes the focus. Rather than exploring dualistic positions, faith now transcends these. As the 
third partner in the relation of relations, faith and Spirit now provide the missing dimension that is 
integral to the new perspective of Christian education to be proposed, and are considered the means 
by which learners might authentically learn.   
150 The role of mediator is that assigned to Spirit in Chapter Two. 
151 The phrase ‘learning and the learner’ is now replaced with ‘knower and knowing’ due to the 
Kierkegaardian implication of knowledge rather than education.  
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mystery of the unknown (Collins, 1983: 67). This reflects the statement in the biblical book of 
Hebrews that faith is ‘confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not 
see.’152  Thus faith is concerned with the absurd and unknowing, and is only attained through 
a leap away from certainty and self-sufficiency. 
           Faith also re-negotiates the relationships of Either/Or. As the individual moves away from 
immediacy to be transfigured in the ethical, faith as the third partner establishes a 
relationship with the relation of the aesthetic and ethical. Described by Kierkegaard as the 
religious state, this third dimension reflects the ‘gigantic passion’ of an ethical person who is 
willing to make the leap from what is known in his personal and historical experience to the 
unknown (Kierkegaard, 1985: 43). The leap is significant here. In terms of the perspectives 
already considered in this thesis, this leap might involve the movement away from commonly 
held truths as in Paradigm One, or from immediacy as in Paradigm Two. Yet it also might refer 
to the philosophies and religious expressions of thought consciousness prevalent in 
Kierkegaard’s day which, in the leap of faith, were suspended. What is ‘known,’ either 
objectively or immediately, is suspended for the aporia that comes with unknowing, and this 
has significance for a new perspective in Christian education.  
           Fear and Trembling is written under the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio. As Gardiner points 
out, the author locates himself within the realm of the ethical; however, the text serves to 
highlight the limitations of this sphere (Gardiner, 1988: 59), thus highlighting the need for the 
ethical individual to make the leap of faith. The text considers the story of the biblical 
character Abraham. The author poses three questions, each of which point towards the 
experience of faith as the answer. The first question concerns the teleological suspension of 
the ethical. In the story located in Genesis 22, Abraham is called by God in faith to sacrifice his 
son Isaac as a gift offering in an act of obedience. In this act, he is led forth to go beyond what 
is ethically acceptable (the universal) in response to his passion for God (the absolute). He 
indicates his willingness to sacrifice his son Isaac (the finite) and deigns to give his all, risking 
the loss of his son to gain eternal validity: that is to attain God’s will. His willingness in faith 
involves superseding the ethical expression of the action – murder – in order to effect the 
religious expression of sacrifice (Kierkegaard, 1985: 42). This is his leap of faith.  
           Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice illustrates how faith is not just about belief, but also action 
and readiness. In making the leap in faith away from what is ethically accepted, he ‘waives his 
                                                          
152 Hebrews 11 vs 1; New International Version.  
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claim’ to the temporal or what is morally correct in temporal terms (Kierkegaard, 1985: 54). In 
his willingness to sacrifice, he claims the absolute as his own. In so doing he becomes an 
individual in absolute relation to the absolute (Kierkegaard, 1985: 72). This again is the 
relation of relations. As the author claims, ‘he who loves God without faith reflects upon 
himself, but he who loves God with faith, believingly reflects upon God’ (Kierkegaard, 1985: 
47). The gravity of the situation is clear, as is the recognition that to make the leap of faith is a 
risk. The anguish of Abraham’s choice and the resulting pain is not to be undervalued. Nor is it 
for everyone.  
           The pseudonymous author, from within the ethical sphere, recognises that when placed in 
parallel to the movement of faith, the limitations of his own position are made clear (Collins, 
1983: 91). In going beyond what is palatable, de Silentio ‘recognises in Abraham the presence 
of something which surpasses his own standards’ (Collins, 1983: 91). He cannot make the leap 
himself: he is not strong enough (Rose, 1992: 15). For within the ethical position, he knows 
himself as a universal. For truth, however, the learning individual must recognise himself in 
the Universal.153 As an ethical being, his ability to understand the Universal is limited by the 
finiteness that disallows a true knowledge of the infinite. The truth of ‘his’ knowledge of the 
infinite is knowledge of God in error. This resonates with the Kantian idea presented in 
Chapter Two as well as the notion of the ethical as the ‘inner voice of individual conscience’ 
(Kant, 1992: 12). As Rose writes: ‘if God should really speak to man, man could still never 
know that it was God speaking’ (Rose, 1992: 12). Gardiner suggests that seeking the infinite in 
the finite is an error as it never possesses any more than ‘relative status’ (Gardiner, 1988: 66); 
it subsequently corresponds to sin. 
           For religion to be reduced to relative reasoning is to be antithetical to its nature. Gardiner 
explains that for Kierkegaard, religious commitment to God should, reflecting Abraham’s 
actions, involve the suspended personal experience of the individual, in relation with the 
absolute other that transcends human reasoning (Gardiner, 1988: 66). When challenging the 
‘self-sufficiency of morality’ (Gardiner, 1988: 67) and locating religious experience ‘outside the 
aegis of human standards of rationality’ (Gardiner, 1988: 68), the individual here might 
experience faith. For the ethicist however, this is an impossibility. Gardiner underlines the 
background to Kierkegaard’s propositions and suggests that the political motivation behind 
the statement of faith was to move the religious people of his day away from paying lip 
                                                          
153 The masculine identification of the individual in this section pertains to both Abraham and the 
author, and for consistency, thus the individual who learns.  
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service to their beliefs, ‘smothered by the comfortable words of clergymen,’ towards 
something more meaningful. Furthermore, he intended to move philosophers away from the 
rationalisation of thought prevalent at that time (Gardiner, 1988: 60). As the leap of faith is a 
movement towards the acceptance of aporia, it involves unknowing. However, it is also more 
than this: it is a movement founded on jeopardy.  
           Walsh writes that the Abrahamic movement ‘is a venture fraught with uncertainty, fear and 
trembling, lifelong striving, self-denial and suffering on the part of the single individual’ 
(Walsh, 2009: 51). But to evade to venture in this way is to lead a religious still-life that ‘avoids 
all risk and danger’ (Walsh, 2009: 51). Walsh suggests that Christian learners should relinquish 
all probability in relation to a belief in God. In other words, reliance on the temporal in the 
form of ‘lenient, comfortable religiosity’ (Walsh, 2009: 52) such as doctrine and dogma, 
should be suspended in order to experience a relation with the eternal. Considering the telos 
of each of the paradigms and perspectives outlined in the current thesis, it might be 
suggested that the teleological suspension of their beliefs, that as already indicated each 
include their own version of essentiality, would allow for the interruption of their claims to 
truth, opening up the space that embraces aporia, and thus allowing for ‘unknowing’.154 
           This is not straightforward or easily determined but in the light of the Abrahamic story, it has 
consequences for authenticity. It is becoming clear that for Kierkegaard, an authentic 
expression of faith involves the leap of the learning individual who is a finite self (including 
both the aesthetic and ethical), away from the limitations of temporal (universal) aspects of 
Christianity, to the unknown. Whilst seemingly absurd and irrational, the unknown is absolute. 
How one comes to understand this in practical terms and indeed how one becomes a 
Christian is yet to be established and these issues will be considered later in the thesis. 
However, at this stage, it is necessary to conclude that in the light of Kierkegaard’s writing, the 
spiritual educator can no longer claim the right to assert how a learner comes to ‘know,’ but 
must now consider faith in terms of what we do not know. In a new perspective of Christian 
education, this idea is important and will be explored further in Chapter Five.  
           In the movement that is the leap of faith, Abraham is defined by de Silentio as a knight of 
faith. This title might also be subsequently applied to the Christian learner or teacher who 
suspends any essential claims to truth. Descriptions concerning this knight are posited in 
                                                          
154 This is risky and a leap that many do not or cannot consider. Yet this has significance for this thesis 




opposition to those concerning the knight of infinite resignation. Had Abraham retained the 
father/son relation, otherwise recognised as the universal/ individual, within the realm of the 
ethical, he would have been recognised as the knight of infinite resignation. In fact, the 
pseudonymous author recognises himself as such. The error of this knight is that he is only 
able to recognise the finite in the infinite in negative terms, therefore once suspended, his 
truth is groundless and the only telos is spiritual ‘death.’ According to Kierkegaard, such 
individuals are in sin (Kierkegaard, 1985: 66). 
           The knight of faith however oversteps the finite altogether for a higher telos. As this knight 
suspends the finite ethical state, he ‘determines his relation to the universal through his 
relation to the absolute’ (Kierkegaard, 1985: 82). This is not a relation of self and other that 
has no telos, but a relation in relation with the relation. The suspension does not lead to 
groundlessness, as nothing is resigned. Both positions remain. The knight of faith does not 
eschew the ethical; the ethical will always be there. Nevertheless, he goes beyond what is 
known to be good and true to recognise the truth of his faith. He finds the infinite in the finite 
positively. In suspending the ethical, and risking the life of his son, Abraham meets God. As 
Tubbs writes: ‘in his anxiety he has the leap of faith that what is error will be true’ (Tubbs, 
2009: 135). His unethical action becomes the truth of his faith. But in his anxiety and in the 
moment, he leaps into the unknown in order to grasp what is known absolutely: the love of 
God. 
           Fear and Trembling states that Abraham ‘believed on the strength of the absurd for all human 
calculation has long since been suspended’ (Kierkegaard, 1985: 45). At the end of his trial, 
Abraham ultimately ‘receives all back in full measure and overflowing’ as his son is returned to 
him (Kierkegaard, 1985: 91). He is given a last-minute reprieve and an animal is sacrificed in 
his son’s place. The character of Abraham as one who has made the leap of faith, makes the 
return to his temporal situation. He is the one who has found himself in absolute relation to 
the absolute (Kierkegaard, 1985: 72). The return is what distinguishes the Kierkegaardian 
perspective from others: for example, the knight of infinite resignation makes no return. In 
the return to the contingent ethical world, the transformed knight of faith understands 
himself more fully as a learner and understands himself and his contingent context155 now on 
the strength of the absolute, rather than on doctrine or Being.  
                                                          




           As a man of faith, he is greater than he who remained within the ethical (Kierkegaard, 1985: 
70). As a learner, the knight of faith has superseded ethics, philosophy and ‘comfortable’ 
religion to meet the absolute. Within Abraham’s faith resides his own truth in relation to his 
own experience of what he knows and understands. He is at rest. But along the way, he has 
encountered paradox and pain. Similarly, for the learning individual who is the knight of faith, 
the paradox156 and pain must also be embraced. 
           Pain is recognised as a necessary part of the process before the leap is made (Kierkegaard, 
1985: 57). On several occasions in Fear and Trembling, the anguish of Abraham’s choice to 
sacrifice his son in response to God’s call is made clear. Within the contradiction of the 
sacrifice is Abraham’s love for Isaac and his fear of God (Kierkegaard, 1985: 42). Within the 
action comes the distress, anguish and paradox of duty and right (Kierkegaard, 1985: 76). In 
the face of the impossibility of a return, there is torment (Kierkegaard, 1985: 58). The drama 
re-enacts the paradoxical biblical theme that life must be risked in order to be gained and 
contra- Hegel, Kierkegaard advocates the overcoming of the bondage of death for life (Rose, 
1992: 16).  
           For the spiritual learner, the pain of the loss of certainty must be embraced and it might be 
argued that without such pain, there can be no authenticity.157 For Christian education, the 
suspension of the ethical and subsequent return highlights the relation of knowledge to the 
knower to be a difficult one and as addressed earlier, considers the claims to essential 
knowledge antithetical to a learning perspective that aims to nurture faith. To that end, the 
new perspective of this thesis involves the loss of certainty and in so doing, presents a riskier 
means of teaching and learning. Yet in the desire for authenticity, Kierkegaard’s writing 
encourages the Christian educator and learner to make the leap.  
           To consider the truth of knowledge and knowing in relation to faith, Tubbs brings the 
discussion back to idea of the middle space (Tubbs, 2005: 228). The movement of the knight 
of infinite resignation might be described as linear. The movement of the knight of faith is the 
double movement of leap and return. For education, this movement represents the truth of 
learning being its relation to the learning of the truth (Tubbs, 2005: 229). Faith as the third 
partner of learning is the middle way that re-negotiates this relation as well as what is learnt. 
                                                          
156 The notion of paradox is explored shortly through the text Philosophical Fragments.  
157 This idea will be highlighted again by Rowan Williams in Chapter Five.  
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The suspension of the ethical and its return is the truth of faith and the truth of learning as 
faith. 
           Gillian Rose proposes that this educational shape, that is the relation of relations, is triune. 
Faith is in the relation of the broken middle in relation to the relation between the individual 
and absolute.158 Brokenness incites pain and this cannot be avoided. As a broken relation, it 
acknowledges the difficulty of the subject/object relationship but rather than seeking a 
resolution, it retains its inequality as an imperative. Rose posits that the broken middle re-
negotiates ‘the breaks between the universal and particular, inner morality and outer legality, 
individual autonomy and general heteronomy, active cognition and imposed norm’ (Rose, 
1992: xii).  
           For Rose and Tubbs, recognition of the struggle in the broken middle is true education. The 
more dangerous situation might reduce faith, promoting a perspective of learning that avoids 
‘the opposition which might induce process and pain, or without any risk of coming to know’ 
(Rose, 1992: 159). Rose continues that the double danger of leap and return is actually the 
only undangerous position: it is one that does not liberate itself from one dominion, but 
submits to other (Rose, 1992: 159). Although Abraham ‘grasped’ the eternal, it is still unclear 
how God might be ‘known’ and this significant question is now explored through the final 
text: Philosophical Fragments. 
           3.5 The paradox: Philosophical Fragments 
           The conundrum explored in this text is such: how might the relationship between an individual 
and God be known in human existence? Walsh proposes that the aim of Philosophical 
Fragments is the passionate attempt to discover what thought cannot think (Walsh, 2009: 55). 
In contrast to the many attempts to prove the existence of God through (for example) the 
ontological argument,159 in which philosophers endeavour to apply a presupposed notion of 
‘God’ as object to the individual,160 Kierkegaard recognises God as a transcendent subject that 
might be encountered subjectively in personal experience (Tubbs, 2009: 55).  
                                                          
158 The triune shape is an important signpost towards later chapters.  
159 The ontological argument, promoted by Anselm of Canterbury, an eleventh century theologian, 
proposed that as God a being that while essential, exists in the mind, and therefore must exist as it is 
greater than the mind that thinks it (Seung, 2007: 86). Kant however critiqued this assertion. As Seung 
points out, Kant argues that as predicates are applied to the concept of God that is thought, God 
becomes a contingent being and must exist contingency. Seung writes that for Kant, ‘the existence of 
God is already contained in the concept of God’ (Seung, 2007: 87). 
160 Inverted commas are used here to designate the provisional label given to the transcendent object 
of enquiry. For Kierkegaard however, the term is used without the need for any. 
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           Under the guise of Johannes Climacus, who according to Tubbs is the pseudonym of his 
philosophical doubt (Tubbs, 2005: 219), Kierkegaard considers that God might be experienced 
by suspending temporal notions of the transcendent as described above and bringing the 
learning individual into a relation with the relation. This relation of relation might also be 
represented by what Tubbs calls ‘subjectivity’s subjectivity’ (Tubbs, 2009: 135). Since 
subjectivity per se experiences itself as groundless, this highlights the importance of 
subjectivity’s relation with relation. This triune relation is Kierkegaard’s fingerprint and 
representing the dialectic of self and other in relation to the absolute as the means of coming 
to know ‘God’, as Collins asserts, this ‘gave a moral and religious meaning to subjectivity’ 
(Collins, 1983: 140). 
           The sub-title of Philosophical Fragments is presented as a question: ‘Is an historical point of 
departure possible for an eternal consciousness?’ (Kierkegaard, 1974: title page). In other 
words, its enquiry considers whether a learning individual requires tradition and thought in 
order to know God. The question intimates that the author seeks to ‘suspend’ historical, 
epistemological and conventional beliefs and practices in favour of uncertainty regarding 
eternal. However, in order to unravel this idea, he explores two modes of thinking and 
learning, that is Socratic recollection and Christianity, and considers how in each the absolute 
comes to be known.  
           Socrates’ ideas regarding knowledge and learning are outlined in the text Meno by Plato (Plato 
1956), in which the former is questioned by the latter and invited to defend his pedagogical 
position. A more explicit outline of this text is provided in Chapter Four in the context of the 
relation of learning and the learner. Here however, Kierkegaard’s reflections on this position 
in the early part of Philosophical Fragments are outlined in relation to the question of 
knowing God.  
           According to Kierkegaard, Socrates’ negative epistemology sees knowledge as implicit. 
Learning is considered as an act of remembering (Kierkegaard, 1974: 11). Truth is not applied 
from the outside to the learner, but is drawn out from within. Thus, the teacher acts as a 
midwife who leads the learner into the truth of his own knowing. The truth of the knower lies 
in his questioning and the questioner is able to acquire the truth by recollecting and 
remembering (Kierkegaard, 1974: 15). Kierkegaard notes that as the individual is the centre of 
learning, his self-knowledge is his knowledge of God (Kierkegaard, 1974: 14). Equally, since 
the eternal as highlighted in his original question is already present in truth, this truth is 
brought to consciousness at the moment of recollection (Kierkegaard, 1974: 16). 
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           This has resonance with examples of spiritual pedagogy in Paradigm Two, in which it might be 
argued, an historical departure is not required for knowledge concerning the eternal (or in the 
rhetoric of the paradigm, the transcendent). Rather, as according to Hyde, learners’ 
ontological predisposition to create their own meanings allows them to recollect their own 
truths in the light of their own experience, albeit often at odds with the wider tradition. The 
teacher acts like a Socratic midwife, with acts of wondering or questioning leading learners to 
‘draw from an eclectic range of frameworks in order that they can create meaning for 
themselves’ (Hyde, 2008: 120).  
           In order to seek a solution to his question, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous counterpart identifies 
that Socratic ideology is in fact inadequate and he presents three problems for learning. In the 
first place he considers whether the learner, being in the negative state of not-knowing before 
recollection, can actually possess the truth. Rather than being drawn to what he knows, 
recollection only serves to remind him of what he does not know. ‘He is then in a state of 
error’ (Kierkegaard, 1974: 17). Secondly, in this state of error, the role of the teacher is to 
remind the learner of his error. The teacher as servant pushes the learner away from himself 
so that the learner will learn of his own truth, but in so doing, this highlights once more that 
this truth is in fact error (Kierkegaard, 1974: 17).  
           The third problem concerns the learner. In his error, the learner is constantly in the state of 
departure from truth which is sin, necessitating a return through repentance (Kierkegaard, 
1974: 23). This again highlights the groundlessness of the negative state and highlights the 
importance of the relation of the learning individual with the relation of error and truth. Albeit 
purporting to avoid mastery, Tubbs also incites Socrates as being a master. He is a negative 
master. In depriving his students of answers, Tubbs argues that Socrates only pulls the rug 
from under their epistemological feet, leaving them to look down into an ‘abyss that 
threatens nihilism’ (Tubbs, 2005: 219). Education then must not be groundless or negative – it 
must have substance.  
           Kierkegaard proposes that for learners to obtain truth, the teacher must bring it to them. The 
teacher should also provide the conditions necessary for understanding the truth in a personal 
way (Kierkegaard, 1974: 17) so that the truth given to them has meaning in terms of their 
historical and contingent lives.162 Learning in Kierkegaard is not just about gaining knowledge, 
                                                          
162 In Paradigm Two, the term ‘condition’ most often pertains to the means by which educators allow 
for children to make their own meaning in the light of their innate spirituality and personal experiences. 
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but about being transformed through reflection on the truth. Here the transformational force, 
or Spirit, is ‘the God’ (Kierkegaard, 1974: 19). ‘The God,’ acting as the condition for learning, 
prompts learners to be reminded that they are in error in their own immediacy. When they 
receive the truth, he provides and they reflect on this in the light of their own contingency, 
they can be transformed (Kierkegaard, 1974: 23). This transformation might again equate to 
conversion, but is considered differently here. The triune shape of the learner, ‘the God’ and 
learning, highlights a move away from the linear process of conversion described in previous 
chapters, to present a dialectical relation of relation. It is the conjecture of this thesis then, 
that in a new perspective of Christian education, transformation might occur through 
reflection on the learner’s relation with learning about God. 
           This again is subjectivity’s subjectivity (Tubbs, 2005: 221). Gardiner notes that the teacher who 
allows for this learning comes as an equal and communicates with the learner on level terms. 
This learning situation is now illustrated not by Socratic recollection but by the Christian idea 
of the incarnation. The incarnation represents God made man in Christ (Gardiner, 1988: 75). 
Although as Gardiner points out, Philosophical Fragments here does not aim to present 
Christianity as an ultimate answer to the question posed, it nevertheless serves to accentuate 
the intellectual difficulty presented by the question and stresses the epistemological problem 
of how the God-man relation might be understood (Gardiner, 1988: 77). The incarnation 
represents what Kierkegaard calls the ‘Absolute Paradox’ (Kierkegaard, 1974: 46). This 
paradox requires that the eternal enters the temporal and takes on the limits of finite 
existence (Gardiner, 1988: 76). As stated in the text: ‘in order that the union may be brought 
about, the God must therefore become the equal of such a one and so he will appear in the 
likeness of the humblest’ (Kierkegaard, 1974: 39). He suggests that it is impossible for human 
cognition to understand it (Kierkegaard, 1974: 46); hence this is an offense to reason 
(Kierkegaard, 1974: 61). 
           Similarly, the idea of God, not being an objective proven reality, is the unknown. Kierkegaard 
states that to seek to prove the existence of God would be to ‘develop the ideality I have 
presupposed’ (Kierkegaard, 1974: 52). This would be meaningless since it is only ideality in 
theory and offers little in terms of bringing God’s existence to actuality (Kierkegaard, 1974: 
53). To give the name ‘God’ to the unknown is paradoxical since the unknown cannot be 
known. In giving a name, it is reduced and expressed (Kierkegaard, 1974: 55). Yet without a 
name (or mark), the unknown is undistinguished and cannot be disclosed. (Kierkegaard, 1974: 
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57). The author then proposes that the learner should let go of the God-conception to make 
the unmediated qualitative leap of faith that is not in any way presupposed. 
           This leap opens up the ‘broken middle.’ The move away from subjective ideas regarding the 
absolute highlights again the middle space within a paradoxical triune relational shape. In this 
shape, self and other are brought into a relation of contradiction and reflection. Spirit as the 
third partner in learning highlights the significance of the paradox and in the middle space, 
identifies the work of reflection on the unequal relation as education. In the light of 
Kierkegaard’s writing, it might be suggested that Spirit is the work of learning that takes place 
in the middle of the absolute and individual, history and immediacy, objectivity and 
subjectivity, and truth and doubt. Spirit here is not the affective ‘heightening of awareness’ 
introduced by Hay and Nye (Hay and Nye, 2006: 21) but in the middle space, is the means by 
which authentic learning takes place.  
           3.6 Summary  
           Having philosophically underlined key ideas regarding relation as well as error and truth in 
both paradigms, and by offering a critique of the ideas of dualism, objectivity and immediacy, 
it has been identified how the current discussion, through engagement with the philosophies 
of both Heidegger and Hegel, has paved the way for Kierkegaard. The writing of this author 
has emerged as having educational importance and in his consideration of faith, the 
Kierkegaardian texts explored so far have significance for a new perspective in Christian 
education. In particular, Kierkegaard’s ideas encourage the Christian spiritual educator to 
reconsider telos. Through his teleological suspension of the ethical, his ideas transcend any 
claims that a life of faith is attained through the completion of a formulaic response to 
learning; furthermore, as a result of his view that in the leap of faith the infinite is recognised 
in the finite, subjective immediacy becomes inadequate. Rather, Kierkegaard’s movement of 
faith requires a leap to the unknown that is the absolute.  
           Whilst recognising the oppositions of subject and object, Kierkegaard’s triune relational shape, 
described earlier as the relation of relations, or as Tubbs proposes, subjectivity’s subjectivity 
(Tubbs, 2009: 135), reinforces the folly of dualism. Its relationality prevents Being from 
becoming its own truth and the brokenness of this unequal relation disallows systemisation 
and conclusions. As such, it allows learning individuals and educators to suspend any claim to 
their own positions and perspectives, to recognise learning as Spirit in the movement beyond 
certainty, and to identify the educational imperative of encountering the absolute. Including 
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the loss of the ethical self to the absolute, and in the return to the self and the world on the 
strength of the absolute, the learning individual is transformed. The pain of this position 
cannot be ignored however, and taking the current thesis forward, the difficulties of 
proposing a perspective of Christian education for an authentic life of faith are reinforced. 
           It is necessary at this point to consider how the discussion so far is relevant to Christian 
education. Having identified the proposed inadequacies of perspectives in the paradigms 
outlined in the Literature Review, as well as the issues that arise when each are considered as 
sufficient in themselves, and having recognised the problems with the dualistic positing of 
paradigms, this thesis has philosophically explored the nature of learning as Spirit in three 
different contexts and highlighted the role of the relationship of self and other in coming to 
know. As Kierkegaardian philosophy has taken the discussion away from knowing to 
unknowing, as well as presenting a new educational shape, the need for Christian learning 
that suspends certainty is highlighted, suggesting that educator might be concerned less with 
teaching agreed doctrine without recognition of the contingent life of the learning individual, 
and more concerned with allowing learners to embrace the aporia of unknowing. 
           The implication of this for Christian education, is that educators and learning individuals must 
be willing to accept risk. Suspending the certainties that come through locating oneself within 
a particular paradigm, and making the leap away from the claim to the perspectives of that 
paradigm, education now allows for the opening of the middle space in which mediation and 
contingency are embraced and the illusion of the illusion is recognised. This might mean that 
educators refrain from presenting their own meanings regarding Bible passages or Christian 
teachings, allowing learners the opportunity in the broken middle not only to negotiate their 
own meanings, but to also critically assess these meanings and apply them to their lives in the 
light of the Christian tradition of which they are a part. It might also mean that space is 
created not only for learning to take place on the strength of an ontological predisposition, 
but on the strength of an encounter with the absolute (or in the context of church -based 
education, God). It is proposed that educators might consider how to create the conditions in 
which this encounter might take place. As this is addressed more fully in later chapters, a 
more practical outline of how these ideas might be implemented in practice will be presented 
in the concluding chapter of this thesis.  
           In order to explore what a new perspective in authentic Christian education might look like, 
the following chapters highlight how both a cyclic movement of learning and a broken 
relational shape become the basis for pedagogy that is authentic to individuals and the 
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tradition, as well as learners and the absolute. Each chapter has a specific focus: relation, faith 
and learning respectively. Additional Kierkegaardian texts present as the theoretical 
framework for further consideration of the research question, with secondary sources by 
Rowan Williams (Williams 2000; 2003) and Gillian Rose (Rose 1992; 1996), highlighting 
relevant theological and educational themes. This exploration of movement and relation thus 
paves the way for a consideration of ‘Repetition’ and ‘Bildung’ as learning tools, before 
outlining how a new perspective in Christian education might be described as ‘Bildung as 
repetition.’  
           Chapter Four provides a more detailed appraisal of relation and in particular a consideration 
of the positions of teacher and learner in Christian education. It further explores ideas already 
introduced such as agency, power and the middle space and begins to assess how 
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           CHAPTER FOUR: RELATION 
           4.1 Introduction 
           In this thesis, the idea of relation in Christian education is first introduced in the Literature 
Review and critiqued in terms of dualism. In dualism, two different modes of learning are 
presented in terms of a subject/object division. Summarising their positions in terms of two 
contrasting paradigms, these modes prioritise either separation or immediacy, and for 
pedagogy it seems that teachers must choose (Hyde, 2008: 117). The Literature Review also 
describes how scholars such as David Tacey and David Hay posit spirituality against religion.163 
Additionally, in other chapters, relations such as the teacher and learner, subjectivity and 
objectivity and the individual and absolute, are all considered either in terms of Being-in-the-
world,164 the dialectic of a master and slave,165 or in the relation of relations.166 Philosophical 
ideas such as misrecognition and illusion167 highlight the inadequacies of dualism and the 
thesis to this point has considered how the self and other relation might be re-evaluated. 
           At this stage, and to introduce the following discussion, attention to context regarding dualism 
is necessary. Having identified the literature of Children’s Spirituality as a framework for 
Paradigm Two, it is important to note that the principal texts cited 168 provide the most 
formative arguments within the discipline. At their time of publication, each contributed 
something new to the discourse. What often inspired dualism was a reaction to what was 
perceived to be the totalising nature of spiritual education rooted in a religious tradition, 
resulting in scholars seeking to prioritise the holistic and experiential nature of a corporeal or 
affective pedagogy. This alternate approach was perceived as less dogmatic and more open-
ended, thus from a political perspective, more democratic and inclusive.  
            It is also important to note that the significant literature was published in the decade 
between 1998 and 2008, most likely influenced by the publication of The Spiritual life of 
Children (Coles, 1990) by Robert Coles. This is a watershed text that for the first time, drew a 
distinction between religion and spirituality. Also significant was the promotion of spirituality 
as an educational value through its inclusion in inspection criteria for schools in England and 
                                                          
163 See pages 35-6. 
164 See page 47.  
165 See pages 82-4. 
166 See page 85. 
167 See page 85-8. 
168 These predominant texts are authored by Hay and Nye (1998; 2006), Erricker and Erricker (2000), 
Hart (2003), Tacey (2004), Hyde (2008) and Nye (2009). 
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Wales (OFSTED, 1994: 8). Both The Spiritual life of Children and directives from Government 
gave scholars and practitioners a secular language with which to describe spirituality, and with 
the introduction of the International Journal of Children’s Spirituality 169 followed by 
international conferences relating to children’s spirituality,170 a rapid increase in interest in 
this area as an academic discipline took place.  
           As indicated earlier, Christian scholars with an interest in children’s spirituality sought to 
negotiate the relation between the religious tradition and the spiritual life of the child by 
adopting a mutual dialogic approach. This is illustrated in the ideas of Rebecca Nye who 
considers the subjective value of the individual child in learning, still within the Christian 
religious tradition (Nye, 2009: 5-9). This is also evident in the educational method Godly Play, 
which aims to nurture the relationship between the individual learner and the Christian 
tradition for authentic spiritual development within a life of faith (Berryman, 1991: 60). As 
suggested earlier however, when handled philosophically, mutuality might be deemed 
inadequate for the task of providing a sufficient answer to the question of   how educators 
might promote authentic learning in Christian education. Chapters Two and Three considered 
this in detail. 
           More recent literature within the discipline of children’s spirituality deviates from the mutual 
dialogical approach. From the turn of the decade onwards, criticality regarding both mutuality 
and dualism entered the discourse. This is exemplified in an article by Jacqueline Watson that, 
although written in the context of school-based Religious Education, provides a significant 
turning point in the conversation. Watson critiques mutual dialogic approaches to education 
in a manner similar to that of Hegel. She observes that akin to community cohesion, their 
focus is on celebrating similarities and encouraging co-operation (Watson, 2011: 100), which 
she argues does not contribute to spiritual development.171 
           Rather, Watson draws on the example of inter-faith dialogue to support her thesis, which 
claims that differences need to be maintained. She suggests that when dialogic partners 
discover the value of difference, which she identifies might take place through discussion 
(Watson, 2011: 105), space is created in which each can evaluate themselves in the light of 
the other. This approach is riskier for both learners and those who provide a learning context. 
She advocates that what is needed is a paradigm that leads students ‘towards the less 
                                                          
169 See http://www.childrenspirituality.org/publications/ijcs.asp accessed on 23/03/2016 
170 See www.childrenspirituality.org/conferences accessed on 10/10/2016 
171 See Hegel, 1977: 9.  
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comfortable aspects of dialogue in which difference and disagreement is acknowledged’ 
(Watson, 2011: 107) and contends that this approach is transformative for each learning 
partner as well as education (Watson, 2011: 106). 
           The significance of the space highlighted here is also recognised in other academic literature. 
Recent articles published in the International Journal of Children’s Spirituality note how the 
gap between self and other inspires authentic learning and this space is recognised for 
example as a place of negotiation and creativity. In particular, articles consider how the 
middle space revises the relation of inner and outer realities and reimagines the teacher and 
learner separation. Published elsewhere and also critiquing dualism, popular Christian authors 
Ivy Beckwith and David Csinos cite John Westerhoff’s assertion that failure to keep ‘two 
diametrically opposed views in tension’ is heresy (Beckwith and Csinos, 2013: 69). The authors 
recognise that finding a third or middle way between positions such as the traditional and 
personal not only re-evaluates existing paradigms but allows for the discovery of new ones 
(Beckwith and Csinos, 2013: 70). In their book Children’s ministry in the way of Jesus, they 
suggest that ‘truth is in the tension’ (Beckwith and Csinos, 2013: 69), and reflecting both 
Watson’s assertions as well the Kierkegaardian aspect of the current thesis, this paves the way 
for a new perspective in Christian education.172  
           In this thesis, the relation of relations is considered as the locus of learning; therefore, 
positions are not important. Indeed, what is learnt in each position is equally unimportant. 
What is significant is the relation between the learner and learning (that also includes the 
tradition and a notion of ‘God’) and subsequently the means by which learners learn. This 
involves the proposition that learning takes place not only between the relation of self and 
other but equally the through the relation that transcends this relation. The current chapter, 
which includes ideas from Levinas as well as Kierkegaard, explores how recognition of the 
relation of relations that is the relation of self, other and Other, is the beginning of learning 
coming to know the truth of itself. This then serves to lead educators beyond what now might 
simply be described as dualism or dialogue, to the acceptance of a third dimension in learning.  
           It is clear then that the way forward for Christian education is the re-negotiation of relation. 
The current chapter explores both the relation of the learner and teacher as well as learning 
and the learner. As indicated above, Kierkegaard’s writings provide relevant commentary. 
Furthermore, recent articles from the International Journal of Children’s Spirituality are also 
                                                          
172 Although Beckwith and Csinos propose the development of a new paradigm, the focus in the current 
thesis is on a new perspective.  
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cited, allowing for comment on the issues of power and control in learning as well as the 
promotion of the idea of a middle space.173  
           4.2 The learner and teacher 
           An article by Christian educator Heather Ingersoll, published in the August 2014 edition of the 
International Journal of Children’s Spirituality, describes the author’s experience of the 
relationship between the learner and teacher in her working context, that is the Protestant 
American church. She incites this learning situation as reflecting pedagogical mastery, 
exemplified through tokenism (Ingersoll, 2014: 168), high entertainment value (Ingersoll, 
2014: 167), reliance on content acquisition (Ingersoll, 2014: 167) and ‘adultism’ where 
‘practice for nurturing children’s spirituality is seen in the priority of adult needs’ (Ingersoll, 
2014: 170). Each of these examples are highlighted as barriers to spiritual development and 
these she perceives, result in disengagement and disconnect on the part of young people.  
           In each strand, the influence of the adult in learning is strong. This is resonant of Tubbs’ 
assertion that in this learning situation, the adult knows in advance what is to be learnt. Tubbs 
argues that this teacher transmits the presuppositions of a tradition or community to 
recipients who internalise, repeat and even imitate the information they attain (Tubbs, 2005: 
69-70). The learner here might be described as a ‘blank slate on which knowledge must be 
impressed’ (Tubbs, 2005: 69). In Kierkegaard’s Concluding Scientific Postscript to Philosophical 
Fragments, this learner is illustrated as a speculator: one who ‘looks on’ learning. Writing with 
a Christian context in mind, Kierkegaard suggests that such learners accept the tenets of faith 
as a matter of knowing (Kierkegaard, 1992: 215) and comprehend the truth of these tenets as 
the truth of Christianity (Kierkegaard, 1992: 223). Everything is explained, untruth is corrected 
and the paradox of knowing and unknowing is removed (Kierkegaard, 1992: 219). 
           The situation described here is clearly reminiscent of the examples of Paradigm One practice 
outlined in the Literature Review. According to Ingersoll, this does not equate to spiritual 
authenticity. The roles of teacher and learner then must be re-evaluated. What she argues for, 
reminiscent of Paradigm Two rhetoric, is a counter-paradigm in which the priority lies with the 
learner (Ingersoll, 2014: 165). She offers the idea of the ‘centralisation of child faith’ as a 
                                                          
173 A significant point here is that the critical voices are those of new authors. Critical evaluations do not 
come from within the paradigm, but from those seeking to make sense of it. Evidenced in conference 
papers and key note addresses, the authors cited in the Literature Review still hold to their positions. 
However, as will be outlined in due course, a more philosophical review of the paradigm urges scholars 
and practitioners to think again. 
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solution and as a Christian educator, she underpins her idea biblically. Citing the words of 
Christ, ‘unless you change and become like little children you will never enter the kingdom of 
heaven,’174 she suggests that children should ‘be in the midst’ (Ingersoll, 2014: 172) of all 
Christian pedagogy, and as such proposes that children might become spiritual agents 
(Ingersoll, 2014: 166).175 
           Akin to the views of Nye, Pridmore and Privett, all introduced in the Literature Review, 
Ingersoll’s proposition prioritises the individual child without negating the framework of the 
Christian tradition; thus, recognition of the significance of the subjective learner’s responses 
to objective truth claims sets her ideas apart from those of Tacey, Hart and Hyde. Her ideas 
however reinforce the idea from Jerome Berryman, founder of Godly Play, that akin to a 
‘player-coach,’ adult educators must recognise when to take a back seat when it comes to the 
spiritual development of the learner (Berryman, 1991: 17); therefore, although the Christian 
educator and tradition play a part in learning, the power of the ‘master’ must be reduced. 
           In the light of the current thesis, it might be argued that when an intentional move is made 
away from authority figures in learning, the teacher becomes valorised (Rose, 1996: 5). Here 
control and power are re-positioned. Although the learner has more autonomy, mastery in a 
different form is legitimised. As Tubbs writes: ‘the teacher who teaches for the freedom of the 
students’ own learning finds herself having to use her authority over the students to do so 
(Tubbs, 2005: 109). This is stated no less emphatically by Hegel whose ‘slave’ similarly seeks 
autonomy (Hegel, 1977: 123). In coming to know the truth of himself, the slave attempts the 
death of the other. Yet the truth of the slave is that he is not free. As outlined in Chapter Two, 
when the slave attains his own essentiality, he in turn demonstrates mastery. His own dogmas 
are formed from the deconstruction of those from which he is freed. The truth of this new 
position is illusory (Hegel, 1977: 124). In the light of this, the idea of the agent being an 
authentic learner might thus be deemed erroneous, and so must be reconsidered. 
           Critique here is provided by contemporary Belgian scholar Matcheld Reynaert, who in the 
2014 issue of the International Journal of Children’s Spirituality, alerts readers to how learning 
in this counter-paradigm might equally be influenced by forms of power (Reynaert, 2014: 
179). She argues that the freedom and autonomy of the spiritual learner is an illusion. 
Reynaert raises awareness of how ‘nurturing spirituality’ through the open and egalitarian 
methodologies proposed in this paradigm might indeed ‘penetrate and shape the life of the 
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individual in a subtle way’ (Reynaert, 2014: 180). She describes how the ethos of placing the 
‘child in the midst’ (Reynaert, 2014: 173) contains the possibility for other forms of power to 
be at work. In so doing, she reviews the wondering and questioning methods of Godly Play in 
which learners integrate their own feelings and ideas within the framework of a Bible story. 
For instance, she suggests that in this method, the direction of learning might be driven away 
from the tradition rather than to it, thus asserting power conversely. Too much power given 
to the learner she argues, is a form of spiritual abuse since learners are left to go their own 
way (Reynaert, 2014: 182), whilst making sense of experiences in isolation. 
           The reduced importance of the adult, using Nye’s statement ‘it is not only about words’ (Nye, 
2009: 29) as an example, might lead the child (or learning individual) to consider that the adult 
(or teacher) does not care about what he or she says, or to suppose that any religious 
reference point is unnecessary (Reynaert, 2014: 182). In all these examples, Reynaert 
highlights how over-emphasising the child as a fully free and autonomous subject might be an 
abuse of power (Reynaert, 2014: 183) and urges caregivers to ‘be aware of the role they take 
in nurturing children’s spirituality’ (Reynaert, 2014: 185). It might be argued that complete 
open-endedness without frameworks and resources can cause confusion and potential 
personal harm. Teacher removal, whilst purporting to avoid positioning, actually reinforces a 
counter-spiritual position and thus allows for ‘anything to become possible’ (Wills, 2014: 195).  
           Reynaert also argues that any mutual relationship of self and other can never be fully equal. 
She describes how in such learning situations, one partner will always have the upper hand 
(Reynaert, 2014: 180). This partner will necessarily direct the learning. Furthermore, she 
critiques the image of the teacher as a guide who ‘can best nurture the spiritual lives of 
children by walking with them on the journey’ (Csinos, 2011: 11-2). This implies a mutual 
learning journey in which both teacher and learner make discoveries together as equals. Yet 
as she notes, power is present implicitly; the guide does know the way ahead and will direct 
the journey accordingly (Reynaert, 2014: 184). Often the safest route is taken and detours are 
made around difficult areas, be they issues of ethics and morals, unpalatable Bible stories or 
even the darker side of spirituality (Adams, 2010: 75; de Souza, 2012: 297). 
           Reynaert concludes that in spiritual educational practice, attention then should be given to 
the ‘intertwinement of power and care’ (Reynaert, 2014: 185). This calls for a criticality that is 
able to identify the illusion of agency and recognise how the proposed freedom of the learner 
is misrecognised. In the scenarios critiqued by Reynaert, the individual has the same self-
sufficient status as Hegel’s in-itself: the autonomous learner retains essentiality whilst the 
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dialogic learner is an entity in-itself in relation to the teacher who is also an entity in-itself. Yet 
as Hegel argues, nothing can be known in-itself (Hegel, 1977: 114). In both cases neither self 
nor other is prepared to recognise the other as part of itself and so the illusion ensues.  
           Whatever is posited as essential is also negated by something unessential and mediated 
through another. Therefore, its truth lies only in relation to ‘other’ (Hegel, 1977: 58). Each 
needs the other for its own education. What is needed then is a new perspective in which 
both teachers and learners are valued as a vital part of learning. Yet here, both are able to 
recognise the illusion of their own self-sufficiency and be prepared, as proposed by Watson 
above,176 to accept their uneasy relation as the beginning of authentic education.  
           In the new perspective, neither the teacher or learner is a master: it is the absolute as Spirit 
that inspires spiritual growth. In the relation of relations, mastery and self-sufficiency are 
interrupted. In the new perspective, as will be outlined in due course, it is also the 
interruption of self-sufficiency on the part of the absolute that re-evaluates power in 
education, and this interruption allows for the work of Spirit in the middle space. This work is 
the education that leads to authentic learning. These ideas will be explored in Kierkegaardian 
terms in Chapters Five and Six. However, at this point, these propositions might also be 
illustrated by ideas from 20th century philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. In Totality and Infinity 
(2003), Levinas handles the issue of relation in relation to an Absolute Other.  
           As much as his writing is not pedagogical per se, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas’s ideas 
advocate the necessity of learners and teachers recognising the relation of self with an 
absolute Other for an authentic understanding of the self. Therefore, these ideas contribute 
to the ongoing notion of a new educational perspective in which there is no master. Levinas’s 
thinking is written in response to the philosophies of (for instance) Socrates, Hegel and 
Heidegger and comments on notions within philosophy such as thought and Being in terms of 
totality. In the light of his assertion that totality is ‘the possibility of signification without a 
context,’ he alludes to objectivity and absolutism (Levinas, 2003: 21), and representation 
(Levinas, 2003: 24) as examples. Additionally, the primal identity that might otherwise be 
translated as ‘spiritual agency,’ and is both essential and contextual, is as much identified with 
the universality of ‘I’ and therefore totality, as that which is absolute (Levinas, 2003:  34). This 
‘I’ is self-sufficient: its subjective identity being its own content (Levinas, 2003: 36).  
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           Moreover, Levinas argues that even in a dialogic relation, self-reflection is evident (Levinas, 
2003: 36). Therefore, he argues that this relation, illustrated above as mutual learning that 
might be expressed as A=A, equates to completion and systematisation as well as to self-
certainty and totality (Levinas, 2003: 37). All these ideas are already familiar.177 However, the 
author’s intention is not to subvert these ideas nor indeed to subvert totality; his task is to 
reimagine them in the light of the Other that is beyond relation. This Other is infinity. Being 
metaphysical, Levinas’s infinity is a dimension of externality that exceeds ‘the knowledge of 
measuring things’ (Levinas, 2003: 34). It surpasses the universality of the ‘I’ that thinks and 
therefore the totality of meaning that dominates Western Philosophy (Levinas, 2003: 21). It 
cannot be considered as in-itself but rather corresponds to the idea of the Other who is 
unknowable.178 Therefore it breaks up any categories that the ‘I’ has made for itself, for 
example ego, and recognises its value not in-itself but in relation to Other.179  
           Being transcendent, infinity is beyond the representation of ‘other,’ or as explored above, the 
representation of the story of God as presented in external and agreed terms.180 According to 
Levinas, through representation, the Other would dissolve into the same, thus again resulting 
in a totality (Levinas, 2003: 38). Rather, the Other should not be disclosed or revealed outside 
of the individual as its nature cannot be made clear. Infinity transcends truth presented as in-
itself and avoids any claims to essentiality. As such the representation of a transcendent Other 
on the part of a teacher who is a master, is a flawed representation. Yet equally as 
immanence, the Other cannot either be reduced to immediate knowledge (Levinas, 2003: 27) 
and so the self-sufficient subjectivity of the learner who is an agent is also posited as opinion 
and illusion (Levinas, 2003: 23). For authenticity, both teacher and learner must be brought 
into relation with externality. 
           The relation of totality and infinity is not presented as self and other in opposition; neither 
does it represent self in other or the negation of other as in the Hegelian system. Levinas’s 
proposition rather considers the idea of infinity as that which is ‘produced in the relationship 
of same with other’ (Levinas, 2003: 33). He states that there is ‘a gleam of exteriority in the 
face of other’ (Levinas, 2003: 24) and as such each relates to the other face to face. The 
                                                          
177 A similar assertion is presented in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel, 1977: 9). 
178The idea of the unknowable Other is also Kierkegaardian and is considered in more detail later in the 
current chapter. 
179 The action of breaking up as cited here, is later reflected in the actions of interruption and rupture, 
which having theological and educational significance, are given further attention later in the current 
chapter as well as in Chapters Five and Six.  
180 See pages 78-9.  
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absolutely other that is Other (Levinas, 2003: 39) is ‘absolute exteriority’ (Levinas, 2003: 35) 
and entirely unknown. Therefore, the relation is imperfect. In the light of infinity, the relation 
includes both the same and other, and Other. This does not reflect mutual recognition or add 
up to a totality. The Other is irreducible, hence the ‘same’ has no power over this Other and 
vice versa.  This is reminiscent of the unequal triune shape introduced in Chapter Three and 
subjectivity’s subjectivity that continues as a recurring theme.181  
           When all ideas are founded on the idea of infinity, any self-sufficiency regarding thought, 
Being and representation is interrupted (Levinas, 2003: 26). The idea of interruption now 
highlights a significant theme in the current thesis, as any perspective, paradigm or position 
in-itself claimed as truth is now broken. Levinas is clear that infinity is not an end result to be 
attained but that which, in an intentional movement, enters the now. This entering is the 
movement by which the in-itself is ruptured. Learning then is not an evasion of, but an 
intentional move towards the Other. As Levinas asserts, the transcendent is ‘other with 
respect to a term whose essence is to remain at the point of departure, to serve as entry into 
the relation, to be the same absolutely’ (Levinas, 2003: 36). In summary, infinity highlights the 
relation of both teacher and learner with an unknowable Absolute Other who whilst 
remaining absolute, intervenes.  
           These points again resonate with the Kierkegaardian assertions of Chapter Three, and having 
significance for the current discussion, they will be considered again in more detail later. The 
movement of desire towards the Absolute Other reflects a journey towards that which is 
beyond definition, completion and irreducibility (Levinas, 2003: 33-5). It is important to note 
that the movement is towards the Other and not away as in the case of the agent; neither 
does the movement represent the overcoming of the other. The movement rather is 
described as ‘transcendent intention’ and is summarised as ethics (Levinas, 2003: 28). For 
Levinas, the face of the Other is the motivation for ethical action.  
           For a new perspective in Christian spiritual education, Levinas’s ideas have significance. It 
might be suggested that agency such as that proposed by Ingersoll and Hyde, reduces the 
other to the same (Levinas, 2003: 42). This is made evident when the learner makes meaning 
at the expense of the adult teacher. However, Levinas argues that this freedom on the part of 
the learner, renounces the desire for the metaphysical relation and becomes its own truth.  
This also has Hegelian resonance. The ‘same’ must be critiqued but critique can only be 
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brought about by the Other; the truth of the individual is only evident through dependence on 
the other (Levinas, 2003: 43) in relation to Other. Therefore, the presence of both the teacher 
and learner are required in learning but their truth is only gained through the intervention of 
the Absolute Other.  
           This is illustrated by Levinas in terms of the use of the conjunction ‘and’ which in this context 
of relation, disallows the wielding of power of one term over another. He suggests that the 
relation of self ‘and’ other is like a conversation in which both partners, whilst retaining their 
own distinctive identities, recognise the importance of self ‘and’ other in relation with Other. 
Each partner is not a contingent formation by which one becomes the other – there is still a 
distance between them. However, as ‘transcendence is the traversing of the distance’ 
(Levinas, 2003: 39), the ethical movement of desire towards the Absolute Other ensures that 
no partner aspires to totality. The teacher-learner relation must then be recognised in relation 
with the Other that is both infinite and unknown.  
           Interestingly, religion is cited as one example of such a conversation, in which the same and 
other (individual and tradition) whilst remaining distinctive, still relate. Again, this has 
resonance with Watson’s proposition introduced above, that distinctives must remain 
(Watson, 2011: 107).182 In relation to the Absolute, the same and other relate but not in 
totality (Levinas, 2003: 40). In terms of Christian spiritual education then it might be suggested 
that the relation of the teacher and learner relates to the relation with the Absolute Other 
who is unknowable and irreducible. As a result of this, any totality regarding thought, Being 
and representation is interrupted, allowing for the possibility of new concepts and ideas to 
emerge, and ensuring a pedagogical movement that is organic, fluid and open to personal and 
communal transformation.183 
           Levinas’s thinking here, whilst resonant of previous material, also provides a platform from 
which the process of learning can be explored. Chapter Six focuses on learning as a priority 
and in that chapter, the notions of the triune relational shape, the interruption of self-
sufficiency and the movement to the Absolute Other are all considered. At this point however, 
relation is now investigated in terms of learning and the learner, including an evaluation of 
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183 David Tacey’s text The Spirituality Revolution is responsive to this idea in terms of his understanding 
of ‘God.’ Whilst not negating the idea of God, he suggests that Spirit sets free old forms of 
representation, changes the shape of how ‘God’ might be perceived and furthermore accepts that 
these new shapes might not necessarily be religious (Tacey, 2004: 158). 
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the middle space, and an identification of the significance of this space in a new perspective of 
Christian education.  
           4.3 Learning and the learner 
           As indicated earlier, when the learner is an agent, the need for a contingent influencer who 
might ‘teach’ by dissemination is reduced and as such the gap between the learner and 
teacher is minimised. Agency also questions who the teacher might be and in the light of a 
learner-led pedagogy, the significance of the role of an adult authority figure for example 
becomes questionable. As highlighted in Chapter One, learning here is inextricably linked with 
‘Being;’ the learner comes to knowledge and understanding a priori, regardless of any 
pedagogue who might lead the way. When Being and the meaning of Being are equal 
(Heidegger, 1962: 27), the gap between learning and the learner is also eradicated and this 
renegotiates not only what truth is, but how truth is attained.   
           Chapter Three reflects how the Socratic method of learning is critiqued by Kierkegaard. As 
stated earlier, Socrates’s educational ideas are founded on the primacy of a priori knowledge; 
therefore, at this point it is necessary to further highlight this pedagogical stance. An 
extensive description of Socrates’ ideas is found in Meno by Plato, and to introduce the 
discussion regarding learning and the learner, this text is cited now.  
           Plato’s Meno represents a conversation that takes place between Socrates the philosopher 
and Meno, a young aristocrat who has a taste for asking intellectual questions (Plato, 1956: 
101). In response to Meno’s enquiry as to how virtue is acquired, Socrates outlines his view of 
knowledge. It is a paradox. Indeed, he states that he does not know what virtue is and would 
not know how to recognise it if he sought it (Plato, 1956: 129). 
           What is important here is how the term ‘know’ is used and Socrates distinguishes between 
different ways of knowing. Facts such as dates are presented by an authority figure and 
recalled. Other knowledge such as virtue, religious ideas and mathematics can be known and 
recalled but not understood. He posits that it is only through the process of learning that he 
names ‘recollection,’ that one can fully understand knowledge and give an account of it as 
truth. Recollection involves latent knowledge within the individual being brought to 
consciousness in response to questioning or stimulation from a ‘teacher’ (Plato, 1956: 109-




           Socrates illustrates recollection through an experiment involving a servant boy and his recall 
of mathematical knowledge. As the teacher, Socrates chooses to withhold what he already 
knows in order to allow the boy to learn for himself. Whilst initially not being able to answer 
questions about the properties of a square, as a result of a series of questions and prompts, 
the boy is able to derive assertions about the properties based on prior understanding. He is 
henceforth able to offer accuracy about them without being told. Socrates explains how 
recollection not only inspires the learner to search for what is not known, but also through the 
company of a teacher who hints, allows for learning without ‘teaching’ in the autocratic sense 
(Plato, 1956: 130). 
           Learning then is not just about acquiring knowledge but coming to an understanding of what 
has been recollected. For this, the learner must become aware of what he or she does not 
know in order to begin the search to know (Plato, 1956: 130). Being a negative education, the 
teacher’s role is to withdraw in order for recollection to take place. Socrates asserts: ‘watch 
what he will discover in company with me, though I ask him questions without teaching him’ 
(Plato, 1956: 135) and continues: ‘seeking and learning are nothing but recollection’ (Plato, 
1956: 130). The teacher provides the conditions by which the learner will come to 
understanding but it is knowledge within that is the truth. 
           For Kierkegaard, as introduced in Chapter Three, this idea must be critiqued. Considering in 
Philosophical Fragments how the learner comes to learn, and under his pseudonym Johannes 
Climacus, he opens with the question: ‘how far does the truth admit of being learned?’ 184 
Kierkegaard points out that for the Greek philosopher, ‘recollection’ encourages self-
sufficiency on the part of the learner (Kierkegaard, 1974: 11) and so is an error. Socrates 
indeed is later (in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses)185 incited as a seducer (Kierkegaard, 1990: 
110); in the light of this, the relation of learning and the learner must be renegotiated. 
Kierkegaard argues that the negativity of Socrates places the learner in a state of sin. To lead a 
student to remember truth reminds him that truth is already absent. The learner here not 
only learns that he is in error, but is excluded from the truth until the moment of learning it. 
Kierkegaard writes: ‘as so far as the learner is in error, he might seem to be free.’ He 
continues: ‘for to be free from the truth is to be exiled from the truth and to be exiled by 
oneself is to be bound’ (Kierkegaard, 1974: 19). 
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185 Kierkegaard’s Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses is explored in Chapter Five.  
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           It also seems that whilst seeking freedom from given or contingent truths to gaining inhered 
truth, in recollection, one is alienated from the truth. Here, the pre-supposed ideas of the 
teacher or indeed the learning context are evaded lest the learning becomes inauthentic. In 
the 2009 translation of Philosophical Fragments by Piety, Kierkegaard notes how Socrates 
regards contingency as a ‘fooling around’ (Kierkegaard, 2009: 89) and it is suggested that in 
this philosophy, any learning that takes place in relation to another is merely formed through 
‘half-baked thoughts, cheap haggling, assertions and concessions’ (Kierkegaard, 2009: 90). 
However, the contingent dimension of the learning individual has significance here. In the 
light of the primary question forming the sub-heading to Philosophical Fragments,186 the 
reader is led to consider the relationship between history and temporality and an eternal 
consciousness – in other words the relation of self and other with Other.  
           This is a much more complex operation than recollection. The individual’s move to 
understanding is signified not by recollecting what is already there, but by the paradoxical 
action of eternity entering temporality. Similar to Levinas’s individual who moves towards the 
Absolute Other, here the teacher moves towards the individual to fully enter the learning 
experience. Kierkegaard’s teacher is the saviour. As a Universal, and on the strength of his 
love, he enters the relation and it is at this moment that learning occurs (Kierkegaard, 2009: 
100).187 Self-sufficient truth is ruptured. As the Other breaks through, the learner is 
enlightened. The moment of learning is the moment when the reality of the absolute enters 
the consciousness of the individual (Kierkegaard, 2009: 100). 
           This is a positive education. There must always be an ‘other.’ Whereas for Socrates the gap 
between learning and learner is reduced, for Kierkegaard, the relation of learning and the 
learner is significant. In a new perspective of Christian education proposed in the light of this, 
there must also be an ‘other.’ Both teacher and learner (or tradition and individual) play an 
active role in learning; yet furthermore, in their relation with the Absolute Other (or God) who 
is encountered in the leap of faith and brought to the relation in the rupture and return, each 
are made aware of the illusions of their own contingent ideas. Yet this is the learning that 
inspires authentic faith. The interruption of mastery and self-sufficiency allow for Spirit in the 
middle space to illuminate the illusion of illusion, re-negotiate existing ideas and discover new 
ones.  
                                                          
186 ‘Can an eternal consciousness have a historical point of departure; could such a thing be of more 
than historical interest; can one build an eternal happiness on historical knowledge?’ 
187 This might be illustrated by the incarnation of Christ. 
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           Concepts introduced here such as the rupture and the breakthrough all signpost later 
chapters. Through these concepts, in the light of the triune relation of relations, the learner, 
learning and the teacher as Spirit interrupt self-sufficiency to open up the middle space. It is 
proposed that the ‘moment’ in which the Absolute enters the relation has educational 
significance and this will be outlined more fully in the following chapters. At this point 
however, the relation of learning and the learner is considered further in terms of 
Kierkegaard’s Stages on Life’s Way. This text serves to take the reader beyond recollection 
and mutuality to recognise the work of Spirit in the middle space.  
           In the opening section of Stages on Life’s Way, Kierkegaard presents five examples of the 
learning and learner relation. All are uttered ‘In Vino Veritas,’ each by a respective orator. The 
examples presented consider the nature of learning in terms of the relation of partners in a 
love affair and whilst concerning fictional characters, all have significance for education. 
           The Socratic idea is most closely presented by Victor Eremita. His key word is negativity and he 
considers how in the relationship of a woman not yet known to a man, negativity inspires self-
understanding. In not-knowing her, the woman is the man’s negativity, or the truth that he 
does not yet know. This is his education. Eremita states: ‘in a negative relationship, woman 
makes man productive in ideality’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 59). It is her negativity that inspires 
him. His not having her is the impetus he needs to fight and become valiant in order to have 
her. His consciousness of immortality is also awakened. This is a forward movement in which 
the man seizes ideality188 and thus understands life to be more than merely the journey 
towards death (Kierkegaard, 1988: 60). 
           This cannot be done positively since the positive, or actuality (that conceals truth) is 
corruptive. When she becomes his wife, she becomes known and all understanding between 
the man and woman is acknowledged equally (Kierkegaard, 1988: 61). His relationship with 
her is changed. She now seems to know ‘all the tricks’ and he accepts them; but these are 
simple deceptions. This actuality is an illusion (Kierkegaard, 1988: 62). Therefore, knowledge 
as actuality must be eradicated and the way for possibility now opened. 
           The Socratic allusion is clear, as is the resonance with the critique presented in Philosophical 
Fragments.189 This movement reflects the overcoming of positivism, allowing for the 
deconstruction of given truths and liberation from the structures within which these are held. 
                                                          
188 The significance of ideality is promoted further through a study of Kierkegaard’s text Repetition.  
189 See pages 105-9.   
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It also considers negation to be necessary for truth and places the learner in a negative 
relation to what is being learned. Yet the woman must become the man’s possibility and in 
order for this to happen, he must lose her. In loss however, as is evident in many of 
Kierkegaard’s works, the absolute is intensified and the man is brought into an awareness of 
his own truth in relation to a higher immediacy (Kierkegaard, 1988: 62). This, highlighting the 
inadequacy of recollection, reflects not only the leap of faith of Fear and Trembling (1983), 
but also the idea of Levinas presented above that spiritual authenticity is gained through the 
recognition of other, reinforcing the notion of infinity as the Absolute Other in learning.  
           Another character, the fashion designer, argues that in the course of finding love, the woman 
must not be just an idea, but someone actually known (Kierkegaard, 1988: 65). He suggests 
that when engaging with a woman, a man should get to know her from the ground up 
(Kierkegaard, 1988: 66).190 This is a practical education. However, it is no less spiritual. The 
speaker explains that the truth of who the woman is, revealed in her choice of attire and 
accessories (Kierkegaard, 1988: 69), is reflected back from the exterior to her inner self. To 
know her, the man must support her in her reflection and consider the importance of 
exteriority in her own education (Kierkegaard, 1988: 70). Resonant of Hyde’s pedagogical 
ideas that locate education in the learner’s own world and reflect on immediate experience 
(Hyde, 2008: 169), it might be argued that education here evades given truth.  
           It is the speech of the orator who opens proceedings however that inspires a new way of 
thinking about learning. His key words are contradiction and illusion. This ‘Young man’ 
describes the contradiction of recollection. He illustrates his idea of a backward movement of 
learning in terms of lovers who consider their musings on their love to only come after their 
falling in love (Kierkegaard, 1988: 33). He explains that recollection at the beginning of 
reflection actually signifies the end of the relationship and whilst fatal, this is also considered 
to be comic. Likewise, to identify the truth of the beginning 191 is to attain the unknown and 
this cannot be brought into the present as truth. This is a contradiction but as learners in love, 
the protagonists remain unaware of the contradiction. This contradiction is not educative as 
proposed earlier; 192 it is an error. The orator also illustrates illusion in terms of a puppet. The 
movements of the puppet are evident and its truth is pre-supposed, but as the puppeteer is 
                                                          
190 This short phrase mirrors the title of the book ‘From the Ground Up’ (2005) by Katherine Copsey, 
that promotes an agenda of children’s spirituality in Christian education.  
191 The nature of the beginning is also considered by Rose who, in The Broken Middle states ‘every 
beginning so far encountered appears as a mask’ (Rose, 1992: 10).  
192 See page 85. 
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hidden, there is no evidence for the truth of the movements. The truth of the present is 
obscured and identified as illusion. The puppet also illustrates the gap between reality and 
ideality. Negativity here illuminates misrelation and hence is illusory (Kierkegaard, 1988: 48). 
           This vignette presents the relation as it pertains to misrecognition. The representation of truth 
(as illustrated by the puppet) obscures the presence of contingency (the puppeteer) and so 
the truthfulness of truth is misrecognised. When the influence of mediation is also denied, 
this truth similarly becomes untruth. The negation of presupposed truth supposedly diverts 
one away from deception, but this negation is also a deception. One cannot doubt what he or 
she has experienced: it is true for him or her. The relation of learner and learning is then a 
misrelation and truth is misunderstood. The truth presented is comic since the viewer of the 
puppet show has no relation with the puppeteer and the learner has no relation with learning. 
And it is a contradiction since without an understanding of the significance of the relation, 
there is no space in which the truth of each can emerge.  
           As will be outlined in more detail towards the end of this chapter, the space is an imperative 
for spiritual learning. In the space, contradiction and illusion are not in error as suggested 
above: Spirit as the third partner in learning opens up the middle space of contradiction and 
illusion (Kierkegaard, 1988: 45) as a double contradiction, to ensure that their dual roles are 
held together in tension for authentic education (Kierkegaard, 1988: 34). The second orator in 
‘In Vino Veritas’ highlights this further. For him, the action of reflection on illusion opens up 
the middle space (Kierkegaard, 1988: 45). Negativity is related dialectically to the external 
presentation of love (or in this context, a religious concept) and rather than achieving an end 
result (Kierkegaard, 1988: 36-7), learning takes place in the space between (Kierkegaard, 
1988: 45). This provides an apt summary of the nature of learning and the learner in the 
proposed new educational perspective. This is also the reality of the middle space. The gap 
between positions remains, but within the gap is where learning, as Spirit, takes place.  
           4.4 The middle space 
           As indicated earlier, the idea of a middle space has recently appeared on the horizon of 
children's spirituality literature. Rather than reinforcing dualisms such as those presented in 
the Literature Review, theory now attempts to re-imagine relation especially in education, 
aiming to recognise the necessity of accepting equally valid partners in the learning process, 
and highlighting the significance of the space in between. 
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            For example, in an editorial to the International Journal of Children’s Spirituality, the middle 
space is illustrated in terms of a womb. Having distinct identities, both child and mother is in a 
unique relationship with the other (Hyde, Ota and Yust, 2013: 304). As the space between 
them, the womb provides the environment which is the locus of self-discovery (Hyde, Ota and 
Yust, 2013: 305). As provider of the space, the adult has a ‘peripheral rather than central’ role 
and as in the notion of the player-coach presented above (Berryman, 1991: 17),193 contributes 
when necessary. Writing as adults involved in education, Hyde, Ota and Yust personify their 
proposition and write:  
           by imagining ourselves as the spaces and elements that hold children while they are 
becoming themselves, we allow children and their spiritual work to be at the heart of 
children’s spirituality rather than a by-product of our own creative efforts (Hyde, Ota 
and Yust, 2013: 305).  
            In a subsequent edition of the same journal, Tony Eaude extends this by proposing the 
metaphor of a ‘hospitable space’ (Eaude, 2014: 241). Reminiscent of the mutual relation of I-
Thou proposed by Martin Buber (Buber, 1970: 58),194 this space allows for individual search as 
well as positive inter-personal encounters (Eaude, 2014: 242). Reflecting the relation of self 
and other as mutual learners (be they the learner and teacher, or learning and the learner), 
the space might also be exemplified by a physical environment such as a classroom or church, 
or even the space between the past and present. For Eaude the significance of the space is its 
role in allowing learners to feel protected, able to explore their own ideas freely. As with the 
womb, the hospitable space might provide for safe self-discovery (Eaude, 2014: 245-6) within 
relation as variously illustrated.  
            For Christian education specifically, at the Fourteenth International Conference on Children’s 
Spirituality, Karen-Marie Yust addressed the notion of ‘middle space’ in terms of the space 
between inner and outer expressions of spirituality. She presented the idea of ‘interplay,’ 
which as a movement back and forth between the two, involves the construction of religious 
identity as an aspect of a child’s social identity. It thus respects both the prior spiritual state of 
the child and the stories, practices and rituals of faith. The outworking of interplay 195 
becomes manifest in the space between the two. 
                                                          
193 See page 116. 
194 See page 73.  
195 Interplay as an educational movement is described in more detail in Chapter Six, specifically in 
relation to the ideas of German educator, von Humboldt.  
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           As a critical response to a welcome turn in the direction of Children’s Spirituality literature, it 
might be argued however that whilst proposing a relation of self and other, these examples 
perpetuate the dichotomy. As the child is the learner and the adult the provider, theory does 
not extend to accepting that the adult might also be a learner. Whilst the space allows for the 
child to be a part of the adult, the adult is not recognised in the child. The learner here is not 
open to self-examination in the light of the relation, and residing within a relation of 
mutuality, the space is enclosed.  
           It might be suggested then that the enclosed environment or framework that supports the 
learning also legitimises any meaning made. Whilst in the context of the current thesis it 
might be argued that a religious framework could provide a helpful support, one must also, 
considering the impact of the lack of criticality especially in Yust’s example of interplay, be 
concerned that a learner is able to construct his or her own theological or ideological views 
without intervention. It could also be argued that the examples of relation are two 
dimensional, reflecting a movement between partners much like recollection. Furthermore, 
there is no dimension that might be termed absolute (or Universal).196 As will be examined in 
the light of Kierkegaard’s Repetition in Chapter Six, this is insufficient for faith. The movement 
of repetition, resonant of ideas explored in this chapter not only takes place between 
relational partners but also beyond relation. 
           The middle space here is one of status quo. However, in Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard 
takes a different view. As indicated earlier, learning for Kierkegaard is a paradox. In this text 
there is also an intervention. He draws on the moment of the eternal entering temporality to 
illustrate how learning involves more than the movement of one to the other. To the modern 
learner, eternity entering temporality equals impossibility. However, for authentic learning 
one must live within the tension inspired by this impossibility. This Kierkegaardian view of 
learning therefore adds another dimension to relation in education. Whilst in each example of 
                                                          
196 This is illustrated by Yust who in both the conference paper referenced in this chapter and her 
popular book Real Kids Real Faith, highlights the importance for Christian faith development of the 
interplay between the child and aspects of liturgy or practice. She describes such development as the 
‘cultivation’ of Christians which might be outworked through learners acquiring Christian language, 
engaging with spiritually edifying texts and experiencing symbolic objects (Yust, 2014). In her text, she 
also presents a number of activities inspired by interplay and examples include creating ‘care-bags’ for 
children in hospitals (Yust, 2004: 154) and cleaning up a playground (Yust, 2004: 155). It might be 
argued that the interplay here which takes place between the learner and tradition is enclosed and 
without the dimension or intervention of an Absolute Other who might interrupt the interplay to 




the middle space provided above there is no tension or impossibility, a Kierkegaardian 
education is the pain and impossibility of the paradox.  
           4.5 The Paradox 
           Akin to the ideas of Levinas outlined above, the notion of the unknown Other especially in 
Christian education, takes learning beyond the process of gaining facts or accepting what is 
presented or ‘known.’ To learn spiritually is to accept that the Other cannot be ‘known’ in the 
epistemological sense and this inspires faith. It is through the paradox that the idea of faith 
enters the discourse of this thesis. As noted in Chapter Three, faith takes the educator and 
learner beyond any sense of ‘coming to know.’197 The paradox of faith is about embracing the 
known on the grounds of experiencing what is unknown. In the paradox, the halves of the 
broken middle are presented as a relation and as Tubbs explains, rather than uniting or 
enclosing, the paradox keeps this relation open (Tubbs, 2005: 218). 
           The Other here might be referred to as ‘God’ - but this is only a name. Indeed, the folly of 
proving the existence of God is highlighted (Kierkegaard, 2009: 113). As Kierkegaard proposes, 
the learner must embrace the difficult relation of the individual to the unknown. This is the 
paradox - the eternal exists, but as unknown it does not exist. Kierkegaard writes: ‘the 
individual, if he is truly to come to know something about the unknown (God), must come to 
know that it is different from himself, absolutely different’ (Kierkegaard, 2009: 119).198  
           The understanding cannot come to know this itself – it needs God to bring it to him. 
Kierkegaard writes: ‘one needs God simply in order to come to know that God is the different, 
and now comes to know that God is absolutely different from himself’ (Kierkegaard, 2009: 
119). A contemporary translation of this paradox is provided in terms of the notion of the 
‘broken middle.’ This is significant for an understanding of how learning must recognise the 
unequal relation of self, other and Other, and is considered further now. 
           4.6 The Broken Middle 
           The term ‘broken middle’ is essential for this discussion. Taken from Gillian Rose’s text of the 
same name, the broken middle challenges dualism and is the converse of mutuality. In her 
                                                          
197 See page 102.  
198 This epitomises Kierkegaard’s view of faith. Faith as a concept, rather than tradition, religion or even 
Christianity, is soon to become a key element in the current discussion. Chapter Five gives further 




book, Rose cites the absurdity of reconciliation or totalisation (Rose, 1992: xii) and argues that 
more important than the essentiality of the partners in learning, is the middle term by which 
they meet.  
           Rose’s middle is not an enclosed space such as the womb. Rather she proposes that the 
broken middle of self and other might be illustrated as a Janus-face (Rose, 1992: 52) whose 
dual-directional view claims neither partner for truth (Rose, 1992: 54). This then evades the 
reconciliation of subject and object and any form of unity. It might be equated to the 
educative relation of double contradiction inspired by the puppet show in ‘In Vino Veritas’ 
highlighted above. The middle is not about mutuality, but misrecognition (Rose, 1992: 14). 
The idea of the broken middle, in contrast to the middle space that is enclosed, now highlights 
how the relation that is a misrelation (or paradox) in fact has educational significance.  
           In the broken relation, the beginning or absolute in-itself is an illusion. The presupposition of 
its absoluteness in relation to its subjective representation is illusory whilst the illusion of the 
in-itself also makes an illusion of subjectivity. This is the illusion of the illusion. For Rose, and 
as stated earlier, illusion has educational value. Just as both Kierkegaard’s puppet and 
pseudonyms provide the illusion necessary for authentic education on the part of the learning 
individual, Rose proposes that more illusion is required (Rose, 1992: 10). Being the negativity 
of the illusory absolute, the individual is able to re-imagine his or her self in relation to the 
illusory in-itself and as illusory being, more easily understand thought as a possibility of a 
beginning. 
           This idea is taken from Hegel who in Science of Logic describes this relation. In his 
consideration of the question ‘With what must the science begin?’ he considers the nature of 
the in-itself in relation to the individual. In so doing he claims that there is nothing that does 
not equally contain both immediacy and mediated knowledge. The beginning, whilst ‘at one 
with its self-alienation’ therefore immediate and pure (Hegel, 1969: 69), is at the same time 
recognised by the contingent ‘I;’ it therefore becomes the unity of being and nothing (Hegel, 
1969: 73). As illusory, the pure in-itself is mediated by the ‘I’ that as subjectivity is also illusory 
(Hegel, 1969: 76); in turn this illusion is reflected back to the ‘pure nothing’ (Hegel, 1969: 73) 
so that ‘that which forms the absolute beginning must likewise otherwise be known’ (Hegel, 
1969: 74). This continuous movement of immediacy, mediation and illusory being ensures 
that the beginning is always present, yet as the relation with the ‘I’ ensures that it is 
absolutely mediated, it is never fully known (Hegel, 1969: 76). 
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           The paradoxical nature of knowing described here proposes that inherited concepts are 
constantly broken and re-worked. Additionally, in the loss of the certain, absolute meaning 
can only ever be noted, not represented (Rose, 1992: 16). However, being the place of pain 
and loss in relation to the absolute (Rose, 1992: 18), the middle becomes the space where the 
self is open to other and each is welcomed in the other. The paradox is this: the beginning, or 
absolute, enters into the act of coming to know (Rose, 1992: 42). As a result, the self is 
transformed.  
           As a Janus - faced relation, learning is the recognition of misrecognition. Subjectivity’s 
subjectivity is a movement of faith that accepts opposition and subsequently loses the 
essentiality of the self. Spirit as the third partner in the middle between knowing and 
unknowing, also has a significant role in learning. It is through the Spirit in the relation of 
relations that one comes to learn and this is authentic education. It is argued therefore, that 
this is more complex than the relation symbolised by the womb in which the role of pain is 
misrecognised199and more precarious than the idea of hospitality that seems to be antithetical 
to the risk of loss. The broken middle is a relation of risk, pain and uncertainty, but as such 
provides a template for an authentic relational shape.  
           4.7 Conclusion 
           In this chapter, the idea of relation, having been taken from a simple dichotomy to that which 
includes contradiction, illusion and loss in the light of the intervention of an Absolute Other, 
now highlights a new educational relational shape. In this shape, the contingent dimensions of 
self and other are not negated; neither are they unified. Rather, in a dialectical relation with 
the Other who is infinite, the personal and traditional, the teacher and the learner as well as 
learning and the learner are all re-imagined. In the paradoxical middle space of contradiction 
between self and Absolute, new learning might take place. This is the significance of the 
proposed new perspective in Christian education: learning takes place in the broken middle of 
self and other, on the strength of the Absolute who intervenes.  
           As in most Kierkegaardian texts, the ideas of tension, brokenness and loss have educational 
significance. These themes feature more prominently in the following chapter as does the 
moment of learning identified by the rupture that opens up the middle space. The rupture is 
illustrated by the breakthrough of the eternal into the temporal as evidenced in the Biblical 
                                                          
199 The safety of the womb is illusory given the pain for both mother and child that comes from the 
inevitable exit from the womb in birth.  
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stories of Job and Abraham. In the light of these stories, the discussion continues to consider 
what the interruption in contemporary learning might look like, signposting further 
conclusions regarding a new educational perspective and locating these in practice. It might 
be suggested at this point, that to embrace illusion and mediation and to open up the 
precarious middle space, is to welcome transformative learning. This provides another step in 
the consideration of how a new perspective in Christian education might inspire an authentic 
life of faith and is outlined more fully now. 




















CHAPTER FIVE: FAITH 
           5.1 Introduction 
           In Chapter Four, the importance of the paradoxical relation of self and other was highlighted. 
Drawing on ideas from Levinas and Kierkegaard, it was acknowledged that through a relation 
with an Absolute Other, authentic learning might take place on the grounds of the Absolute 
who is unknown. This idea of the unknown, which relates to the aporia identified in Chapter 
Three,200 now paves the way for a deeper exploration of ‘faith’ as a concept. As a key element 
in the research question, faith concerns the aim of education in the proposed new perspective 
and therefore is considered philosophically here. In addition to this, the current chapter 
considers the significance of the moment of breakthrough in faith education, and again 
explores these ideas in the light of the writings of Kierkegaard.  
           Faith surpasses knowledge (Kierkegaard, 1985: 67). Reflecting the biblical maxim introduced in 
Chapter Three: ‘faith is confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not 
see,’ it involves a movement to the unknown and a return on the strength of a relation with 
the Absolute. In regular parlance, the term is used in a number of ways. First it might be 
recognised as a noun such as ‘The Christian Faith’ or as a possession, that is to ‘have faith.’ It 
might also be described as an action - for example, living a life of faith. Faith is furthermore 
connected to trust and by inspiring a connection with or belief in something that cannot be 
seen, it concerns one’s capacity to journey beyond corporeal experience towards an 
encounter with something ‘other.’ Finally, it is connected to belief in this unseen ‘other;’ this 
of course in Christian education concerns a deity, but equally could represent an ideology or 
political system (Bridger, 2000: 111). In the section that follows, the notion of faith in Christian 
education is critically considered in terms of the movement of faith development.   
           5.2 Christian Education and faith development  
           In terms of faith development in Christian education, the notion of faith is considered by three 
Christian educationalists in particular: John Westerhoff, author of Will our children have faith? 
(1976), Francis Bridger whose text Children Finding Faith (2000) is still a key text for Children’s 
Ministry students, and Karen-Marie Yust, co-editor of the International Journal of Children’s 
Spirituality and author of Real Kids, Real Faith (2004). All three authors have already been 
introduced in this thesis and each proving influential in their respective fields, they collectively 
                                                          
200 See page 102. 
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summarise a broad understanding of faith development within the church. With the latter two 
authors being explicitly inspired by the former, commonalities are evident across their texts, 
providing an introduction to faith development as the aim of learning in a Christian education 
context.201 
           Westerhoff begins by making the distinction between religion and faith, so that Christian 
teaching is not ‘about’ faith but about providing the opportunities for faith to be experienced 
and lived out. He describes it as an action based on an encounter with the divine (Westerhoff, 
1976: 22). With this he provides an ontological starting point. Using a generic application of 
the term ‘God,’ he asserts that all people are essentially created to relate to God and others as 
an aspect of being human. There is no sense of being outside this relationship at the 
‘beginning of faith’ (Westerhoff, 1976: 33) or indeed life; human connection with the divine 
remains a constant throughout one’s life. Yust and Bridger concur. The ontological element is 
evident in both authors’ texts, each of which describes faith as a gift (Yust, 2004: 4; Bridger, 
2000: 46). The idea of imago dei from Genesis 1: 27 is a clear influence.202 Yust notes faith as 
being present from birth (Yust, 2004:4) and Bridger describes how this ontological state 
provides the potentiality for a life-long spiritual exploration (Bridger, 2000: 47). Yust explains 
that the gift of faith embodies God’s grace and this is reflected in ‘his’ choice to be in 
relationship with ‘his’ created beings (Yust, 2004:5). 
           Yet faith involves more than ontological privilege. Faith development concerns the will of the 
individual, and Westerhoff describes the life of faith as a pilgrimage (Westerhoff, 1976: 89). 
Westerhoff is well known for his theory of faith development which as a linear trajectory 
demonstrates the learner experiencing different styles of faith. As already highlighted in the 
Literature Review, 203 Westerhoff’s aim for education as faith development is for learners to 
have a faith that is ‘owned’ (Westerhoff, 1976: 39). Owned faith is reflective of a meaningful 
encounter with God, the result of which is an authentic Christian life (Westerhoff, 1976: 41). 
Faith development starts with the innate capacity for faith held by each individual 
(Westerhoff, 1976: 90) and akin to rings on a tree (Westerhoff, 1976: 89-90), the learner 
transitions through each style, culminating in owned faith. Whilst in all stages the learner has 
faith, in owned faith it becomes personal and a transformation occurs. This transformation 
manifests a change in the way the individual lives (Westerhoff, 1976: 98). The author 
                                                          
201 See page 14.  
202  Genesis 1 vs 27; New International Version. ‘So God created mankind in his own image, in the image 
of God he created them; male and female he created them’. 
203 See pages 18-9.  
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emphasises that this change occurs within the life of the learner and is not imposed from 
without (Westerhoff, 1976: 98). 
           Yust’s description of faith development might be considered reflective of Westerhoff’s 
transitions; illustrated as a journey from gift to action, Yust’s idea embraces the same 
ontological starting point, with its telos similarly aspiring for transformation. Being relational, 
this requires the participation of others (Yust, 2004:13). She outlines how faith develops 
through ‘cultivation’ activities facilitated by parents, teachers and adult friends (Hyde, Ota and 
Yust, 2013: 303-4). For example, these adult learning partners might provide soft play toys or 
musical instruments to illustrate a Bible story (Yust, 2004:37) or encourage learners to write 
prayers inspired by the Psalms (Yust, 2004:110).  
           As suggested in Chapter Four, according to Yust, it is not the role of adult learning partners to 
provide answers to questions of faith. In a means similar to the dialogical process of 
‘wombing’ described earlier, their role is to frame learning. Yust writes that adult learning 
partners ‘must allow for (the holy) and seek relationship with it’ (Yust, 2004:19). Yust insists 
that it is through engagement in spiritual practices that take into account a learners’ age and 
stage that faith is inspired (Yust, 2004:12-3). Dimensions of community life such as belonging, 
giftedness and hope provide the conditions in which faith might grow (Yust, 2004:14-7). 
           Bridger explains how through educational dimensions such as the imagination (Bridger, 2000: 
51), story (Bridger, 2000: 66) and play (Bridger, 2000: 71), the individual can explore aspects 
of faith within everyday experience. He argues that the process of faith development is multi-
dimensional (Bridger, 2000: 97-101). The individual learns through investigation. Being a 
personal journey, each comes to understand ‘the faith’ on his or her own terms. Furthermore, 
according to Bridger, in faith the individual on the basis of the condition and gift, also moves 
towards a personal experience of God. He writes: ‘the exercise of trust within the divine 
covenant is thus wholly a matter of grace’ (Bridger, 2000: 56). This has reminiscence of 
Levinas’s movement towards the Absolute Other. It highlights the dimension beyond the 
enclosed relational space described at the end of Chapter Four, and demonstrates how the 
individual might move beyond temporality to a transcendent experience of faith as trust.  
           Whilst influential in Christian educational settings, these ideas are nevertheless open to 
critique. First, although purported to be open-ended, the movement of faith development has 
a conscious aim, that is the ownership of faith. The movement towards owned faith is an 
intentional action on the part of the educator; for this educator, trusting in the reality of the 
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absolute and claiming this for oneself, equates to conversion. However, claiming might also be 
described as ‘possession’ and this is antithetical to what the current thesis considers to be 
authentic. Although it has been already highlighted how in Fear and Trembling Abraham 
‘grasped’ the eternal, here it might be argued that possessing has connotations of the fixed 
representations critiqued in earlier chapters, and so must be interrupted.  
           All three authors are clear that ownership of faith includes the acceptance of the contents of 
given doctrine. This also involves the claim to certain methods and practices. This places faith 
in the realm of what is known rather than unknown. Although it is noted in the Literature 
Review how Bridger provides critique from within Paradigm One,205 he also writes: ‘the 
content and object of faith make all the difference’ (Bridger, 2000: 111). He outlines how 
formative life experiences provide the foundation for certain beliefs. For example, he 
indicates that putting things right when a relationship is broken, paves the way for 
‘repentance and reconciliation.’ (Bridger, 2000: 75). He also illustrates his understanding of 
‘conversion’ in terms of repentance and surrender to Christ, a change in allegiance to Christ 
and transformation through the Holy Spirit (Bridger, 2000: 154-5). These doctrinal statements 
are reminiscent of ‘The Four Points’206 outlined above; hence the conversion that is a result of 
owning faith has theological implications for the learner. As will be outlined in due course, for 
Kierkegaard, conversion pertains to a reworking rather than a possessing of the contents of 
faith. 
           The role of the teacher here is also to be critiqued. Although arguing for an open-ended 
approach to learning, Bridger states that in the context of inspiring owned faith, the teacher 
‘must preach Christ in such a way that his hearers may come to own a new faith in him’ 
(Bridger, 2000: 112). This resonates with the transmissional pedagogy of Paradigm One and 
incites mastery. Whilst the teacher provides the conditions for the exploration of faith, and 
although learning is experiential, it seems that for faith to become owned, the contents must 
be possessed. Again, as will be explained later, this is considered erroneous in the light of the 
current thesis. The Kierkegaardian idea of the condition that is the locus of learning will be 
explored in the following chapter, and this re-evaluates the relation of the teacher and learner 
in an education for authentic faith. 
           Whilst advocating an open-ended approach to faith development, Yust reflects how in 
spiritual practice, children are to be immersed in the culture of Christianity as a way of 
                                                          
205 See page 22. 
206 See page 16.  
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accessing the spiritual (Yust, 2004: 70). She encourages educators to teach hymns, model the 
movements of worship such as kneeling and eye closing, and repeat familiar words such as 
hosanna and hallelujah. Here again the teacher is the provider and mastery is in evidence. 
Practices such as silent prayer, meditation and praying using art are also encouraged and in 
this way, she suggests, children might be encouraged to interpret the life of faith personally, 
so to make meaning for themselves and others (Yust, 2004: 92). However, meaning is made 
within the enclosed space of pre-determined practices which it might be argued, whilst being 
useful in encouraging prayer and worship, are not essential to a life of faith. 
           This approach highlights immediacy, which might be recognised as an illusion. As highlighted 
in earlier chapters, immediacy as truth is actually a misrecogntition of truth. Immediacy 
negates the ambiguities of faith. What is possessed, whether the absolute or an 
understanding of the absolute, is reduced to doctrine and practice. Rather than being a means 
to an end, the activities or practices become the end in themselves. Although the proposed 
telos is a deepened understanding of the absolute as embodied in the culture of Christianity, 
it is a deeper understanding of the contents of Christianity that is in evidence here. The 
absolute as a result is misrecognised and misunderstood. 
           Likewise, faith development as outlined here is a person-centred movement that is linear and 
forward facing. Bridger describes the process as a move towards the absolute on the strength 
of the gift of grace (Bridger, 2000: 155). Learners, guided by the teacher, make their way to 
the desired owned faith, resting on the gift of the relation with God that is already present. 
When claimed, faith then becomes a possession. The individual comes to understand the 
infinite in terms of the finite and learns to live accordingly. As critiqued in Chapter Three, the 
linear movement is inadequate. For authenticity, there must be a sense of the individual 
understanding the absolute in-itself as illusory and experiencing the tensions that arise from 
embracing the absolute as both known and unknown. These ideas are addressed in 
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and a brief return to this text now serves to illustrate how 
authentic faith involves embracing tension and loss.   
 
           Fear and Trembling, which depicts a process laced with torment, sheds light on the 
inadequacy of the linear movement. According to pseudonym Johannes de Silentio, faith 
pertains to belief and action on the strength of the absurd (Kierkegaard, 1985: 38). This is not 
a linear movement towards claiming what is ‘known’ of the absolute. It is a movement 
towards the unknown. Likened to the movement which the author describes as a movement 
of resignation (Kierkegaard, 1985: 38), de Silentio claims that the linear movement does not 
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inspire faith but is a substitute for faith (Kierkegaard, 1985: 37). Here the learning individual is 
self- sufficient and knows what he or she believes. The learner is at rest. The knight of infinite 
resignation claims to surrender everything infinitely (or believes in God) but takes everything 
back finitely (Kierkegaard, 1985: 44). This individual is not able to make the leap beyond the 
finite and therefore invests in temporality, with all its assurances and security (Kierkegaard, 
1985: 47). 
 
           de Silentio’s faith however is characterised by a movement of loss and return (Kierkegaard, 
1985: 53). Using the Old Testament story of Abraham as an illustration, he outlines how in 
faith, the individual is willing to sacrifice individuality for the eternal. In the context of 
Christian education, this might involve the sacrifice of the contents of faith as much as the will 
of the individual learner. The leap of faith is riskier than the linear progression. The leap 
negates the claim to meaning: all that is believed and understood is lost. However, in making 
the leap, the individual comes into an experience of the absolute that is undefined and way 
beyond any finite knowledge or representation. The absolute is not owned or possessed, but 
rather encountered. This encounter highlights another significant theme for Christian 
education and will be explored in the following chapter.  
           In the leap, human calculation is suspended. Abraham’s action in sacrificing his son is totally 
unethical. It makes no sense. It is absurd. But faith cannot be gained by the movement of the 
individual who is unacquainted by life’s dangers (Kierkegaard, 1985: 35). It rather concerns 
the willingness of the individual to go beyond the temporal and ethical, to meet what God 
requires (Kierkegaard, 1985: 37). The torment involved demands that faith involves paradox 
and pain as well as contradiction and unrest (Kierkegaard, 1985: 38). 
           In a forward facing movement however, there is an absence of contradiction. As proposed 
above, contradiction is a requirement in the authentic movement of faith. Yet the self-
sufficiency of the individual who learns in a linear manner, reconciles the individual with his 
own existence (Kierkegaard, 1985: 48). There is no separation between self and other. Neither 
are the individual and eternal lost to each other. There is no allusion towards education as 
aporia and there is safety in the contents and religiosity of ‘The Christian Faith.’ The absolute, 
perceived as a reality, is reduced to the finite, thus becoming possible and known. Yet 
Kierkegaard’s knight of faith concerns the paradox by which the individual strives for the 
impossible on the grounds of the unknown. This individual suspends everything infinitely and 




           This suspending involves a leap away from temporality and all its certainties: the self-
sufficiency of the individual is surrendered. It also moves the individual away from claiming 
the truth of the eternal. Kierkegaard writes: ‘Through faith I do not renounce anything, on the 
contrary in faith I receive everything’ (Kierkegaard, 1985: 55). Faith as such becomes the third 
partner that allows the learning individual to suspend the ethical and meet the absolute. This 
is the truth of faith: the absolute whom the individual encounters through the leap of faith, is 
the unknown. Faith is required to meet the unknown (Kierkegaard, 1985: 55). And it is faith, 
on the strength of the absurd, that is the unknowingness of the absolute that allows the 
individual to make the leap (Kierkegaard, 1985: 54).  
           This provides another illustration of the educational shape that is the relation of relations, or 
the relation and self and other with Other. The temporal self, in relation with the ethical state 
(that is suspended but not renounced), through the leap of faith, comes into relation with the 
Other who is the absolute. But faith here, again unlike the linear movement described above, 
involves a return to the self and the temporal ethical world. Abraham received his son back 
following his ordeal. As Kierkegaard explains: ‘it takes a paradoxical and humble courage then 
to grasp the whole of temporality on the strength of the absurd, and that courage is the 
courage of faith’ (Kierkegaard, 1985: 55). On the return, what was understood or believed 
finitely within temporality is now interrupted. The return from the leap of faith allows the 
learning individual to receive and embrace these truths differently in the light of the 
intervention of the Absolute and rather than claiming or renouncing, the individual might 
experience them personally and in freedom. 
           Kierkegaard’s ideas in Fear and Trembling outlined here, further support the proposal of a 
new perspective in Christian education. In this new perspective, what is ‘known’ must be 
suspended so that the learner might embrace the unknown. As such, claims to the importance 
of methods and models of practice should be laid aside. Thus, the hymns and prayers of Yust, 
the preaching and proclaiming of Bridger, as well as models cited here such as Godly Play,207 
beach missions and others, that all pertain to temporality, must be surrendered so that the 
Absolute, who is infinity, might intervene. Additionally, the movement of leap, loss and return 
supports the notion that the linear progression of faith development, which concludes in the 
grasping of the contents of the faith, is inadequate. For authenticity, the contents, knowledge 
and beliefs, whilst important, are not the means by which an individual comes to faith. The 
Christian educator in a new perspective then must consider these contents as the platform 
                                                          
 207 See page 41. 
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which learners might surrender in order to encounter the Absolute, and that to which on the 
strength of the encounter, they return transformed.209 
Kierkegaard’s text highlights then how perspectives in Christian education that concern the 
application of ideas about ‘God’ or ‘faith’ as certainty, cannot fully embrace faith as a reality. 
Furthermore, educators whose perspectives consider such representations of the absolute to 
afford salvation (Bridger, 2000: 113), must now reconsider how the absolute is brought into 
temporality, let go of such preconceived (thus illusory) labels, and re-examine the notion of 
salvation. For authenticity, in the new perspective, the teacher is Spirit who inspires an 
encounter with the Absolute. It is suggested that, in the light of ideas explored here, it is this 
encounter, in the moment of learning inspired by the intervention of the Absolute, that 
affords salvation and therefore inspires an authentic life of faith. In Kierkegaard, it is 
uncertainty regarding the Absolute that is crucial in learning and this is considered more fully 
now in the light of more contemporary theory.  
           5.3 Certainty and uncertainty 
           In his text On Christian Theology, Rowan Williams explores the issue of uncertainty and 
suggests that believers coming to faith should venture ‘beyond the easy and familiar’ 
(Williams, 2000: 23). He proposes that faith begins with loss and here the loss is death. 
Williams writes from within a Christian context and as such his ideas have theological 
resonance. For example, as the physical death of Christ embodied the end of a religious 
paradigm, he suggests that death serves as a metaphor for the dissolution of all that is 
believed and understood. When there is no certainty, faith cannot be possessed and ‘we are 
left with no firm place to stand’ (Williams, 2000: 83).  
           From the perspective of Christian theology, Williams’s text further illuminates the ideas 
presented in the previous sub-section, and underlines the significance of unknowing. It also 
promotes the notion that for authenticity, the contents of faith must be reassessed. Williams 
argues that in the light of the death of understanding, religious concepts and idioms cannot be 
legitimised and it is harder to talk about God (Williams, 2000: 84). Doctrine is considered 
empty and destructive when it is deemed to be the solution to the complexities of faith 
(Williams, 2000: 84), and it is argued that dogmatic ideas should be reviewed. Williams also 
critiques subjectivity. He writes that the 'shape of faith is determined in a life lived away from 
                                                          
209 It might be suggested that the learner, on the strength of the encounter with the absolute, views the 
contents of the Christian faith differently – more authentically – and is able to understand them in a 
way that is more personally meaningful yet without becoming purely subjective.  
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our own innate person-centred resourcefulness and self-understanding’ (Williams, 2000: 83). 
Much like Kierkegaard, coming to faith for Williams includes questioning and provisionality, as 
well as the pain and suffering that accompanies the loss of fixed absolutes. Silence and 
powerlessness instead provide an alternative to immediacy, and when the individual makes 
the leap from the self, the uncertainty they afford ensues (Williams, 2000: 84). 
           The loss of absolutes and subjectivity is equated to a death. As described above, the death 
represents a surrender to the Absolute, not death in a nihilistic sense. In Kierkegaard, 
following the (surrender to) death is a return. This is illustrated by Abraham in the Biblical 
story who, as willing to surrender his son, ultimately receives him back. Yet more poignantly, 
the death and return might be signified by the death and resurrection of Christ.210 Williams 
proposes that the resurrection brings freedom to renew and absolve (Williams, 2000: 84), 'so 
that what becomes possible in (Christ’s) renewed presence after Good Friday has the 
character of a wholly creative ex nihilo’ (Williams, 2000: 83). This reflects the ideas regarding a 
new perspective of Christian education suggested above. The movement of the incarnate 
Christ, who having surrendered to the pain of death to embrace eternity, dwells again 
amongst humanity. His return brings new life. As such for education, the learner surrenders to 
the absolute; on the return to self – or the contingent realm of the faith ‘tradition’ - the 
learner has new life. Faith is renewed and a life is changed (Williams, 2000: 86). This is 
transformation through which it might be argued, the learner is saved.  
           Williams explains that as with the ex nihilo of Genesis 1,211 the outcome of the return to each 
individual following resurrection is unknown and cannot be pre-determined. This also has 
implications for Christian education. Williams writes about the contents of faith for example. 
He suggests that rather than bringing one to judgement, doctrine ‘should give place to the 
freedom of God’ (Williams, 2000: 84). As the resurrection brought new life, learning in faith 
then should ‘open up wonder and newness of life’ (Williams, 2000: 86). It might be suggested 
that Christian doctrine is not to be applied from an external source to the life of the learning 
individual; rather, an authentic engagement with doctrine in relation with the self and the 
Absolute might afford the learner freedom to experience, embrace and question aspects of 
the ‘The Christian Faith.’ The movement of loss and return opens up the middle space 
between doctrine, the learner and the Absolute, and as already identified, it is in this space 
that the individual might learn.  
                                                          
210 See John 19 and 20.  
211 ex nihilo refers to the assertion of Genesis 1, that God created the universe out of nothing.  
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           According to Williams, Christ is the mediator in the gap between the temporal self and the 
Absolute. The relational shape again is triune: this is the relation of self and other with Other 
that is the relation of relations. Reminiscent of Chapter Four, in which it is proposed that the 
educator in the middle space is Spirit, Williams suggests that Christ’s words, in the middle, 
also educate. He writes: ‘Christ stands in the centre, between me and myself, between the old 
existence and the new’ (Williams, 2000: 91). He explains how a parable for example, facilitates 
self-awareness and discovery. To avoid providing any given meaning, Christ employs parables 
as a means for the individual to think again about him or herself in relation to God and the 
contingent world (including the Christian religious tradition), for his or her own education. 
(Williams, 2000: 91).  
           The parable, as an example of the moment that provides the opportunity for the Absolute to 
intervene, within the relation of relations, is explored more fully in Chapter Seven. However, 
at this stage, it is necessary to point out that engagement with Biblical texts such as parables 
might serve as a template for the proposed new perspective of Christian education. In the 
light of the discussion so far, one might associate the lack of given meaning in the parables 
with the loss of what is believed and known. Since in the Gospels Christ rarely applies 
definition to parables,212 uncertainty regarding the meaning of Christian doctrine for example 
is highlighted, leading to the aporia that comes with unknowing. This does not mean that 
meanings regarding Bible stories or Christian doctrines must be avoided; however, in the 
middle space, Spirit allows for the individual to wrestle with the aporia of Christ’s words, 
illuminating the story of God in a new way and inspiring learning that is more creative, 
personal and dynamic.  
           The parable also highlights the risk involved in suspending given meanings and truths. 
Certainly for educators in Paradigm One, theological safety comes with the presentation of 
what is commonly agreed and believed. But the significance of the risk involved in suspending 
this agreement, such as in the parable, is that in surrendering safety, the story inspires the 
search for a glimpse of the ‘eternal consciousness’ (Kierkegaard, 1985:55). Through the loss of 
pre-determined definitions, one might indeed encounter the Absolute who is beyond 
definition. Therefore, the movement to the Absolute is not a 'God with' movement of implicit 
faith, nor does it involve the claiming of certain doctrines in order to own faith; the movement 
in an authentic perspective of Christian education, illustrated by the parable, is one where 
                                                          
212 The only example of Christ explicitly explaining the meaning of parables is found in relation to the 
‘Parable of the Sower,’ found in Matthew 13 vs 1-23. 
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Christ intervenes and Spirit works to re-imagine, reform and renew. As a result, through the 
subsequent return, a more dynamic understanding of Christ’s words in the Gospels is gained. 
           As a continuous process of learning, uncertainty continues throughout the life of faith. As the 
Absolute can no longer be possessed only encountered, faith becomes a continuous 
dialectical movement that allows the Absolute to enter the contingent experience of the 
individual and so bring about change. 213 Williams’s ideas lead Christian education away from 
the certainty of the finite towards the uncertainty of the infinite in the light of loss. For 
Kierkegaard, coming to faith includes both certainty and uncertainty; therefore, the notion of 
faith in the light of his writing is considered now. 
           Kierkegaard’s ideas regarding the Christian life are most explicitly outlined in his Eighteen 
Upbuilding Discourses, each of which explores the issues of becoming and being a Christian 
(Kierkegaard, 1990: xii). In his reticence to term these discourses sermons, Kierkegaard 
distances himself from any meaning that might be made by the reader (Kierkegaard, 1990: 
xx). Although they are not pseudonymous, the discourses are written so the ‘single individual’ 
(the reader, or in the context of this thesis, the learner) can access the writing within his or 
her own contingency and with little intervention from the author. He even acknowledges that 
his writing is his own education so that in any learning that takes place, this comes first 
(Kierkegaard, 1990: xv). 
           Alongside this introductory claim, the idea of faith as a loss is laid out. Discourse One, ‘The 
Expectancy of Faith,’ concerns the loss of the ‘known’ and highlights how it is through the 
absence of immediacy that one might come into an absolute relation with the Absolute. The 
single individual is warned against relying on transient aspects of life and is encouraged to 
seek the ‘highest good thing’ that is faith (Kierkegaard, 1990: 9). The individual is also 
exhorted to relinquish the present and the illusory assurances that are ‘captive to the service 
of the moment’ (Kierkegaard, 1990: 17). Resonant with points made earlier in this chapter, 
Kierkegaard encourages his learning individual to surrender what is known in order to 
experience the unknown. 
           According to Kierkegaard, faith cannot be imparted. Imparted faith is merely an appearance 
and the ‘teacher’ who gives such faith, gives it imperfectly. To be ‘perfect’ (or authentic), it 
must be willed by the individual (Kierkegaard, 1990: 12-3). This involves a movement away 
                                                          
213 As will be explained in Chapter Six through the illustration of a mobius strip, this is not a systematic 
circular movement but an ongoing process of learning and relearning.  
145 
 
from the certainty of what the ‘other,’ be it a teacher or friend offers, in order to find ‘what he 
or she is looking for’ (Kierkegaard, 1990: 14). Kierkegaard suggests that the more one holds on 
to ‘given’ truth, the further away from truth one becomes. Thus, it is recognised that faith is 
not concerned with externals but with the individual’s inner being. This of course does not 
concern ‘Being’ in the Heideggerian sense, nor does it relate to the self-sufficient faith 
described above.214 It is a faith that accepts relation. As Kierkegaard writes: ‘Faith is the 
eternal power in a human Being’ (Kierkegaard, 1990: 11-12). 
           As such, authentic faith does not involve a total rejection of what is ‘given.’ This is important 
to note. As explained in the Literature Review, the current thesis does not purport to negate 
Christianity or undermine its doctrines in the process of a learner coming to faith.215 
Nevertheless, the proposed new perspective of Christian education allows the learner to 
suspend immediate claims to truth in order to explore the new meanings that might emerge 
following an encounter with the Absolute. This adds a new dimension to learning. In the light 
of the new perspective, ‘The Christian Faith’ and its contents are opened up (or interrupted) 
for the possibility of new meanings. These meanings, in the light of the contingent life of the 
learning individual, might be recognised in the illusion of illusions. This idea is significant and 
will be explored in more detail in the following chapters. 
           Similarly, for Kierkegaard, the move away from immediacy allows the individual to recognise 
the Absolute without having to make a claim to it. As the movement involves inquiring, 
wishing, thinking deeply and being anxious, the individual is able to wrestle with rather than 
eschew what has been ‘given’ and for Kierkegaard, this inspires a more authentic kind of 
meaning making (Kierkegaard, 1990: 15). It might be suggested that the action of wrestling 
with truth also encourages a stronger faith. When God breaks into the contingent present, 
immediacy is transfigured and the perspective of the individual is changed (Kierkegaard, 1990: 
21; 26). Kierkegaard writes: ‘God penetrates everything with his eternal clarity’ (Kierkegaard, 
1990: 39). This not a jolting that brings about the owned faith that is the telos of faith 
development (Bridger, 2000: 111) 216  but one that opens up possibility. Again, as outlined 
above, the intervention of the Absolute ruptures certainty, allowing the individual to engage 
with Christian truths more openly, and have a fuller and more authentic understanding of 
                                                          
214 Faith that for example, relies on conforming to the system of belief provided by the ‘Four Points’ 
(see page 16).  
215 See pages 19-20.  
216 Bridger explains that when one comes to ‘owned faith,’ one is 'jolted' into making the move away 
from the self in order to surrender to the absolute (Bridger, 2000: 111). 
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them. This idea will be explored further in the light of the story of Job later in the current 
chapter.  
           Therefore, the contents of faith can only be held lightly (Kierkegaard, 1990: 267). As already 
argued, when the individual’s faith becomes ‘actuality,’ it is a mirage, or an illusion 
(Kierkegaard, 1990: 36).217 Discourse Two explains how what is gained as a result of the loss 
must remain in the negative to be truthful. If it becomes self-certain or presented as fait 
accompli it becomes its own immediacy and the problem persists. Therefore, Discourse Two 
encourages readers to assume a relationship with God the constant eternal (Kierkegaard, 
1990: 33), to acknowledge ‘his’ grace and to desire that their natures become like ‘his’ 218 
(Kierkegaard, 1990: 40). This is enough. 
           What Kierkegaard calls for is a dialectical relationship in which the individual is able to 
understand himself in the light of the eternal (Kierkegaard, 1990: 259). He writes:  
           if a person sustains that expectancy (of faith) in his soul, he has a goal that is always 
valid, a criterion that is always valid and valid in itself; by means of this goal and this 
criterion he will always understand himself in temporality (Kierkegaard, 1990: 260). 
           This is featured in the thirteenth discourse, ‘The Expectancy of eternal salvation,’ in which the 
author describes how eternity disturbs temporality and takes the individual beyond the 
immediate to a concern219 for the eternal. This disturbance awakens a concern for ‘God’. This 
does not equate to any conditions. It concerns only the Absolute. The disturbance, or 
intervention of the Absolute, will be explored further in due course.  
           For Kierkegaard concern is not certainty, or what he calls ‘temporal assurance’ (Kierkegaard, 
1990: 266), but in fact uncertainty. He writes: ‘he who is truly concerned can never fathom 
eternal salvation finitely as it can never be fathomed’ (Kierkegaard, 1990: 266). In the 
                                                          
217 ‘Actuality’ will be highlighted again later in this Chapter, regarding Kierkegaard’s Stages on Life’s 
Way.  
218 Again, the designation of gender pertains to the rhetoric of the author but it might be argued that 
any designation, where masculine, feminine or neutral is antithetical to his view regarding the 
unknowable absolute.  
219 The notion of ‘concern’ features in the text Dynamics of Faith by Paul Tillich. In this text, Tillich 
alludes to faith as ‘Ultimate concern,’ that is, a concern with the dimension of life that is beyond the 
immediate. For faith, Tillich exhorts the learner to lose self-certainty (Tillich, 2001: 4;7) and to 
participate in a transcendent experience of the ‘Ultimate.’ Concern for the Ultimate is described as 
surrender. This surrender involves uncertainty. In the act of surrender, the ‘cleavage between subject 
and object’ is overcome and the idolatrousness of dualistic faith is eluded (Tillich, 2001: 13). 
Uncertainty might also be equated with doubt. However, in his consideration of doubt, Tillich does not 
advocate the rejection of the contents of faith, but their re-evaluation. He describes the importance of 
promoting a dialectical relation of faith and doubt, noting that doubt, which is ‘aware of the element of 
insecurity in every existential truth’ (Tillich, 2001: 23) is a necessary element in faith (Tillich, 2001: 19). 
147 
 
thirteenth discourse, as in all his writings, he diverts the reader away from making pretensions 
to having absolute knowledge and advocates the move from the immediate states of human 
existence to the religious (Kierkegaard, 1988: 415). He petitions the individual who seeks to 
secure a faith on the strength of the eternal not to diminish the eternal in any way, and in  
laying aside any claims to self-sufficiency, appeals to him or her to become expectant of 
salvation (Kierkegaard, 1990: 272-3). 
           For a new perspective of Christian education one might consider again how Kierkegaard’s 
ideas have significance. First, to make the leap of faith means to relinquish what the Postscript 
describes as the ‘reliable teachers’ (Kierkegaard, 1992: 12) and their activities. This includes 
suspending mastery in all its forms. It also identifies the teacher not as the adult authority 
figure, but as Spirit. Next it involves letting go of the presuppositions and pre-determined 
truths that the ‘reliable teachers’ present. It means recognising that truth is contingent and 
provisional, and therefore illusory, inspiring teachers and learners to recognise the illusion of 
the illusion. It also means leaping into epistemological uncertainty where unknowing takes 
precedent. In such a perspective, the teacher does not know in advance what is to be learnt. 
Neither does faith development equate to the grasping of the contents of ‘The Christian 
Faith.’ Here, the loss of the certain and the subsequent return instead allows for the eternal to 
interrupt the presuppositions of the finite and temporal. In an ongoing process, the learning 
individual is able to continually reimagine the contents of faith and thus develop freely and 
become transformed.  
           Faith is no longer a possession to be claimed and grasped, imposed or given. In the light of this 
chapter, it is suggested that the movement of faith neither is directed towards grasping what 
is learnt. The movement is rather a forwards and backwards interchange in which the learning 
individual and the contents of faith relate dialectically with one another in relation with the 
Absolute. In the middle space of the relation, inspired by the work of Spirit, is faith. A new 
perspective of Christian education then considers learning for faith in terms of a process that 
takes place in the broken middle. The following chapter explores the issue of education and 
the movement of learning in particular. However, to consider the notion of faith more fully, it 
is necessary to note the nature of truth in authentic learning. This this is considered now, 
again in the light of Kierkegaardian theory.  
           5.4 Faith and truth 
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           It is clear through Kierkegaard’s writing that what is presented is not to be accepted as ‘the 
truth.’ As highlighted above, even the Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses which reflect the 
Christian tradition more explicitly, promote the process of learning more than the meaning 
that is made. Gardiner emphasises the importance for truth of Kierkegaard’s indirect 
communication in his pseudonymous texts, and outlines the significance of the mask. Through 
the disguises of the various ‘authors’ in these texts, the reader is left to draw his or her own 
conclusions (Kierkegaard, 1988: 44) regarding what is written. By losing Kierkegaard as the 
author, the individual comes to the truth of ‘nothing’ as ‘something,’ so to learn about his-self 
as well as his-self in relation to other. 
           Stages on Life’s Way is one of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous texts. The writing is indirect and is 
presented by a number of pseudonymous characters to the ‘single individual’ in various 
scenarios. In this text, Kierkegaard considers further the movement away from the aesthetic 
and ethical states as previously presented in Either/Or (1974); for faith, he now adds the move 
to the religious. This is illustrated partly through the story of a young man who struggles with 
love. In coming to learn truth, it is suggested that ‘each person,’ that is both the young man 
and the reader ‘must find his own path to inner understanding that does justice to his own 
individuality and may carry him beyond the boundaries of the ethical’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 56). 
           The section ‘Guilty/Not Guilty’ is written in the form of a diary and recounts the activities of 
this young man in relation to the girl who is the object of his affection. The illusion of 
immediate truth is reflected in the characters' relationship. At the outset, this young man’s 
desire for the girl is concealed like a mask. It is his immediacy and is true only to himself 
(Kierkegaard, 1988: 201). Thus, it is illusory. The author suggests that what is true is masked 
by ideality. However, recognition of the ‘illusion’ is the beginning of his journey. This is his 
education; this leads him into self-understanding and so to truth. 
           As the character seeks to move beyond the mask and into a relationship in actuality, the 
illusion is underlined. Actuality illuminates something totally different and this is alarming. On 
declaring ‘she is mine’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 211), his knowledge of her changes and so does the 
relationship. He now knows her in reality. She is now his possession. But he questions: what is 
reality, if not another illusion? He therefore experiences tension; the comfort of ideality in his 
not-knowing is coupled with the terror of knowing her in actuality (Kierkegaard, 1988: 215). 
The diary writings indicate how he attempts to manage this paradigm shift and as the relation 
evolves, the reader becomes aware of his pain in the struggle as he experiences the change 
(Kierkegaard, 1988: 231-2). 
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           The girl on the other hand exists in aesthetic immediacy. Her truthfulness in relation to the 
man is immediate since he appears to her in his externality. Knowledge is given to her and 
through this she makes him ‘ideal.’ Her love is in-itself and there is no obstacle or pain 
(Kierkegaard, 1988: 413). Whilst developing a relation with the other, her truth is still 
immediate, since love is assumed and she is in no doubt (Kierkegaard, 1988: 414). The man 
however, in his distress, bemoans this fate. He declares that the ideal view of a lover is an 
illusion and describes the relationship as a ‘relation of power-seduction’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 
311). As such the relation is a misrelation. 
           For education, the misrelation is significant. In this context, it inspires the young man to move 
beyond his immediacy. He needs to experience a ‘higher passion’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 406) 
and so in transcending immediacy, he moves towards the religious which is his relation with 
the infinite. The contradiction of the immediate in the relation to the infinite (Kierkegaard, 
1988: 409) becomes his learning. This is a dialectical experience in which he ‘holds on firmly to 
his love and maintains that he will not, cannot make it concrete’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 415). As 
outlined above, when the misrelation illustrates the unequal relation of broken halves, it is 
educative. The misrelation which disallows totality, rather allows for the identification of the 
middle space, in which learning as Spirit might take place.  
           The events of the diary entries provide a parallel to that of the single individual whose learning 
involves the movement to the religious state. This is considered in the section ‘Letter to the 
reader,’ a commentary presented in Stages on Life’s Way by pseudonymous author Frater 
Taciturnus. In this commentary, the author highlights the imperative of the dialectic for an 
authentic life of faith and explores what the term ‘religious’ might mean. He explains how for 
some it concerns the means by which the individual accesses the immediacies of faith: history 
or poetry for example. The individual here remaining in the aesthetic state, is enthusiastic 
‘about’ the religious but is not yet religious himself. The ethical individual enters into an 
immediate relation with the religious and being ‘untested in infinite reflection, he embraces 
the ‘doctrine of obligation’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 486-7).  
           Taciturnus argues rather for the ‘religiousness of infinity’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 304). As well as 
accepting the truth in relation as misrelation, and acknowledging the value of loss (Gardiner, 
1988: 60), Taciturnus illuminates how the tension between ideality and reality and the risk of 
loss of one to the other, result in the ‘higher passion’ of the religious (Kierkegaard, 1988: 435). 
Here, just as the young man becomes the negation of immediacy and ideality, the movement 
to the religious is made on the basis of his negative relation to the infinite. He does not ‘know’ 
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the infinite, therefore cannot grasp knowledge as truth. Recognising that the ‘infinitely 
negative is the only adequate form for the negative’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 486), the learning 
individual recognises the illusion of the finite in-itself. 
           The infinite reflection which inspires a sense of the ‘religiousness of infinity,’ involves a double 
movement. This is the negation of the negation. Although not without obstacles, danger or 
risk, this negation signifies a ‘God-relationship of the widest scope’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 414). It 
opens up the way for the impossibility of the infinite to influence the finite. The author writes: 
‘infinite reflection is not something alien but immediacy’s transparency to itself’ (Kierkegaard, 
1988: 414). Unable to grasp the contents of religion and thus seemingly further away from 
being religious, the author suggests he is paradoxically closer. He understands the religious to 
be beyond temporality and does not ‘make the mistake by grasping something particular’ 
(Kierkegaard, 1988: 487).  
           As in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses cited above, the author’s suspicion regarding immediacy 
is evident at various points in the diary writing. For example, he writes that in immediacy 
there is no distinction between the idea of the absolute and that which is represented 
through language and thought (Kierkegaard, 1988: 216). The consequences of this are that 
God might be created in man’s image (Kierkegaard, 1988: 229), thus making the absolute 
exclusive (Kierkegaard, 1988: 260). He incites individuals who prioritise religious categories 
such as ‘holy names’ and ‘Biblical terms’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 304)220 and as these also might 
equate to possession, they must be renounced. As Taciturnus argues, when the individual 
seeks the ‘religiousness of infinity,’ truth is not presented or proclaimed as highlighted 
above,221 (Kierkegaard, 1988: 304) but rather incites a transformational relational encounter 
(Kierkegaard, 1988: 434-6). This is the reality of faith.  
           As the story of the young man highlights, it is within the dialectical relation of ideality and 
reality that the learner is able to experience the negation of negation and so come to a 
transformed understanding of truth. ‘Reality’ is often used as a driver word in Children’s 
Spirituality literature and seeking to provide an alternative to a doctrinal engagement with 
spirituality, authors perceive spiritual reality to be separate to the contingent world. However, 
this idea must be revisited and comment on this in the light of Kierkegaard’s view of truth is 
now provided. 
                                                          
220 This might also pertain to the creeds and Christian practices presented earlier. 
221 See page 20. 
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           5.5 Reality and ideality 
           Spirituality is often described as an ‘ontological reality’ (Hyde, 2008: 29). By this, scholars 
promote the idea that spirituality, as an innate and universal dimension of humanity, cannot 
be denied (e.g. Hardy, 1979; Zohar and Marshall, 2000; Newberg and D’ Aquili, 2001). 
Moriarty proposes that spiritual experiences often involve an ‘unseen reality’ and drawing on 
William James’s accounts of a variety of religious experiences, she suggests that his theory 
defends the ‘reality of subjective spiritual experience’ (Moriarty, 2014: 12-3). As such it is 
proposed that what takes place within the inner life of the individual, whilst not expressly 
articulated or demonstrated, is real and therefore personally meaningful. Describing the 
movement to Ultimate Unity with the other depicted as an ‘Ultimate Reality,’ Hyde explains 
that the individual experiences reality at the widest or deepest level of connectedness. He 
suggests that as the ‘I-me-mine’ egocentric triad breaks down,  
           the world as it really is, without self-referent attachments is apperceived and one can 
glimpse the reality of things as they really are (Hyde, 2008: 34). 
           Reality is no longer masked. Reality is then not what is experienced in the contingent world, 
but that which is transcendent of it. Hart presents spirituality in terms of ‘direct knowing.’ This 
is ‘mystical knowing that is beyond the intellects’ ability to pin down as infinite 
comprehension’ (Hart, 2003: 50). In order for one to access this ‘direct knowing,’ a veil should 
be lifted. This is the veil of illusion. Once the veil is lifted, questions inevitably emerge to 
existentially consider the dimensions of ethics, intentions and truth (Hart, 2003: 278-9). 
           Each author here deems ‘reality’ as a dimension to be grasped personally and immediately. 
The contingent world seems to be a dimension that veils reality and as such should be 
overcome. However, in the light of the current discussion, the veil and mask are vital for 
education and will be considered again shortly. In Kierkegaard, it is the relation of reality with 
ideality that allows for the individual to experience truth, within the contingent world and not 
apart from it. Therefore, in considering a new perspective of Christian education, it is 
important to consider further how the dialectic of reality and ideality promotes authentic 
learning.  
           As stated above, Kierkegaard addresses reality in the ‘Letter to the reader’ section of Stages 
on Life’s Way. The relation of reality and ideality is presented in terms of the aesthetic hero 
who in the immediate has not yet attained the religious state. At the beginning of the story, 
the young man’s love is true only for himself. It is not yet expressed to the woman and is 
concealed by his ‘inclosing reserve’ (Kierkegaard, 1998: 427). It is thus only evident as ideality. 
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When the young man’s love becomes a reality, it is only expressed in immediacy (in limited 
terms) and therefore is an illusion of reality. The female character’s love is also lost to ideality. 
As she loves the man in immediacy, within the aesthetic state, she loves according to how she 
believes she must love. Her love is ‘canonized’ and accepted as true. However, the woman 
does not yet know the man in reality, so her truth is also illusory.  
           The illustration of both characters here again highlights the limitations of immediacy in 
learning. The ideality of the young man might pertain to the contents of faith as immediately 
expressed in the ideas of Bridger and Yust, or the learning that takes place in the enclosed 
space of the womb. Here, immediate truth serves to validate itself and rather than promote 
the higher passion that is faith, it remains as it is, static and unchanged. Truth here is truth 
only in terms of the context that has created it. The ‘canonized truth’ of the young woman 
similarly highlights limitations. Here truth equates to that which the learner understands he or 
she should believe. It suggests that proclaimed truth, which is accepted and agreed, is true 
truth. Yet as Rose points out, any truth that is accepted as truth amongst many is illusory 
(Rose, 1992: 10).  
           Again, it must be noted that the doctrines of the Christian faith are not considered here to be 
untrue. Nevertheless, it is the conjecture of the current thesis that when educating learners 
within a Christian context for an authentic life of faith, it is erroneous to suggest that 
immediate apprehensions and expressions of Christianity such as doctrine, tradition and a 
notion of ‘God’ are in themselves the means by which learners learn. Furthermore, since 
learning for faith transcends knowledge, the reality of faith is inspired not by accepting and 
believing what is presented in immediacy, but through an encounter with the Absolute. 
Therefore, whilst not negating the truth claims of Christianity, the proposed new perspective 
of Christian education considers that learners, through the work of Spirit in the middle space, 
explore the truth of the ‘unseen reality’ away from the immediacy of the self, so to inspire the 
higher passion that is faith. This requires a leap of faith, or in the rhetoric of Stages on Life’s 
Way, the move to the religious. 
           The mask that conceals reality becomes the means by which immediacy is overcome. When 
used as a starting point for thinking and reflecting, the mask becomes the key to learning 
(Rose 1992: 10). It provides the middle space between ideality and reality in which more 
authentic learning can take place. Rose argues that every beginning appears as a mask. 
However, as a negative self-relation, the ‘dramatized illusion’ of the mask prevents the 
individual from lapsing into thought and having ‘the advantage in coming to understand’ 
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(Rose, 1992: 10). As truth is in the negative, rather than claiming the beginning as absolute, 
the mask opens up the possibility of the beginning and this is the foundation of faith.  
           This is illustrated by Tubbs in terms of the story of a minister who wears a veil, signifying his 
imminent death (Tubbs, 2008: 16). When his congregation look upon the veil and not his real 
face, this alerts them to reality of death. The veil interrupts the separation of life and death 
and brings death into the realm of life. The symbol of the veil also exemplifies the middle 
space between life and death and ensures that ideality (life without death) is recognised as 
illusory. When the veil is lifted, reality is also revealed as an illusion. This marks the illusion of 
the illusion. Recognition of the illusion of the illusion inspires the congregation (or in the 
current thesis, the learning individual) to come to ‘know thyself’ (Tubbs, 2008: 16-18). The 
illusion of the illusion prevents the learner from possessing actuality as truth and learning 
begins from the moment of this recognition. As the congregation are forced to consider their 
own death, this is their education.222 
           Again, for a new perspective of Christian education, when the illusion of immediacy is 
revealed, and through negation immediacy is interrupted, recognition of the illusion of the 
illusion highlights how perceptions of truth must be continually reworked and reassessed. 
Exemplifying the middle, the veil highlights the space in which the relational element of truth 
is made manifest. Truth for faith therefore is not based on externals but what is in between, in 
the dialectical relation of the learner and immediate truth. The space is opened up as 
immediacy is interrupted, and this is signified as the intervention of the Absolute that inspires 
the relation of relations. This idea of interruption is significant in the current discussion and 
considered now.  
           5.6 The breakthrough 
           Considering love as an allegory of faith, Kierkegaard notes in Philosophical Fragments, how 
faith is gained at the nexus of the understanding with the paradox (Kierkegaard, 2009: 129). 
This happens in a moment when the self is surrendered and the paradox is accepted 
(Kierkegaard, 2009: 125). The self (single individual/immediacy) is lost to the other 
                                                          
222 The idea of the veil is also addressed in Kierkegaard’s text Works of Love. Here he opens with the 
statement that love’s hidden life is recognisable by its fruits. What is hidden or masked is the truth of 
love which resides within the individual (Kierkegaard, 2009: 23). The mask is not deceit or separation 
but when considered in terms of relation, the middle space between self and other has significance. 
The author considers love to be temporality and eternity related dialectically: the mask’s hidden-ness 
prevents love from slipping into the self-deception of the temporal world and thus becoming a 
possession whilst eternality ensures that it is ‘before everything else and remains when all else is past’ 
(Kierkegaard, 2009: 24). 
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(eternal/absolute) but through the loss, the eternal intervenes. This is the interruption or 
‘moment’ of learning. It might also be described as a breakthrough. As noted variously in 
previous chapters, the idea of the interruption or breakthrough is highlighted as having 
educational significance and therefore in the proposal of a new perspective in Christian 
education, it is necessary to consider further what this might mean for learning. The 
breakthrough is illustrated by Kierkegaard in terms of the Biblical story of Job.  
           In a number of Kierkegaard’s writings, the story of Job is used to provide an analogy for the 
movement of surrender, loss and return in coming to faith (Kierkegaard, 1988: 243). It also 
illustrates the torment involved in this process. Job, a wealthy businessman and man of faith, 
finds his faith tested when, at the direction of God in response to Satan, his belongings, 
livelihood and family are all destroyed. Job’s anguish is recounted in a lengthy Biblical 
narrative. Accusing and criticising, his ‘friends’ offer unhelpful counsel. An embittered lengthy 
dialogue between Job and these opponents is presented as the story’s protagonists try to 
make sense of Job’s circumstances. What is significant here is that Job’s extreme loss is his 
education. At the point of recognition of his loss, Job surrenders himself to God. Rather than 
respond in anger, he proclaims: ‘The Lord gave, the Lord took away – blessed be the name of 
the Lord.’223  
           At first, the surrender does not improve Job’s situation. This leads his opponents to question 
how and why he has experienced such loss. However, at the conclusion of a lengthy narrative 
that outlines Job’s torment, God intervenes. God’s voice is heard as a thunderbolt from within 
a storm. This thunderbolt signifies the ‘moment’ that leads Job to recognise God’s sovereignty 
in all things. This is Job’s moment of submission. He declares: ‘I will change my heart and life 
and sit in the dust and ashes.’ 224 Finally, we read that he was given back twice as much as he 
had lost, being blessed by God and having much success.225 As the loss allowed for the 
breakthrough of the Absolute, Job was transformed and blessed. 
           Job is first introduced as a resource for reflection in Kierkegaard’s Repetition. Published in 
1843, Repetition concerns the plight of a young man in love. The narrative describes the 
author’s exchanges with this young man as he wrestles with the agony of loving and not 
having. Albeit similar to ‘Guilty/Not Guilty' in Stages on Life’s Way, this text particularly 
concerns the method by which the young man comes to let go of the lover who torments his 
                                                          
223 Job 1 vs 21; New International Version. 
224 Job 42 vs 6; New International Version. 
225 Job 42 vs 12; New International Version.  
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soul, and therefore it concerns the educative aspect of love. As the text outlines the 
subsequent movement towards this young man’s own self-understanding, it reflects the 
movement of loss and return in coming to faith. This character recognises the power of Job as 
a teacher; hence he reflects on this Biblical character’s story as a means of coming to terms 
with his own situation (Kierkegaard, 2009: 63). 
           For his personal life, the young man notes how Job’s plight illuminates his own torment. He 
initially highlights how Job’s faith was not immediate. Although losing all his possessions, 
representing the tangible expressions of immediacy, he suggests that Job was able to accept 
that the Lord took his livelihood away. He was able to accept this not because it came easily to 
him in ‘immediate self-possession,’ but because of the faith that came as a result of suffering 
(Kierkegaard, 1990: 58). When Job was able to say ‘blessed be the name of the Lord,’ he did so 
not as a voyeur, or one who looks on faith, but because he had experienced God’s 
magnificence. As the writer later outlines, Job’s struggle was neither aesthetic nor ethical but 
transcendent, surpassing knowledge and thought. His religiousness then suggests that his 
faith was not possessed in immediacy, but it suspended all actuality in relation to the eternal 
(Kierkegaard, 1990: 68). The loss of the immediate made way for the intervention of God.  
           The pseudonymous author of Repetition suggests that in order to empathise with Job, and to 
reflect on his own torment, he might enter into the situation of Job and make Job’s words his 
own. However, he also recognises that this would lead to misunderstanding since he has not 
yet experienced the extent of Job’s pain. This lies in wait. To do so would be to ‘put on’ the 
words in the same way as the child who wears his father’s clothes. He cannot understand 
Job’s torment from the inside and therefore cannot recognise his pain. He has not 
experienced the pain of faith nor the grace of the eternal (Kierkegaard, 1990: 65).  
           Reflecting this in educational terms, it might be suggested that any explanation regarding the 
eternal is abstract, holding no meaning, unless the individual is able to enter into the same 
difficult relation. This highlights again the significance of the risk and anguish involved in a 
perspective of education that aims to work within a broken middle space. The spiritual 
educator must be prepared to surrender models and methods that ‘put on’ words and beliefs, 
so that the learner might experience the intervention of the Absolute from within the broken 
middle.  
           Being transcendent, Job’s relation with the eternal is one of opposition; it therefore cannot be 
placed in the realm of thought or understanding. It exists beyond the ethical realm 
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(Kierkegaard, 1990: 67). Job’s faith lies beyond the immediate. Kierkegaard writes: ‘the 
disputes at the boundaries of faith are fought out in him’ (Kierkegaard, 1990: 67). This sits in 
contrast to the ‘half-hour’s reading’ undertaken on the part of philosophers or theologians, 
and their ‘hastily drawn conclusion(s)’ (Kierkegaard, 1990: 67), clearly illustrating immediacy 
and the evasion of any terror. Resonance with the perspectives of Paradigm One are again 
clear, yet it might also be suggested that this transcendent dimension of faith sits in contrast 
to the enclosed space of children’s spirituality, in which the inner life of the individual is 
validated and not surrendered.  
           For Kierkegaard’s young man, the movement of giving and taking away, followed by the 
doubling of the gift through grace, is considered an example of the movement of repetition 
(Kierkegaard, 1990: 69). Whilst this movement will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 
Six, it is necessary to provide a simple definition now. In Kierkegaard’s text of the same name, 
the movement of repetition is explored in relation to Socratic recollection. Although the 
author accepts that the movement back to what has already been is necessary, equally there 
must be a movement forward. Repetition for Job meant that in aftermath of the loss of the 
immediate, he was able to recollect that God is good. This is his statement of faith. Yet after 
the breakthrough inspired by the storm, he was able to move forward into a future of 
blessing; this forward movement repeats his statement of faith as an actuality. Job ‘knows’ 
that God is good; yet it is in his experience of the goodness of God, that he is able to 
understand this more fully (Kierkegaard, 1990: 69). It also inspires him to live in this light.  
           In the Literature Review, as well as the early part of the current chapter, it is highlighted that 
according to faith development theorists such as J.W. Westerhoff, an external demonstration 
of ‘owned faith’ is a change in the way the individual lives (Westerhoff, 1976: 98). When one 
owns faith, the decisions and behaviours of the individual are carried out in the light of the 
faith. Yet, as also highlighted in this chapter, this linear movement towards the grasping of 
faith contents does not include the breakthrough that interrupts such grasping, and there is 
no middle space. It is argued here that in order for the learning individual to live authentically 
in the light of faith, he or she must first, as did Job, surrender to the Absolute and allow for 
the experience of the breakthrough in his or her own life.  
           The author of Repetition concedes that ‘a thunderstorm can really do one good’ (Kierkegaard, 
1990: 69). To only recollect is to only rethink and reorder the situation. To accept repetition is 
to accept change. When all seems desperate, God intervenes. The young man of Kierkegaard’s 
Repetition subsequently considers how a breakthrough similar to that of Job’s might assist 
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him in his own situation (Kierkegaard, 1990: 70). It would certainly subvert his immediacy, 
forcing him to deny any aspect of the voyeur in his situation, and disturb him so to effect a 
transformation (Kierkegaard, 2009: 70-1). He would be disrupted but ultimately strengthened.  
           For a proposed new perspective of Christian education then, this idea presents a helpful 
summary: through the negation of immediacy, which recognises the illusion of the illusion, 
perceptions of learning and truth are disturbed and reworked, so that transformation takes 
place. The loss of the universal experienced by the individual is a rupture, resulting in anguish 
and pain. But a result of the loss is the breakthrough which brings about change. This idea is 
considered further by Rowan Williams in his short chapter ‘Ray of Darkness’ and key points 
from this text are presented now in conclusion to the current chapter.  
           5.7 Ray of Darkness 
           Williams notes that the ‘ray of darkness,’ a phrase used by the 5th Century Syrian Dionysius 
and later the 17th Century poet Henry Vaughan, is made in reference to God who, as the ray or 
beam of light, cuts in to the lives of individuals to cause an interruption (Williams, 2003: 119). 
In the short chapter that explores this concept, Williams first acknowledges the ray of 
darkness as a paradox. The paradoxical nature of this concept highlights his view concerning 
the ‘elusiveness of truth’ (Williams, 2003: 119). As it is paradoxical to equate a ‘ray’ with 
darkness, this paradox serves to illustrate how the truth of faith is not always what is obvious 
and known. He asserts that a paradox ‘keeps a question alive,’ and avoiding conclusions, it 
stops learners from taking an easy option in coming to faith (Williams, 2003: 119). The 
paradox opens up a space for enquiry and reflection, and reinforces the brokenness of the self 
and other relation.  
           As signified earlier in terms of Fear and Trembling and Repetition, the interruption is an 
educational imperative. Here the ray interrupts the illusion of self -sufficiency. As it does so, it 
disturbs and transforms. Williams suggests that when the ray of darkness cuts through, it ‘may 
make me a stranger to myself’ (Williams, 2003: 119). Yet, as highlighted through Job and the 
plight of the young man, the interruption of self-sufficiency is indeed the education of the self. 
In the light of the interruption, one must find a new way of knowing oneself. For the current 
thesis, the learner comes to know him or herself subjectively as the illusion that recognises 
illusion. Aporetically, this moves the learner to a state of unknowing – to embrace what is 
beyond utterance and comprehension in order to challenge what is acceptable or ‘given.’ 
Williams writes: ‘when God’s light breaks in on my darkness, the first thing I know is that I 
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don’t know – and never did’ (Williams, 2003: 120). This unknowing - the negation of certainty 
- takes one closer to truthfulness; but this only comes about as a result of the unrest caused 
by the disturbance. 
           In the second section of his chapter, Williams claims that the breakthrough might not happen 
in a temporal moment (Williams, 2003: 120). Whilst ecstatic experiences such as those 
recorded by William James, as well others in Children’s Spirituality literature,226 are significant 
to the individual at the time, their impact might not be long-lasting. Indeed, one might ask: 
how do we recognise the fruit of this learning? Williams explains that the breakthrough that 
interrupts and questions self-certainty is a process that happens over time. As the characters 
in Kierkegaard’s stories do not attain self-understanding in a singular moment, Christian 
teachers who aim to inspire a lasting faith and spiritual life in learning individuals should also 
be aware of this. The fruit of spiritual education should not be emotional or transitional: it 
should be transformational.  
           Williams posits that Christian educational practices (such as prayer and ritual for example) 
should be ‘designed to keep us in some degree on this edge of experience where I and my 
world, my regularities and securities are always being made provisional’ (Williams, 2003: 120). 
He argues for a paradigm where the individual might feel safe in finding, losing and re-finding 
him or herself (Williams, 2003: 121). This does not mean that the practices should be 
abandoned altogether. However, Williams intimates that when the ray of darkness interrupts 
their self-enclosing, the practices might take on new meaning for the learner, accessed in a 
more personal and dynamic way. The loss of the self-certain and enclosing nature of Christian 
teaching ensures then that learning is not controlled.  
           In terms of a learner’s consideration of God, the interruption forces the individual to consider 
contingency and accept the myriad understandings and misunderstandings that comprise 
such a consideration (Williams, 2003: 121). As stated in the Literature Review in terms of 
research by Rizzuto, there are as many ideas of God as there are people (Rizzuto, 1979: 
180).227 The ray of darkness interrupts representations of God that might have little meaning 
to learners in their own contingent situation, and allows for the ‘misunderstandings’ that 
learners might have as they explore their own representations, to become their own 
                                                          
226 An example of an ecstatic spiritual experience is described by Tobin Hart: he suggests that ‘a few 
hours in the surf’ might become an experience of absorption – where the individual is at one with the 
moment – and that such an experience can have sacred properties, leading to awe, wonder and 
mystery (Hart, 2003: 49). 
227 See page 43.  
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understanding.  The interruption also provides an alternative to the ‘cultivating’ of Christians 
proposed by Yust, which sees learners adopting the language and rituals of ‘The Christian 
Faith’ as a means of developing faith. It also edges away from uncritically engaging with 
concepts, ideas and symbols. Rather than adopting the concepts of ‘The Christian Faith’ in 
order to come to faith, the ray of darkness allows them to be re-imagined by the individual 
learner. 
           Finally, death and resurrection of Christ, noted earlier in reference to On Christian Theology, 
also serves in ‘Ray of Darkness’ as a template for the loss and return. The paradox of the cross, 
with its contradictions of love and pain, disturbs that which is controlled ‘by law and 
institution’ (Williams, 2003: 122). Historically, the breakthrough exercised as Christ rose from 
the dead, overcame the religious world of First Century Jews. Equally today, it overcomes that 
which is immediate, authoritative and inescapable. It is ‘a promise for those alive to their own 
vulnerability’ (Williams, 2003: 122-3). Furthermore, the loss results in the gaining of strength. 
The resurrection ‘breaks through to some unimaginable new level of being’: in the same way, 
learning individuals can come into the same newness of being. They can be transformed. 
Christians can live with uncertainty, mystery and unknowing because of the certainty of the 
breakthrough of Christ (Williams, 2003: 123). As Williams states: this is our repetition - that 
we live in the light of death and resurrection, terror and joy, and loss and fullness. The ray of 
darkness is not the antithesis of light; it is an expression of God’s ‘dart of love’ (Williams, 
2003: 124). 
           5.8 Conclusion 
           The ray of Darkness is the moment of rupture that breaks into self-sufficiency and allows for 
the individual to understand him or herself more fully in relation to the eternal. For a new 
perspective of Christian education proposed in the light of the surrender and breakthrough, 
the notion of the model or method for inspiring a life of faith as presented in this thesis, must 
now be must be revisited. In the new perspective, the inspiration for faith involves a leap 
away from the certainty of what is known and understood; the life of faith is illuminated by 
the paradoxical breakthrough of the eternal into temporality; the ‘fruit’ of a life of faith is not 
necessarily demonstrated externally but manifested in the strength gained from an encounter 
with the absolute. The journey of faith then must be considered as a continuous movement of 
loss and return that embraces difficulty and pain. The following chapters consider the 
significance of the movement of learning for Christian education and exploring the 
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Kierkegaardian notion of repetition further, the discussion considers how the movement 
might inspire authentic learning for a meaningful life of faith.  
























           CHAPTER SIX: LEARNING 
           6.1 Introduction 
           The previous chapter notes how Rowan Williams explains that the ‘ray of darkness’ provides 
the moment of rupture that breaks into self-sufficiency, and allows for the individual to 
understand him or herself more fully in relation to the eternal. The ray interrupts ignorance, 
cuts through comfortableness and questions personal identity (Williams, 2003: 119-20). This 
chapter explores further the idea of rupture in the light of the paradoxical relation of self and 
other, and considers its significance in learning for a life of faith. 
           6.2 Self-sufficiency 
           In Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (1992), Kierkegaard likens 
self-sufficiency to the wider aspects of society, including the church, that represent an 
established order; here the understanding of objective precepts is deemed to precede 
subjective knowledge and experience (Vardy, 1996: 57). Self-sufficiency concerns for example 
the ‘what’ of God that is communicated in religion. This is illustrated by the activities of what 
he calls ‘Religion A’ (Kierkegaard, 1992: 555). Here the religious person, who is baptized, 
carries a bible and owns a hymn book, presents all the required outward appearances of a 
Christian (Kierkegaard, 1992: 557), yet does not fully live a life of faith (Vardy, 1996: 31-3). 
           Kierkegaard continues to describe how speculative thought has taken control of historical 
Christianity.228 As the understanding here is so prevalent, there is no sense of ‘beyond;’ the 
experience of Christianity is merely finite (Kierkegaard, 1992: 361). As a result, everything is 
standardised: ‘the concepts are gradually being cancelled and the words are coming to mean 
everything.’ He continues: ‘the whole thing is toothless maundering’ which he argues, 
represents spiritual bankruptcy (Kierkegaard, 1992: 363). In practice, the activities of the faith 
become custom and habit; nevertheless, the Christian is led to assume that these are a 
necessary requirement for a life of faith. 
           In their reader based on the works of Kierkegaard, Chamberlain and Ree place Kierkegaard’s 
thinking in contrast with Hegel. They suggest for example that self-sufficiency is evident when 
thought is brought into a mediate relation with Christianity. Understanding the telos of the 
Hegelian dialectic to be absolute knowledge, speculative thought assumes itself as part of the 
                                                          
228 This reflects further his discomfort regarding the activities of the Danish church goers of his day and 
his deeming of the church as a secular institution in which the true aims of such activities are inverted 
(Gardiner, 1988: 15-6). 
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other. In this case, self-consciousness becomes its own truth. Chamberlain and Ree argue that 
in the paradigm described by Kierkegaard here, the individual similarly assumes Christianity 
(and not faith) as part of him or herself, evidencing ‘the Hegelian egocentric orientation of the 
subject’ (Chamberlain and Ree, 1998: 27). This concerns the contents of Christianity as well as 
models and methods of learning.  
           The critique of Hegel by Chamberlain and Ree also concerns the relation of master and slave. 
Considering immediacy as error (Hegel, 1977: 59), Hegel’s Phenomenology highlights how self- 
consciousness recognises the other mediately as an illusion of itself (Hegel, 1977: 114). As the 
dialectical struggle indicates, although self-consciousness seeks its own freedom, it must 
accept that it exists only in relation to the illusory other. It needs the other for its own truth. 
Life is only life in relation to death (Hegel, 1977: 111-138), and the struggle that perpetuates 
in the Unhappy Consciousness (Hegel, 1977: 131) is a reminder of this. In its ultimacy, Hegel’s 
dialectic is ‘self in other’ and this equates to absolute knowledge.229 
           Chamberlain and Ree describe this relation as A=A (Chamberlain and Ree, 1998: 28): each 
partner is absolute in absolute relation. This equation was introduced earlier in the current 
thesis in terms of Levinas’s criticism of mutual recognition; Levinas posits this relation of ‘self 
and self’ as complete and self-certain. The equation is also reflective of educational shapes 
described earlier such Erricker’s liberationist pedagogy or Wright’s confessional pedagogy in 
which the self is absolute in relation to an absolute other. It further illustrates the dichotomy 
outlined in the Literature review, and highlights how the learning individual claims either an 
external presentation of Christian truth, or validates personal truth. In each case, the learning 
individual is self-sufficient.   
           Kierkegaard suggests that this relation is a relation of misrecognition (Kierkegaard, 1992: 264). 
In the A=A relation, neither speculation nor Christianity are opposites but reflections of the 
same (Kierkegaard, 1992: 363-4). Yet in a relation with a third partner, that is the relation of 
relations, misrecognition is education. These opposites no longer relate absolutely; they relate 
unequally. As unequal, a disturbance, or interruption in the relation is evident and this, 
opening up the broken middle, is the moment of learning.  
                                                          
229 It is also important to note that whilst in this thesis the middle space proposed by Hegel is 
significant, as is the educational value of illusion, Kierkegaard’s educational philosophy represents a 
divergence from the systemic negotiation of self and other. For Hegel, the conditions of knowing the 
absolute are described epistemologically through struggle and illusion but for Kierkegaard the absolute 
of Christianity goes beyond thought and is given to the individual in experience. 
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           As Tubbs highlights, Kierkegaard’s philosophy of the teacher is founded upon the idea of this 
unequal relation. His use of indirect communication in storytelling, the use of pseudonyms, 
the paradox of the human and divine relation, and the asymmetry in the relation of teacher to 
student (Tubbs, 2005: 216), all point toward the notion that truth cannot be given or 
understood either immediately or mediately; truth is negotiated in the middle of self and 
other and Other. The Absolute of Christianity becomes the third partner in the broken relation 
(Tubbs, 2005: 218): as Spirit, the absolute is the one who intervenes and illuminates the truth.  
           According to Rose (Rose, 1996: 71-2) and Tubbs (Tubbs, 2004: 44-5; 2005: 217), 
misrecognition is a significant educational tool. It is the recognition of misrecognition that 
takes learners beyond the simple relation of A=A, to confront self-sufficiency and open up the 
middle space. This inspires the leap of faith. As the teacher, Spirit works within the asymmetry 
of the relation, and in the continuous process that is the life of faith, what is understood as 
truth is transformed. What is required for authentic education then is the broken relation of 
misrecognition. It is proposed here that learners recognise the illusion of the A=A relation, and 
through the double negation of the illusion of illusion, embrace the truth of untruth. 
           In the Postscript, Kierkegaard presents Christianity not as speculation but in terms of 
‘existence.’ Here becoming a Christian ‘should occur quietly within the individual without any 
decisive external action’ (Kierkegaard, 1992: 365). This takes the Christian away from a 
cognitive understanding of the faith to an experience that will ‘exist in it’ (Kierkegaard, 1992: 
378). Having considered the idea of existence in terms of Rahner’s theology of childhood 230 
and more fully in Chapter One in terms of Heidegger’s philosophy, attention is now given to 
this notion in terms of the life of faith.  
           6.3 Existence 
           In the context of Christian education, ‘existence’ concerns the relation of the subjective 
individual with Christianity. It is noticeably at a tangent to the concept proposed for example 
by Heidegger.231 As explored in Chapter One, Heidegger’s ‘existenz’ is the designation of Being 
given to Dasein, which is the manner of Being of an individual, rather than a determinate 
signification of logic (Heidegger, 1962: 67). In response to the forces of science or theology, 
                                                          
230 See page 26. 
231 As Pattison in The Philosophy of Kierkegaard points out, the relationship between Heidegger, 
Kierkegaard and existentialism is complex and it whilst it must be acknowledged that the ideas of this 
philosopher ‘received from Kierkegaard its decisive impulse’ (Pattison: 2005: 13), a difference in 
understanding regarding ‘existence’ is evident.  
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and seeking to regain possibility as an imperative in philosophy, Dasein’s existenz is grounded 
in its essence (Heidegger, 1962: 152). It must be interpreted existentially, exhibiting 
phenomenally that which Dasein possesses in its possibility, rather than historically regulated 
interpretations of Being. 
           Dasein is a totality of existence (Tubbs, 2004: 59). Exhibiting phenomenally, it involves the 
thrownness of existence ahead of itself in care and in anticipatory resoluteness, recognises its 
own end as it moves towards death. This movement also returns to the self to make 
possibility possible (Tubbs, 2004: 59). The movement forward and back is one and the same – 
that of the possibility of existence. This is not Hegelian circularity or Kierkegaardian repetition. 
It is the movement of Dasein being thrown into its own possibility which as anticipatory 
resoluteness, is nothingness. 
           As such there is no relation between two separate entities and therefore no ‘other’ that might 
be considered absolute, or ‘God.’232 To embrace other is to fall into the world of concern and 
this is inauthenticity.233 On the other hand, Kierkegaard is concerned with existence and its 
relation with Christianity. He posits that Christianity relates to itself as existence; the 
individual, who also relates as existence, relates to it (Kierkegaard, 1992: 371). When this 
relation is placed in relation with the Absolute, neither is the same as the other is neither 
equal to the other. Each exist and relate to the existence of their relation in relation to Other. 
The third partner interrupts each in its existence, and also interrupts their mutual relation. For 
Christian education, the imbalance ensures then that the absolute is not reduced to a 
preconception or a mere label. The rupture of existence illustrated by the ray of darkness 
fragments the idea of ‘God’ as an objective totality and opens up the possibility that the 
absolute might be experienced personally. This experience is not outwardly detected 
(Kierkegaard, 1992: 382), grasped or possessed (Kierkegaard, 1992: 381), but relates to the 
aporia that is the knowing of the unknown.  
           As illustrated in Either/Or, and Stages on Life’s Way, existence as the total ground of Being 
leads to despair. The temporal and sensory existence of the aesthete is found to result in 
                                                          
232 It might be argued that the self as a totality is indeed a ‘God.’ This is represented in the view within 
National Socialism of the Fuhrer representing the totality of the people and state (Tubbs, 2005: 135) 
233 As already highlighted, educational literature within the children’s spirituality paradigm resonates 
with this idea, locating spiritual learning outside of the conventions of an organised belief system 
(Hyde, 2008: 12; Watson, 2010: 14), and considering a life of faith to be an ontological experience 




disillusionment (Vardy, 1996: 40), necessitating a move away from immediacy. The ethical 
existence is similarly thrown into question as the individual considers the impossibility of 
totalising for truth as well as faith. Kierkegaard’s writing, as outlined in Chapter Three, served 
as a response to the ideas of some Danish Hegelians, whose claim was that truth as a whole is 
without presupposition. For these scholars, the Hegelian system was total. For Kierkegaard, a 
totalising perspective betrays the experience of the individual, with whom universality must 
be in relation (Kierkegaard, 1992: 379).  
           For the contemporary Christian, Williams suggests that the ‘total’ perspective set by 
participants of religion is often actually posited as God’s point of view; similarly, the religious 
‘script’ that is presented is deemed the will of God. It is his contention that agreed theological 
language wields control and therefore lacks integrity (Williams 2000: 4-5). He suggests that 
religious integrity is only possible when the discourse moves away from the total point of view 
(Williams 2000: 5-6). He argues that if Christianity is to remain honest, it must not move too 
far from the particular, with ‘the conviction that God is to be sought and listened for in all 
occasions’ (Williams 2000: 7). Without abandoning the ‘script’ entirely, the Christian is able to, 
by means of subjectivity, creatively engage with aspects of the faith in the light of the world’s 
complexities. Rather than distorting responses to God, this might ‘regenerate’ them (Williams 
2000: 7). 
           Again for Kierkegaard, logic must be related to existence in experience - not abstracted or 
uncontingent. Indeed, in Philosophical Fragments he notes that Christian thinking always 
moves from the starting point of existence and can never be demonstrated totally in actuality 
(Kierkegaard, 1974: 50). The antidote to a totalising perspective of Christianity, is an 
expression of the faith in which the individual’s subjectivity engages with his or her own 
subjective experience of it. The subjective learner relates to him or herself subjectively as an 
existing being; Christianity relates the individual subjectively to matters of the infinite. This is 
the triadic relation of subjectivity's subjectivity (Tubbs, 2009: 135), which ensures that the self 
and other never become one.  
           As the infinite is unknown and unknowable, yet enters temporality on the strength of the 
absurd, the triadic relation of self and other with Other prevents faith being comprehended, 
generalizable or measurable (Tubbs, 2005: 27). Yet it still allows for an encounter of the 
absolute. The interruption of the finite takes place through the recognition of misrecognition 
that opens up the middle space; it is in this space, in the middle of the triad, that learning 
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takes place. This is a relation of imbalance, or paradox. In the light of this, Christianity can no 
longer be self-sufficient. 
           6.4 The Paradox 
           In seeking to know the unknowable, the Christian learns the dilemma of faith (Rose, 1992: 42). 
The relation of faith and understanding for Kierkegaard is a paradox (Kierkegaard, 1974: 46). 
As Vardy explains, in the paradox the primacy of faith over reason suggests the individual 
must take a risk, staking one’s spiritual life and as such meeting the highest and most difficult 
demands (Vardy, 1996: 31). Vardy describes how in Concluding Postscript to Philosophical 
Fragments, Kierkegaard presents ‘Religion B’ as the relinquishing of understanding and 
thinking, allowing the individual to embrace the absurdity of the paradox (Vardy, 1996: 58-9; 
Kierkegaard, 1992: 556). Similarly, Rose suggests that when the paradox comes into existence, 
the individual has ‘the moment around which everything revolves’ (Rose, 1992: 43). The 
paradox is the ultimate example of imbalance. It requires that the individual let go of accepted 
representations of Christian precepts such as God and Saviour ‘lest understanding destroy 
their meaning’ (Rose,1992: 37), for a faith that exists in a broken relation with the infinite. 
           In Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus explains that in the 
paradox, man and his self-knowledge repeatedly collide with the unknown (Kierkegaard, 
1974: 48), reinforcing their absolute difference and confirming that reason cannot understand 
‘God’ by itself (Kierkegaard, 1974: 57). The infinite cannot be thought finitely, just as the 
understanding cannot negate itself to the absolute without the intervention of thought. 
Hence, the relation must be re-imagined. Rather than attempt understanding, the Christian 
must make the move away from obtaining God’s factual being in order to expose the 
condition in which the temporal individual might dialectically experience the infinite as given 
by the unknown God. 
           When the individual accepts absolute difference (Kierkegaard, 1974: 119), God is able to 
reveal ‘himself’ eternally as subjective truth. The key here is that truth is eternal, not merely 
objective or subjective. It concerns what it means to be human in relation to the infinite God. 
It is given in the moment of acceptance and is a gift. It is in this moment that spiritual 
understanding is illuminated as faith. This is difficult to grasp epistemologically; however, 
Vardy cites Rahner who suggests that this unknowing might inspire a sense of the mystery of 
faith (Vardy, 1996: 17). By introducing the idea of incarnation, Kierkegaard provides an 
illustration of how the paradox is made manifest. He writes: 'the incarnation makes the 
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paradox possible' (Kierkegaard, 1974: 68). When God became man, the infinite effected an 
absolute relation with the individual. The paradox came into existence (Rose, 1992: 43). 
           In the death and resurrection of the incarnate Christ, the absolute difference between the 
individual with the infinite was annulled. The power of sin was broken and the gift of grace 
was given. This is offensive to reason (Kierkegaard, 2009: 120), yet in the resurrection 
moment, the paradox of the incarnation revealed the illusion of absolute difference and the 
self-sufficiency of the thinking individual was ruptured. In the moment, God was given to man, 
allowing for the possibility of an absolute relation with the temporal individual - not in 
totality, but as broken halves of their relation. 
           This moment has been characterised in this thesis so far as the thunderbolt, the ray of 
darkness or the breakthrough, all in which the self-sufficiency of the finite or in-itself is 
interrupted, and the truth of the eternal is revealed (Vardy, 1996: 12). Here in the broken 
middle between the finite and infinite, the paradox allows for the discovery of truth. 
Kierkegaard writes: ‘The understanding sets itself aside while the paradox gives itself’ 
(Kierkegaard, 2009: 128). As Vardy states, the decisive moment is when the individual comes 
to learn his (or her) eternal truth (Vardy, 1996: 11-2) and this is the moment of coming to 
faith. 
           6.5 The moment 
           In contradiction to the Socratic educational ideal in which the self-knowledge of the learner is 
the knowledge of God (Kierkegaard, 1974: 14), and learning involves an occasion in which the 
answer is contained in the questioning (Kierkegaard, 1974: 17-8; 29-9),234  Kierkegaard in 
Philosophical Fragments, describes learning as a moment. When the occasion, as for Socrates, 
is the possibility of the learner learning his or her own truth, truth is already within and 
becomes its own absolute. However, in the moment, the paradox is made manifest as the 
truth of the absolute is imparted to the contingent learner. Like Job’s thunderbolt moment, 
the moment when the absolute enters temporality is decisive (Kierkegaard, 1974: 22). It 
                                                          
234 In Concept of Irony Kierkegaard proposes that by the single individual avoiding tension i.e. between 
history and philosophy (Kierkegaard, 1989:10), temporality and consciousness (Kierkegaard, 1989: 11) 
and between recollection and a dual directional approach to learning (Kierkegaard, 1989: 11), ‘he has 
left nothing by which a later age can judge him’ (Kierkegaard, 1989: 12). This highlights the 
inadequacies of recollection and self-sufficiency, which are exposed more fully in this text and the texts 
that underpin the current discussion.  
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brings an awareness of new life. It inspires the transformation of the individual from a state of 
non-being to being, as the learner becomes aware of his or her error and is given the truth. 
           The individual however is not only given the truth, but also the condition for learning the 
truth. As suggested by Westerhoff, Bridger and Yust, through the gift of faith with which each 
person is blessed,235 the individual is given the capacity for learning the truth. However, it is 
the intervention of the eternal that provides the condition in which this might take place. Not 
working for knowledge or content but relationship, the condition serves to reveal the space 
that is itself the potentiality for the moment. Whilst the contingent experience of the learner 
is the starting point, it is not the end; therefore, the ontological perspectives of Nye, Hyde, 
Hart and others from within Paradigm Two cannot contribute fully to this education. 
Furthermore, the learner does not move towards an acceptance of any agreed truth, 
therefore also rendering perspectives in Paradigm One inadequate. Rather, in the new 
perspective, the teacher (or the God) resolves to reveal ‘himself’ in order to win the love of 
the learner and bring new life. As a result, self-sufficiency is lost to the God. The individual is 
not a commodity. The new life is a gift that reimagines the learner’s relation with the absolute 
and in the middle space, allows for the re-learning of truth. 
           The moment in which truth is given through the occasion signifies the nexus of the paradoxical 
relation of the individual and eternal. It occurs when the eternal (the teacher/the god) comes 
into relation with the temporal and is realised in existence. Kierkegaard writes: ‘the moment 
makes its appearance when the eternal resolve comes into relation with an incommensurable 
occasion’ (Kierkegaard, 1974: 30).236 The God is resolved to reveal himself and this is made 
manifest in the incarnation of Christ. Kierkegaard notes the incarnation as the absolute 
paradox, as God in Christ becomes man. In the incarnation, the truth that Christ reveals, is not 
the truth of a totality but the truth of being human in relation to the eternal. 
           As the paradoxical relation of God and man in Christ cannot be understood but embraced as a 
gift (Kierkegaard, 1974: 68), so too is learning. What occurs in the moment is not to be 
understood rationally but embraced as unknown. Kierkegaard writes: reason and the paradox 
encounter one another happily in the moment, when the reason sets itself aside and the 
paradox bestows itself’ (Kierkegaard, 1974: 73). In the paradox, God gives the condition for 
unknowing, reveals the gift of eternity and in the moment brings the learner into eternal 
                                                          
235 See page 135. 
236 The nexus is significant for the current discussion and will be explored in more detail in Chapter 
Seven. As already noted, this is illustrated by Gardiner (1988: 7), Rose (1992: 53) and Tubbs (2005: 9) as 
the Janus face which represents the meeting of the eternal and temporal and as its broken middle.  
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relation with his or her historical existence (Kierkegaard, 1974: 76). This is the moment of 
faith. In summary: in the moment, man receives the same condition which is the requisite for 
understanding eternal truth (Kierkegaard, 1974: 77). 
           This affects a change in the individual. It affords encounter. The truth here is not what is 
already within the learner, but that which is given in the moment. What is given, is the 
paradox. Vardy comments on this, concluding that faith accepts the paradox. Furthermore, 
faith involves the commitment of the individual who lives in a subjective relationship with an 
absolute God (Vardy, 1996: 19). This life is described by Kierkegaard as the religious state and 
concerns what authentic Christian living and learning might entail.  
           6.6 The Religious 
           In Concluding Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, an expression of Christianity that 
renounces the security of reason for the absolute paradox, is described as ‘Religion B.’ The 
Christian who prioritises the safety of language and doctrine, yet is also prepared to risk 
uncertainty, participates in ‘Religion A.’ The Christian in each expression has made the move 
to the religious stage of existence. Reflecting the imbalance in the paradoxical relation of 
subjectivity with ‘The Christian Faith’, it is now proposed that for authentic faith, Religions A 
and B must relate. This does not suggest a relation of A=A as outlined earlier. For an authentic 
experience of Christianity as faith, each must relate as the broken halves of Christianity.  
           Here, both expressions of religion are necessary; held in tension, the relation of their relation 
with the Absolute, provides a practical example of the movement of the individual to the 
absolute within this particular tradition. The external manifestations of Christianity that 
Religion A provides are not abolished in the life of faith: the truth gained from Religion B 
which is personal and given to the individual, ensures that faith also corresponds to the lived 
experience of the learner. This means then, that the interactive and entertaining learning 
activities described in the Literature Review, that form part of a presentational pedagogy, are 
not rejected. However, the third way of Christianity, which ensures that the space between 
the individual and such learning is kept open, allows for Spirit (as learning) to enable the 
individual to understand and wrestle with the contents of this learning in a way that is fluid, 
dynamic and continuous. This is the movement to the religious. As a movement of faith, this 
movement allows for self and other to relate as broken halves, in relation with the Absolute 
(Tubbs, 2005: 218; Kierkegaard, 1988: x). 
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           This is another example of paradox and as illustrated in Stages on Life’s Way with love as a 
metaphor for faith, the movement of the individual to the religious is outlined. This text, 
introduced in Chapter Three,237 which concerns the relation of young man with a girl who is 
the object of his love, reinforces the assertion that it is the tension between knowing and not 
knowing that is educative. This reflects the suggestion made above that in Christian 
education, both Religions A and B should be held in tension for their own education. This also 
underlines the proposition that rather than existing as in other or against other, the reality of 
the broken middle and the move to the religious allows each to relate to the other in relation 
to the Absolute for their own truth. 
           Representing what might be considered the aesthetic nature of Paradigm Two, the girl 
embodies love and affection. Her loveliness is immediate and the love she seeks in return is 
likewise immediate (Kierkegaard, 1988: 235). Religiously, she is a ‘follower’ who has no 
thought of the infinite or any relation with the Absolute. God is made in her image 
(Kierkegaard, 1988: 236). The man on the other hand represents the ethical. For him, 
‘everything is defined in the same way’ (Kierkegaard, 1988: 216). He does not succumb to the 
intimacies of immediate love and to love does not mean to grasp an idea. But this man desires 
to make the move to the religious state. In so doing, he is prepared to risk his ‘life’ as he 
surrenders to love (Kierkegaard, 1988: 222). He is not lost to the girl: he is lost to love. 
Religiously, he offers the loss of his immediate self to the infinite and thus accepts himself as 
an individual in relation to eternity. Resonance with the current discussion is clear, and it is 
now evident that in Christian education, the learning individual, in losing ‘religion,’ loses 
himself to God. This is faith.  
           In terms of knowledge of love, the relationship of the young man and the girl is one of 
imbalance which leads to misunderstanding; each considers love on his or her own terms. Yet 
again, it is this misunderstanding that is educative. The man’s misunderstanding of what love 
is in the ethical sense, inspires a desire to embrace it personally and fully. It inspires in him a 
higher passion. In his reflection on the self and other relation, (in this case through engaging 
with poetry), he recognises misrecognition; he is able to observe the illusion of the in-itself 
and thus establish an understanding of the misunderstanding (Kierkegaard, 1988: 417). This 
understanding of misunderstanding represents the dialectic of both the aesthetic and ethical 
positions. The man’s reflection, which represents the middle term, allows for the possibility of 
his own learning (Kierkegaard, 1988: 418). Reflection provides the condition in which the man 
                                                          
237 See page 125. 
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can transcend the self and other relation, so to make the move to a religious consciousness 
(Kierkegaard, 1988: 237). As in the dialectic of self and other with Other, the ethical state is 
not overcome in this move: it is interrupted and subsequently transfigured. And as the 
misunderstanding ruptures self-sufficiency, the movement of infinite reflection allows 
immediacy to become transparency to itself (Kierkegaard, 1988: 413-4) and so his perception 
of it is changed.  
           The movement of infinite reflection is based on the individual in his ethical state making the 
leap to the ‘other’ to experience actuality; this might also be described as the movement to 
the eternal in order to gain a religious consciousness. In this movement, the ethical state is 
not negated: it is suspended. In fact, Kierkegaard proposes that the ethical state is demanded 
(Kierkegaard, 1988: 441). As both Religion A and B, are considered dialectically as unequal 
partners in a triadic relation with the absolute, the ethical individual is always in relation with 
‘other’ in actuality, and with the eternal in the religious.  
           The triadic shape of the relation between the individual, actuality and the eternal is important 
here. Recognising the third partner in the relation, the triad ensures that a middle space is 
always evident and that the relation remains unequal. It also ensures that each partner is 
present. However, as subjectivity and the eternal continually engage in the movement of 
infinite reflection (Kierkegaard, 1988: 417), the pattern of learning changes. In this respect, 
whilst the contents of faith which represent the ethical state remain, the movement of 
learning ensures that the learner’s perception of them changes. This is a paradox in which 
there exists a tension between established and revised doctrine. Yet, as already established, 
the truth is in the tension, and as a result of this, religious knowledge remains unfixed. 
           As Job discovered, the prioritising of temporal matters in the light of the eternal, will be forced 
to change. Losing his family and possessions led Job in the moment of understanding to 
understand God differently. With conviction and experience, he was able to assert: ‘the Lord 
gave and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord’ (Job 1:21). And whilst all 
that was lost was restored, the temporal worth of possessions became secondary to the 
relationship with God that was gained. Similarly, as Abraham considered the sacrifice of his 
son for the sake of his God, all ethical obligations were placed on hold (Genesis 22). The leap 
to the absolute did not negate ethics but suspended them in an act of faith. The return to the 
ethical world in each case resulted in a restored individual whose movement was made on the 
strength of the absolute. 
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           The ideas presented here have pedagogical importance and it is necessary now to locate 
concepts such as imbalance, paradox and ‘the moment’ in an educational context. In a new 
perspective of Christian education, learning takes place in the moment which reveals the 
middle space of the self and other in relation with the absolute Other. The task for the 
Christian educator is to manage and protect this space that is the potentiality for the 
‘moment.’ In so doing, learning should not strive for content or outcome but seek to risk self-
sufficiency for the absolute. As Williams in ‘Ray of Darkness’ states:  
           we are struggling for a discipline that stops me taking myself for granted as the fixed 
centre of a little universe and allows me to find and lose and refind myself constantly in 
the interweaving patterns of a world I did make and do not control (Williams, 2003: 
120-1). 
           The aim of the current thesis is to propose how educators allow for the rupture that provides 
the space in which learners can come to an authentic understanding of God. The following 
material explores the movement of learning as it relates to self and other, including a 
consideration of what representation in the middle space might look like. The movement, as 
suggested above, begins with misrecognition. 
           6.7 Misrecognition 
           In Mourning becomes the Law, Gillian Rose writes about the drama of misrecognition. Her 
observations are based on the relation of self and other as described in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology and in her text, Rose attempts to re-claim the system from the ‘caricatures 
and errors’ of (mis)interpretation (Rose, 1996: 72). She cites the ideas of Heidegger and Marx 
as examples of such interpretations (Rose, 1996: 71). Rather than noting the imperialism, 
domination and totality that are often associated with Hegel,238 she argues that the 
Phenomenology promotes an educational perspective of provisionality and discord in a 
‘ceaseless comedy in which our aims and outcomes constantly mismatch each other’ (Rose, 
1996: 72). This is the comedy of the Unhappy Consciousness, which continues as self and 
other misrecognise and struggle in the dialectic of life and death.  
           Rose identifies that, as opposed to the subjective truth that in-itself is universal, truth for 
Hegel accepts the part of truth that whilst being subjective, exceeds subjectivity (Rose, 1996: 
72-3). Furthermore, she notes that in this comedy, subjective actors (whilst playing out an 
interest in the truth of others), actually deceive: their real interest is ‘without substance’ 
(Rose, 1996: 73). This then reveals the folly of totality and acknowledges the necessity of 
                                                          
238 See Chamberlain and Ree, 1998: 27-30. 
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relation. For Rose, the relation must be unequal; she thus outlines three ways in which 
misrecognition between self and other becomes the starting point for learning.  
           Her first point concerns mutual recognition. Mutual recognition, noted earlier as A=A,239 
implicates the self-relation of two forms of self-consciousness. Their relation depends on what 
is recognised of themselves in relation to the other. Each is equal and as such this is dualism. 
As Rose argues, all dualistic relations are ‘attempts to quieten and deny the broken middle’ 
(Rose, 1996: 75). This is unsatisfactory for authentic learning and as outlined in Chapter Two 
of the current thesis, results in separation and alienation. However, it is the failure of mutual 
recognition in a separating out of self-consciousness, and their refusal to recognise each other 
as self-relation, that highlights the educational value of misrecognition. This failure provides 
the opportunity for the relation to be reworked. Whilst critical of dualism, Rose does not deny 
its significance: for misrecognition, mutual recognition must first be in place. Here, the broken 
middle which arises out of misrecognition posits the relation of A=A in a dialectical relation 
with self-relation, so that the actuality of the in-itself has truth in the relation with the relation 
(Rose, 1996: 75). Mediation is also a vital part of the learning process and Rose asserts that as 
each ‘self’ is constantly being reformed and re-imagined, each learns of itself in a way that is 
unfixed and unstable. This movement of learning not only reflects Kierkegaard's ideas as 
outlined above, but also the educational premise of Bildung, to be explored shortly.  
           In the second point Rose, describes the dialectical relation as triune. This is the same as the 
triad that has featured regularly in the thesis so far: the triune shape places otherness in 
relation to the self-relating of the other. Rose suggests that the short-hand term for this 
three-way relation is Spirit and that Spirit inspires the education of the self. Significantly, and 
again reminiscent of earlier material, the triad ensures that no partner has the upper hand. 
For example, contingency (or the ethical) is not extinguished; neither is the law (or truth) the 
driving factor in learning. There is no actuality, therefore no space for domination or totality 
(Rose, 1996: 75). Regarding Christianity then, this prevents either the public and private 
expressions of Christianity from becoming the dominant aspects of a life of faith, and provides 
the potentiality for Spirit, in the middle space, to educate and transform.  
            Finally, Rose asserts that the broken middle reconfigures relation. She does not aim to 
destabilise dualism, but to inspire a new educational shape. In highlighting the need for the 
recognition of the misrecognition of mutual recognition, and misrecognition of the law that 
                                                          
239 See page 119. 
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had induced dualism, the triune shape provides an alternative. In the middle of this unequal 
triune relation is learning, identified in the current thesis as Spirit. Furthermore, the meaning 
of learning is now identified as ‘Bildung.' Rose describes ‘Bildung’ as ‘formation or education 
which is intrinsic to the phenomenological process’ (Rose, 1996: 72). It also involves a 
movement of learning that is a reflection between unequal partners. As a provisional process, 
it is authentic to both self and other in their relation with self-relation. Therefore, it presents a 
movement that is significant to this thesis and so is considered in some detail now. 
           6.8 Bildung 
           At the outset of this section, it must be highlighted that although an account of Bildung’s role 
in the proposal of a new ethos for education is significant, the concept can also be 
problematic. Here, an historical consideration of Bildung and its developments, gives way to 
critical appraisal before highlighting how in the light of Kierkegaard, ideas regarding Bildung 
might contribute to conclusions in this thesis.  
           In the chapter ‘Reflections on the Future of a Modern Educational Ideal,’ featured in the 
reader Educating Humanity: Bildung in Postmodernity, Biesta describes Bildung as an 
educational process that brings ‘the individual in touch with what is general or universal and 
enduring’ (Biesta, 2003: 63). In its original inception, details of which are outlined shortly, 
Bildung concerns a learning relationship that interacts between self and other; in a 
transcendent manner, it also moves beyond the present and particular, and as such 
counteracts universality (Biesta, 2003: 64). In this respect, it is congruent with the 
perspectives outlined in the current thesis. However, Biesta argues that a contemporary 
renaissance of Bildung has distorted the relation. That is, he proposes that since the 1980s, 
new ideas regarding Bildung have been conscripted for the purposes of general education. For 
example, the word ‘Bildung’ is often applied as an alternative to ‘education.’ This serves only 
to simplify Bildung and this consequently pertains to ‘universality’ or in the rhetoric of 
Kierkegaard, totality (Biesta, 2003: 63). As Biesta argues, this is antithetical to the spirit of 
Bildung.  
           As Prange outlines, some contemporary translations of the term ‘Bildung’ include notions such 
as education, growth, shape and training (Prange, 2004: 502), all of which again are removed 
from its formative application. Part of the problem is that having no obvious translation from 
German, meanings given to it are merely ‘circumscriptions’ and do not do justice to the 
complexity of its learning relationships (Prange, 2004: 502). When applied to ‘whatever 
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relates to learning and education,’ Prange argues that often Bildung is utilised as a paragon of 
all that is good (Prange, 2004: 502) and represents the unity of education’s purpose and 
implementation (Prange, 2004: 503). When represented as a pillar or paradigm to aspire to, 
he argues that it is hard to stand up against this interpretation, thus allowing the 
administrators and ‘experts’ in education to retain control over learning processes and values. 
This he argues, invites political hegemony.  
           According to Nordenbo, the German word ‘Bildung’ relates to the noun ‘bild’ that means 
image, with the suffix ‘ung’ concerning process. Thus, it concerns something or someone who 
actively participates in the process of learning. Here the individual is an agent who, in the act 
of education, takes part in his or her own formation (Nordenbo 2003: 25). As such the telos of 
learning is individual freedom. However, the agent of Bildung is not the agent of Paradigm 
Two, nor the self-sufficient agent of Chapter Five. This agent learns through relation.  
           Presented as neo-humanist theory, early ideas concerning Bildung, from German educator 
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), are significant. ‘Dismissive of a religious interpretation of 
existence’ (Nordenbo 2003: 31), von Humboldt proposes Bildung as the personal development 
of the individual into Being and within temporality (von Humboldt, 2000: 58). This is a 
reactionary view to that held by many at the time that the individual’s meaning of life was to 
secure the ‘eternal’ status achievable through Christianity.  
           As Hamilton points out, von Humboldt’s theory counteracted Ramist thinking, in which it was 
proposed that knowledge can be impressed upon the mind in a process similar to that of a 
printing press (Hamilton, 1990: 12-3). Informing the development of universities based on 
humanist principles, where the ideal is the ‘harmonious development of man,’ von 
Humboldt’s ideas concern the individual through Bildung succeeding in self-formation to 
negate external influences (Nordenbo 2003: 29), and thus prioritise the personal over 
hegemonic hierarchies. The result is personal freedom and growth in a life endowed with ‘as 
rich a content as possible’ (Nordenbo 2003: 32).  
           In his short fragment ‘Theory of Bildung’ (2000), von Humboldt first argues that the purpose of 
learning is not to gain the contents of knowledge, but to afford an individual’s ‘inner 
improvement’ (von Humboldt, 2000: 58). He or she represents humanity as a ‘rich and worthy 
substance’ (von Humboldt, 2000: 59) whose actions secure value as Being. The actions of the 
individual do not take place in isolation, but occur in relation with ‘other’ who here is named 
‘world.’ Between self and other is ‘the most general, most animated and most unrestrained 
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interplay,' resulting in the ‘attempt of the will to become free and independent in itself’ (von 
Humboldt, 2000: 58). With this freedom comes the potentiality for human development, with 
the possibility of learning arising from what occurs in the process of interplay.  
           The interplay between self and other is a continuous movement. The individual reaches 
beyond him or herself to ‘external objects’ but reflects back into one’s own inner being ‘that 
which he undertakes outside himself’ (von Humboldt, 2000: 59). As it is essential that the 
individual is not alienated in selfhood, interplay ensures that there is a ‘resemblance’ between 
self and other; the self and world are linked though not unified. The relation also ensures that 
a diversity of ‘tools,’ including the senses and feeling, allow for different ideas regarding the 
concept of the world to be shaped, and rather than being ‘acquainted with it from all sides’ 
(von Humboldt, 2000: 59), there is no singular means of understanding one’s experiences. 
Plurality contributes to learning as much as objectivity. As Lovlie and Standish summarise, 
‘Bildung starts with the individual embedded in a world that is at the same time that of the 
differentiated other’ (Lovlie and Standish, 2003: 3). 
           The relation and movement here might be considered Hegelian and indeed as a contemporary 
of von Humboldt, Hegel is cited as also providing a neo-humanist idealist view of Bildung 
(Nordenbo, 2003: 33). Nordenbo suggests that being ‘confronted with continual 
contradiction,’ the circularity of Hegel’s Phenomenology reflects the driving of the individual’s 
consciousness outward to the sphere beyond, to be then internalised subjectively. This 
movement provides a subjective insight into the objective world that in turn transforms 
objectivity. The dynamic relationship evades knowledge in-itself and considers the interaction 
to be the Spirit of learning (Nordenbo, 2003: 32). Yet it is also considered a systematic 
movement whose outcome is absolute knowledge. 
           Concerned that his idea of learning might easily become systematised, von Humboldt 
highlights the risk to learning that circularity might induce. As a circular movement, Bildung 
would no longer be a process but ‘merely scholarship’ (von Humboldt, 2000: 60). For von 
Humboldt, the telos is not absolute knowledge, rather the freedom of the learning individual 
posited against the universalising political systems and schemes that ‘own’ learning. He 
writes: 'the ideal becomes greater if one measures the exertion it requires rather than the 
object that it is to represent’ (von Humboldt, 2000: 60); in other words, the action of learning 
takes priority over the outcome. Rather than concerning involvement from universalising 
influences, it instead concerns the ‘upbringing’ of an independent and engaged individual 
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(Nordenbo, 2003: 31), whose actions in relation with the world allow for an awareness of 
Being and uncontrolled personal growth. 
           Although the literature of children’s spirituality features little of Bildung per se, the idea of a 
creative interplay between self and other underpins Hay and Nye’s theory of ‘relational 
consciousness’ (Hay and Nye, 2006: 116). Here the relation of the world, others and God with 
the individual, allows for an awareness of spiritual understanding that has an ontological 
basis, so to inspire inductive learning. Furthermore, the theories of faith development 
highlighted in Chapter Five also represent examples of interplay. Located within the Christian 
tradition, the movement of faith development includes the individual’s interplay with spiritual 
images as a means by which he or she might access the spiritual. The significance of the 
participant in the learning process likens the theories of Westerhoff and Yust to Bildung more 
than the didactic approaches of Paradigm One presented in the Literature Review. However 
as highlighted in Chapter Five, the aim of such faith development theory is for learners to 
possess their understanding. In Bildung, the process is its own aim and its own meaning. 
           This is illustrated in an early edition of the International Journal of Children’s Spirituality, in 
which Heins Gunther-Heimbrock underlines how Bildung is relevant to learning in Christian 
spiritual education. Bildung here is described as a productive and creative process that allows 
children to shape their own world view. With the telos of personal freedom, Bildung is posited 
as the ‘concept which human formation is aiming at’ (Gunther-Heimbrock 1999: 51), and 
identified as the means by which learners might become aware of their ‘personal capacity to 
develop their own theology’ (Gunther-Heimbrock 1999: 52). Drawing on data gained from his 
study involving children’s pictorial representations of God, the author proposes that through 
the process of painting or drawing, a ‘playful interaction’ takes place between traditional 
conceptions of God, and the inner and outer worlds of the learner. Reminiscent of von 
Humboldt’s interplay, he describes the painting process as an example of ‘creative 
subjectivity’ in which the emotional life of the student contributes to his or her own 
representations. The provisional nature of these representations is noted and whilst the 
tradition is not rejected, it is suggested how the student’s own perceptions continually evolve 
(Gunther-Heimbrock 1999: 55).  
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           Gunther-Heimbrock argues that when Bildung, as the process of creating rather than the 
object created is evaluated, one might gain an insight into how children’s 240 views (of God) 
are constructed, imagined and even changed. What is important is the interplay that takes 
place between the learner and the world. Here the ‘between’ is represented by the activity of 
painting. In the middle space between the traditional and personal, and as the child paints, 
Spirit as the third partner inspires the child to present, evaluate and re-present his or her own 
God-conception.  
 
           As illustrated by the tension between Religions A and B described above, both the tradition 
and the personal life of the child are held in an unequal relation (Rose, 1996: 72). Unlike the 
liberationist ideas presented earlier,241 there is no overcoming. The middle space is the locus 
of learning. In the middle, learning that has meaning takes place. Both educator and learner 
value something other than the end result and in ‘seeing seeing,’ an idea taken from Merleau-
Ponty, (Gunther-Heimbrock 1999: 58), they come to understand (the idea of God) differently 
(Gunther-Heimbrock 1999: 58).  
 
           Gunther-Heimbrock writes: ‘the creative element of such an awareness, to see something 
with other eyes, is part of human freedom, the concept which human formation (Bildung) is 
aiming at’ (Gunther-Heimbrock 1999: 58). Thus, he proposes that religious or spiritual 
education might become a creative process that considers the idea of God as a transitional 
object rather than a ‘snapshot’ (Gunther-Heimbrock 1999: 59).242 Not dissimilar to the ideas of 
Ana Maria Rizzuto outlined in the Literature Review, the learner’s idea of God adapts and 
evolves in the light of his or her personal context, experience and encounters with others 
(Rizzuto, 1979: 209). Through the interplay between the self and each context, the movement 
enables the learner to make meaning for him or herself. 
 
            In a more recent edition of the International Journal of Children’s Spirituality, John Pridmore 
also considers the importance of Bildung in religious education. Noting the word ‘formation’ 
as a comparable English term (Pridmore 2004: 285), Pridmore draws on the ideas of 
Eighteenth Century German educationalist Jean Paul Friedrich Richter, for whom religious 
education concerns interiority. Based on his belief that religious consciousness is inherent 
                                                          
240 As Gunther –Heimbrock’s study involved children, the discussion here also refers to children. 
However, in the context of the current thesis, the same ideas might be applied to any learning 
individual who, as a student or a teacher, takes part in education as creative interplay.  
241 See pages 36-7. 
242 The ‘transitional object’ will be considered in more detail later in the following chapter.  
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within each individual, Bildung in this context involves ‘arousing awareness already present’ 
(Pridmore 2004: 285). He suggests that exposing learners to religious (and other spiritually 
influenced) imagery of ‘the divine’ provides the inspiration for formative learning. This 
learning is initiated within the learner who through wonder and a sense of the holy is then 
able to glance at ‘the infinite’ (Pridmore 2004: 285). The movement here differs to that of 
‘interplay’ and might be considered a more linear movement with no obvious return to self or 
impact of ‘the infinite’ on the immediate.  However, Pridmore’s use of the image as the 
starting point for religious awareness is significant to the current discussion and is considered 
further in the following chapter.  
 
           According to Masschelein and Ricken, Bildung might be viewed historically in two waves. The 
first is founded on Bildung’s eighteenth century German roots, as introduced above, with its 
critical principle of education being the emancipation of self from the state through the 
creative interaction between individuality and sociality (Masschelein and Ricken, 2003: 140). 
In the second wave, identified from end of the nineteenth century, a more romantic paradigm 
sees the individual as a universal; education therefore involves the development of the self 
with no need for dependence on ‘other’ (Masschelein and Ricken, 2003: 140-1.) Spirit as 
learning here is primarily concerned with self-creation with education as a law of its own. 
            In another chapter of the reader Educating Humanity: Bildung in Postmodernity, Peukert 
describes this second wave as a Negative Utopia which, as opposed to the neo-humanist 
Bildung, has as its telos the possibility of the human subject that understands self-formation 
as the ‘presence of the absence’ (Peukert 2003: 77). Peukert likens this to Heidegger’s 
nearness of Being, where learning is not historically determined but ‘springs from the deeper 
sources’ than those determined externally (Peukert 2003: 76). The self, the central participant 
in the learning process, is provisional and always issuing forth to the future: it is always in a 
state of ‘not yet.’ The outcome is undetermined and self-formation never is completed 
(Peukert 2003: 111). The individual here comes into Being through the continual 
reconstructing and deconstructing of the self (Peukert 2003: 106; 111). Bildung thus has no 
impact beyond the self. In eschewing the influence of ‘other,’ it is the beginning and the end 
of learning. 
           This is also a feature of postmodern Bildung illustrated by Giddens for example, who refers to 
the process of self-formation as the ‘trajectory of the self.’ Here the life of the learning 
individual represents a continuous movement of reflection and reconstruction without 
reference to an external entity (Giddens, 1991: 75). Whilst there is a strong resonance 
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between Pridmore’s notion of Bildung and that of the second wave, Heins Gunther-
Heimbrock’s journal article presents a slightly nuanced relation which is more aligned to the 
views of Rose and Kierkegaard than von Humboldt and Giddens, and thus provides the 
inspiration for a new perspective. 
           Rather than proposing a two-way interaction between self and other, Gunther-Heimbrock’s 
idea that includes the notion of ‘seeing seeing,’ incites a self that is in relation with the 
relation of self and Other. This relation has been identified throughout this thesis as 
‘subjectivity’s subjectivity’ (Tubbs, 2009: 135). Bildung is the means by which the individual 
expresses, evaluates and refines one’s responses to the ‘data’ provided by the outer world in 
the light of one’s inner world. It takes place in the middle of the triune relational shape. There 
is little in von Humboldt’s fragment that pertains to a middle space. His educational interplay 
is reminiscent of the immediate relation of mutual recognition, again reflecting for example 
Hay and Nye's interaction between self and other in ‘relational consciousness.’ What Gunther-
Heimbrock’s thesis suggests however, is whilst interactions between self and world raise 
spiritual awareness and contribute to subjectivity, there is a third partner in learning. When 
self-consciousness is in relation with relational consciousness, a middle space is opened up, 
the meaning of which is Bildung. This is the unequal relation of misrecognition (Rose, 1996: 
75). 
 
           von Humboldt’s theory of Bildung concerns the interaction between the self and the world as 
a creative interplay. As already stated, this has Hegelian overtones and although striving to 
avoid becoming systematic, it is a ‘necessary relation’ (Standish and Lovlie, 2003: 3). Here self 
and other relate as A=A. In contrast, the romantic idea considers the individual as potentiality; 
however, being self-sufficient, this individual consciousness also exists as a totality. It seems 
that historical Bildung considers education to be the movement of the self-sufficient ‘I’ either 
in opposition to or embedded within social culture for the actualisation of the individual and 
the transformation of the learning environment. Both are insufficient for conclusions in the 
current thesis. 
           In his chapter ‘The Promise of Bildung,’ Lars Lovlie comes some way towards readdressing the 
ideals of both ‘waves’ of Bildung for contemporary education. He suggests that Bildung might 
be illustrated by a mobius strip that represents a continuous connection between its inside 
and outside. This is not the circular movement that von Humboldt wishes to avoid. It is not 
complete as in Hegel’s system. It reflects more a Kierkegaardian broken circularity in which 
each side meet but are never unified. This is a dynamic representation of interplay, regarded 
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as an ongoing process, with no fixed result. Lovlie writes: ‘recollection of history consists in 
seeing the old in the altered perspective of the present.’ History (and/or culture) in creative 
interplay is both maintained and changed: ‘the existence that has been, now comes into 
being’ (Lovlie, 2003: 151). 
           As the mobius strip represents a paradox with no end, Lovlie suggests it is likewise paradoxical 
for the past and future to meet in continuous learning. This is the requirement for the 
proposed new perspective. Likened to Kierkegaard’s movement of repetition, as an 
asymmetrical relation, the paradox that the mobius strip illustrates, involves the dynamic 
movement of reflexivity that allows for the education and transformation of the present 
individual in the light of his or her past.243 It also reflects the movement outlined earlier in 
terms of Kierkegaard’s Stages on Life’s Way,244 in which the single individual is disturbed in his 
temporality and taken beyond the immediate towards a concern for the eternal.  
           Similar to the process highlighted by Rose, mediation between the relational partners assures 
that each ‘self’ is constantly being reformed and re-imagined, and each learns of itself in a way 
that is unfixed and unstable. As also indicated by Williams and cited at the end of Chapter 
Five, the broken relation provided by the moment of rupture that is the ray of darkness, 
allows for the individual to understand him or herself more fully in relation to the eternal; like 
the movement of the mobius strip, this understanding is never complete. Accordingly, 
reflecting the ideas of Gunther-Heimbrock, the representation resulting from this movement 
is unfixed. As the image or ‘bild’ is always in process, so too is its meaning. 
           In addition to the analogy of the mobius strip, Bildung is illustrated by Mortensen as ‘doubling’ 
(Mortensen 2003: 121). Alluding to the Wordsworth poem ‘To the Cuckoo,’ Mortensen 
outlines how in this poem, the present experience of an individual is transformed on hearing 
the call of a cuckoo. As he is reminded of his childhood experiences, the protagonist’s present 
is mediated by his past for a re-imagined future. Here Bildung does not represent the learning 
individual embedded in or as opposition to history and culture, but acknowledges the 
separation that allows for the mediation of the sensory present in the light of recollection of 
the contingent past, and the movement forward to create new ideas. 
           Mortensen describes doubling as ‘the dialectical relationship between that which exists and is 
perceivable by the senses and that in nature that cannot be captured or grasped’ (Mortensen 
                                                          
243 The idea of Bildung as the unfixed representation of the movement is significant to this thesis and 
will be given further attention in the next chapter. 
244 See pages 148-9.  
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2003: 122). Self-formation is rooted within experience. However, this is not the immediate 
experience of the in-itself. The value of the experience lies in the illumination of the self in 
relation to other, as well as the present and future in relation to the past (Mortensen 2003: 
122). Thus, it is reminiscent of a form of recollection: a recollection that ensures that 
immediacy is transcended and the prior experience of the individual is acknowledged. The 
movement is not only backwards but involves a return. Mediation allows the impact of the 
prior experience to address the present. Mortensen explains that in recollection, the learner is 
‘searching for something that cannot be found even though it exists’ (Mortensen 2003:  121). 
This is the means by which he or she re-evaluates the present for the future. This then is more 
than recollection: it is repetition.   
           In its acknowledgement of the past and future of the learning individual, repetition becomes 
the consciousness of what is recollected. As in doubling, it involves a movement backwards 
and forwards. Indeed, as Kierkegaard states:  
           repetition and recollection are the same movement, just in opposite directions, because 
what is recollected has already been is thus repeated backwards whereas genuine 
repetition is repeated forwards (Kierkegaard, 2009: 3).  
           However, it is also through the negation of immediacy and in the relation ‘between’ reality 
and ideality that the meaning of Bildung becomes known (or in the rhetoric of Mortensen, the 
relation between the sensory present and that which cannot be known). In highlighting the 
significance of Bildung for the current discussion, it is necessary to finally explore ‘repetition’ 
in relation to Bildung, in order to propose an authentic educational movement and illustrate 
how this movement might contribute to a new perspective for Christian education. 
           6.9 Repetition 
           Written under the pseudonym Constantine Constantius, Repetition begins by highlighting the 
inadequacies of Socratic recollection. Similar to the critique presented in Philosophical 
Fragments, this deficiency pertains to the idea that truth is already present in aesthetic 
immediacy and as such there is no need for any occasion of learning, or any teacher. As there 
is no historical ‘other,’ learning is negative, concerning only what is not-known (Kierkegaard, 
2004: 86). For Kierkegaard, this is an epistemological shortcoming that leads to unhappiness 
(Kierkegaard, 2009: 3). 
           Repetition on the other hand is contra recollection. Its significance is in the unequal relation of 
past and future as known and unknown; it concerns not what has gone but what is to come. 
Founded upon the contingent and historical, it relies on a revelation from the unknown future 
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on the grounds of the condition provided by ‘the teacher’ in the present. In repetition, ‘that 
which has existed now comes into existence’ (Kierkegaard, 2009: 19). Yet repetition does not 
bring an exact reflection of the past into the present (Kierkegaard, 2009: 37-8); rather it allows 
the individual to respond to the present in the light of recollection (Kierkegaard, 2009: 39), 
thus re-learning the present so to inform the future. As the nexus between past and future, 
repetition enables the learning individual to recognise who he or she is, has been and can be 
(Tubbs, 2004: 94). This is a formative movement, generated not only as a result of the relation 
of past and future as in doubling, but as the educational significance of the relation. 
           As often in Kierkegaard’s texts, a story provides an allegory for his philosophical thinking. In 
this case, the narrative outlines the author’s investigation into how repetition might be 
possible in love. The young man (introduced in Chapter Five), in love with a girl yet not in a 
relationship with her, is able to recollect his feelings. But the movement is only within him. 
Having no external expression for his love, he longs for her yet remains at a distance from her 
(Kierkegaard, 2009: 7-8). His love is ideal and as yet has not been brought into reality. With 
this comes the unhappiness cited above. Indeed, the author stresses that this man is far from 
realising this ideal love due to his ‘melancholy soul’ (Kierkegaard, 2009: 48). For his own 
education, the young man requires repetition to understand who he is in relation to the girl 
and to gain clarity regarding his situation. (Kierkegaard, 2009: 49). For instance, he recognises 
that he does not know how to love the girl in reality and never will. 
           As the story continues, the young man wishes to break away from any affair. It is too difficult. 
Yet in and through his torment, he becomes aware that this unequal relation is the beginning 
of his learning. Kierkegaard as Climacus writes: ‘repetition is how recollection is known’ 
(Kierkegaard, 2009: 93). The paradox of actuality and ideality is indeed his learning tool. In his 
commentary on the situation of the young man, Kierkegaard explains that whilst the girl does 
not have actuality, it is not her as herself that is significant. The relation the young man has 
with her, albeit ideal, is that which illuminates who he really is. He comes to learn about 
himself in an ideal relation to her. She is his teacher: one who brings him to learn from his 
situation. Kierkegaard writes: ‘the girl has not actuality but is simply a reflection of, and 
occasion for, movements within him’ (Kierkegaard, 2009: 49).  
           This educative movement is repetition. It is not the ‘trajectory of the self’ that involves a linear 
progression forward, but a movement that opens up the middle space between ideality and 
reality. The relation between what is recollected (his innate love) and what is mediated for the 
moment of reflection (his learning through the torment), is unequal; the relation that the 
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movement inspires is a misrelation. In the movement of repetition, the relationship of self and 
other cannot be reconciled (Tubbs, 2004: 86-7). As such the third partner, identified here as 
Spirit, keeps this relation open. What is learnt in the movement of repetition, and in the 
middle space as reflection, is the truth of education.   
           For the young man, the significance of his learning is not his possession of the girl, but his 
understanding gained through loss. In the concluding section of Repetition, Kierkegaard 
reflects on this in philosophical and religious overtones. He describes how the young man 
recognises the difference between the ideal outward appearance of love and the tragedy of 
his situation in reality. This dialectical difference is presented as a struggle. Preventing him 
from coming close to the girl in question, or indeed receiving the love of any other girl, the 
young man’s personality induces the loss of love and this is difficult. However, this loss allows 
him to negate the ideality that prevents him from loving in reality. This negation involves the 
move to the religious: indeed, it for allows for his thinking to become ‘ineffably religious’ 
(Kierkegaard, 2009: 80). This establishes the relation of himself with the relation of reality and 
ideality and, creating the educative triune shape, this allows for a learning situation similar to 
that described above as ‘seeing seeing.’245 Having made the move to the religious, he 
becomes aware that he is changed (Kierkegaard, 2009: 81). In his return to his immediate 
state, he is not necessarily able to explain his situation, or fully understand his education 
(Kierkegaard, 2009: 81), but he knows he has been transformed.  
           Tubbs notes that what is possessed can only be gained in the educational significance of it 
being lost. He writes: ‘gaining or receiving is learning that possession, loss and gain are the 
absolute relation of recollection and repetition’ (Tubbs, 2004: 93). Loss for the young man 
involves not only negating the reality of the girl, but also negating his immediate self. In the 
story of Job, alluded to by the young man, loss comes in the form of the rupture of self-
sufficiency (Kierkegaard, 2009: 59). Through the sudden death of his family and livestock, Job 
recognises the misrecognition of himself in temporality. Drawing on this for his own 
education, the young man recognises his relation to the girl as a misrecognition of their 
relation and as such his own self-sufficiency is ruptured. 
           The rupture provides for the moment in which misrecognition is recognised. Both Job and the 
young man acknowledge self not as an entity in-itself, but in relation to the relation of self and 
Other. This unequal relation provides the condition for his surrender and allows the eternal to 
                                                          
245 See page 178. 
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break through (Kierkegaard, 2009:  69). As in Discourse One of Eighteen Upbuilding 
Discourses,246 Kierkegaard describes how the eternal breaks into the contingent present to 
change the perspective of the individual. As in Philosophical Fragments, the individual comes 
to self-understanding not just through recollection but in the light of infinite reflection. 
Kierkegaard as Climacus correlates the movement of repetition with the unequal relation of 
the individual and the universal. It is not the grasping of the universal by the individual that 
inspires learning: it is the rupture of the relation (Kierkegaard, 2009: 78). This inspires the 
triadic structure in which the single individual is in relation with the other who brings him or 
her to the realisation of contingent knowledge, so to inspire new understanding and take it 
forward. 
           Climacus highlights how in Repetition the young man’s learning was not transmitted to him, 
but illuminated through his struggle. Through repetition he was able to lose his self-sufficiency 
for a ‘higher’ (religious) consciousness and understand actuality not as the concrete present, 
but as a re-imagined notion of actuality (Kierkegaard, 2009: 80). So too, Christian education 
must not be grasped, but experienced as the condition for the breakthrough of the absolute. 
In consideration of the notion of Bildung as a template for the process of learning, and 
repetition which establishes the triune relational shape, it is possible now to refer to the 
proposed new perspective of Christian education as ‘Bildung as repetition.’247 This is a working 
title, which is itself provisional; yet it highlights the significance of the interplay between self 
and other in learning, and at the nexus of this learning relationship with the eternal, it 
illuminates how the middle space that is a result of the intervention of the absolute, allows 
Spirit to inspire learning that is dynamic and authentic, and for a life of faith, transforms.  
           In ‘Bildung as repetition,’ the known illuminates the unknown. This paradox might be 
illustrated in practice through an interactive activity that allows learners to make creative 
responses to Biblical texts. Following the reading of a Bible passage, learners are given the 
opportunity to reflect on the text through (for example) writing a poem, drawing a picture or 
creating something from clay. It is important that the Bible story is presented in its entirety - 
not paraphrased, modernised nor indeed its difficulties sanitized – and that the story is 
                                                          
246 See pages 144-5. 
247 It is antithetical to the nature of this thesis to apply a name or label to the proposed new perspective 
of Christian education. ‘Bildung as repetition’ therefore summarises the movement and shape of 
learning as explored in this thesis but is not to be used as fixed representation. In practice, an educator 
might describe the new perspective as ‘creative reflection’ or ‘learning as spirit;’ yet as the intention is 
not to propose a method, model or paradigm, again the perspective is not to be limited by any label 
and addressed variously in the light of each learning context and community.  
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allowed to speak for itself. No ‘teacher’ is to offer any meaning; however, Spirit as the 
teacher, working in the middle space between the learner and the Bible passage, illuminates 
meaning for the learner, which in turn might be shared with others and inspire meaning for 
them.   
           As learners wrestle with what the Bible passage might mean in order to create the piece of 
art, they are encouraged to draw on both personal contingency and any previous knowledge 
of the Bible and ‘The Christian Faith.’ As stated above, both are vital aspects of the learning 
process. However, the learner is also allowed to surrender any fixed ideas regarding the 
meaning of stories and thus allow for the absolute to intervene. The absolute illuminates the 
misrecognition of such immediate representations and in the ongoing reflection through the 
creative process, Spirit is given the freedom to shape the thoughts and responses of the 
learner.  
           In the middle space, which interrupts the ideality of the past and the reality of creating fixed 
knowledge in the future, Spirit allows the learners to create and recreate meanings that 
illuminate the relevance of the story for their personal lives. Creative reflection might inspire 
questioning regarding theological or existential issues, afford clarity regarding the significance 
of the story for the wider Biblical context, or even apply this significance to life today. As a 
result of ‘seeing seeing,’ creative reflection allows the individual to respond to the story in the 
present in the light of recollection; but as learning takes place in the middle space, it also 
illuminates new ideas so to inform new meanings for the future.248  
           These meanings have significance for the personal lives of the learner and so learning is 
authentic. It is vital that teachers and learners recognise that these meanings are provisional. 
Following the suspension of the immediate, in the return to self and the ethical world, these 
meanings must again be suspended, lest they perpetuate the illusion of immediacy. To that 
                                                          
248 An example from practice illustrates ‘Bildung as repetition.’ The examples presented in the latter part 
of this thesis are based on observation and not part of any research project. Following the reading of 
the story of Moses at the Burning bush (Exodus 3), a group of children were invited to compose a piece 
of music to represent the different aspects of the story. After listing characters and events such as the 
bush, the fire, the angel and the snake, and assigning sound sources to each one, the children struggled 
to find a suitable sound to represent the character of God. A discussion took place that saw the children 
wrestling with the ambiguity of having to apply a temporal characterisation (a sound effect) to a 
transcendent being, who is beyond characterisation. They were equally uncomfortable with the idea 
that no sound effect should be provided for God, as this would reduce his significance in the story. The 
children eventually decided to have a cymbal play quietly throughout the music to represent the 
constant present of God in this story and in their own lives. ‘Bildung as repetition’ here allowed the 
children to interact with the idea of God in a way that did not negate formal representations, but 
inspired a new way of coming to understand the nature of God and the meaning this has for their own 
lives.   
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end, ‘Bildung as repetition’ persists throughout the life of the learner, enables the revision of 
learning, and thus continues to shape and transform.  
           The outcomes of ‘Bildung as repetition’ are the gap, the unknown and the difficulty. ‘Bildung 
as repetition’ differs from ideas proposed by Gunther-Heimbrock for example, in its inclusion 
of scripture. Rather than present learners with the capacity to develop their own theology,249 
here the theology of ‘The Christian Faith’ is accepted. In ‘Bildung as repetition,’ it is the 
learner’s perception of such theology that develops. Involved in the interplay which takes 
place as the individual creates, the learner is able to reflect back to prior knowledge regarding 
the Bible and ‘The Christian Faith,’ and in the middle space, wrestle with this knowledge in the 
light of his or her own contingency. This struggle allows for the loss of certainty regarding 
Biblical hermeneutics,250 in order to reflect forward for new meaning. For Gunther-Heimbrock 
the reference point, that is the notion of God, is nebulous and therefore more open to the 
critique as presented in Chapter One.  
           ‘Bildung as repetition’ furthermore differs from the interplay of Yust presented in Chapter 
Five,251 in that here the fixed meanings attached to religious icons and symbols (including 
religious language and scripture) are ruptured. Again, it is not the theology per se that is 
negated but the inherited perceptions. Whereas Yust encourages learners to adopt such 
symbols and their pre-determined meanings in order to engage spiritually with the religious, 
in this new perspective, the symbols represent the interface in the light of which repetition 
reflects backwards to recollect and forwards to inspire new meaning. The role of the symbol, 
or icon as a transitional object is explored in Chapter Seven, and its significance for the new 
perspective is noted. At this point and in summary, it might be suggested that ‘Bildung as 
repetition’ is not historical or contemporary Bildung, but the dialectical relationship of 
Bildung’s interplay with the movement of repetition.  
           What Kierkegaard’s contribution to the discussion confirms here is that the fixedness of ideas 
and concepts should be set aside, or ruptured. This includes all that is possible and ‘known’ 
regarding matters of the absolute. Images or representations should also be transitory, 
evolving and re-forming in the light of the interplay between the learner and other. Always in 
process, the meaning of religious truths also constantly changes, as the learner is changed. 
The final chapter of this thesis considers further the nature of the ‘event’ that provides the 
                                                          
249 See page 177. 
250 The new perspective proposed in this thesis is not a hermeneutic, but the activity described as an 
example might be considered as such. 
251 See pages 128-9. 
188 
 
inspiration for ‘Bildung as repetition.’ The idea of the image as a transitional object is explored 
in more detail and more specifically the parable is identified as the icon which is the condition 
for learning and relearning in this new perspective of Christian spiritual education. 
 
 
            
     



















CHAPTER SEVEN: ‘BILDUNG AS REPETITION’ 
           7.1 Introduction 
           As identified in this thesis so far, the task for the Christian educator is to reveal the middle 
space that is the potentiality for the ‘moment’ of learning truth. Here truth is not content, 
form or outcome but that which is inspired within the unequal relation of self and other with 
an Absolute Other. Learning and the learner are not commodities, but an integral part of a 
pedagogical process that involves a movement away from content and epistemological 
certainty. Inciting risk, this involves a leap to the unknown. Fixed perceptions of beliefs are re-
imagined and reworked, making it possible to have faith in the Absolute whilst at the same 
time ‘making it impossible to think or narrate it away’ (Mortensen, 2003: 137). 
           This chapter considers how these ideas might become applicable to learning in a perspective 
now described as ‘Bildung as repetition.’ Having briefly introduced a learning event that might 
illustrate the new perspective in practice, this chapter now continues to investigate further 
the nature of the ‘moment’ that interrupts immediacy, and considers the role of 
representation. As much as the thesis began by considering education in terms of work with 
children, ‘Bildung as repetition,’ whilst also being relevant to children, represents a movement 
of learning that is applicable to all learners (including teachers, policy makers and those who 
create curricula). This chapter begins by focusing on the notion of the transitional object, 
initially introduced by the American clinical psychologist D.W. Winnicott, and notes how this 
applies to the proposed new perspective of Christian education.  
           7.2 The transitional object 
           In the chapter ‘Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena’ first published in 1958, 
Winnicott sheds light on the significance of relation for the perception of an object, and does 
so in terms of the effects of the separation of a mother and child following birth. When a child 
is born, the immediate attachment between the mother and child is lost and therefore, for 
the safety and security of the child, intermediate attachment figures are identified. Winnicott 
indicates how objects - initially fists and fingers then soft toys or dolls - become such 
intermediate attachment figures, representing the loss of immediacy and replacing the figure 
that is ‘not-me’ (Winnicott, 2002: 1). He purports that this is an object -relationship that 
places the object at the border of the child’s personal experience and establishes the 
(significant) separation between self and other. 
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           Winnicott proposes that a dialectical movement takes place between what has already been 
‘introjected’ by the mother and the external projection that takes place as the child makes 
sense of life and the world (Winnicott, 2002: 2). This movement might be described as 
interplay: indeed, he adheres to the idea that for all human beings, there is an inner reality 
that experiences interaction with externality. This interaction might be either at odds with or 
in accord with the other, but in each case, it is significant for human development. Yet a third 
dimension named ‘an intermediate area of experiencing’ is also proposed. This is a middle 
space by which paradoxically, inner and outer realities are kept separate, whilst being also 
interrelated (Winnicott, 2002: 2). This space is ‘between’ what is subjectively and objectively 
perceived (Winnicott, 2002: 3), allowing the child to recall what has been lost and renegotiate 
what is ‘now.’ Therefore, it might be considered as an instance of ‘doubling,’252 introduced by 
Mortensen in Chapter Six, and reinforced through the movement of repetition.253 
           To allow for this negotiation, an object first might be recognised as intermediate, representing 
the first possession residing in the area between awareness and reality (Winnicott, 2002: 3). A 
corner of a blanket for example, being an example of a ‘not-me’ figure, symbolises continuity 
in the child’s experience of intimacy. Whilst itself not being the mother, the object embodies 
the mother-child relation and until replaced by other objects such as hard toys or even sexual 
partners, it has significance as a reality of its own (Winnicott, 2002: 5). Winnicott makes it 
clear that it is not the object that is significant but the middle space that provides the 
condition for inspiring the object as transitional (Winnicott, 2002: 3). 
           Further to recognition of an object as transitional, such an object or phenomena might also be 
created in the middle space. Winnicott refers to both art and religion as examples; here the 
provisionality of the middle avoids representation of ‘reality’ as truth but negotiates the 
borders of the subjective and external self so that reality cannot be claimed (Winnicott, 2002: 
3). Furthermore, he highlights its illusory effects. What art or religion represent or create in 
this space is illusion. As explained in Chapter Two, illusion is not delusion and as highlighted in 
Chapter Six through Repetition and the short illustration from practice,254 it prevents the 
learner from claiming ‘reality.’ Consequently, what is illusory should not be imposed when 
shared, but embraced as the inspiration for one learning learning. 
                                                          
252 See page 181 
253 See page 183-4.  
254 See page 186. 
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           Winnicott visits the idea of symbolism in characterising his ideas. For example, he describes 
the Eucharist as an example of how symbolism is a reminder of the passion story and the 
sacrifice of Christ (Winnicott, 2002: 6). The symbol occupies the middle space between 
fantasy and fact as well as inner and external objects. However, he argues that further to 
symbolism, the transitional object involves a process in which the individual progresses 
towards experience as a learning tool (Winnicott, 2002: 6). The symbol is not a closed 
expression of spirituality, rather the inspiration for meaning-making. This has resonance again 
with the practical idea outlined at the end of the previous chapter. Through play, artistic 
expression, religious feeling and rituals, the individual is able to affect meaning-making 
(Winnicott, 2002: 5) and this might be summarised as the essence of both Bildung and 
repetition. 
           The transitional object then represents the nexus of ideality and reality, past and future as 
well as the subjective and objective dimensions of existence. In Educating Humanity: Bildung 
in Postmodernity, Mortensen sheds more light on this. He explains that as the substitute for 
something that was lost (the immediate relation with the mother), the transitional object is 
the fruit of the separation (Mortensen, 2003: 132). That which is ‘not-me’ is the learning tool. 
He also equates the transitional object with a variety of literary forms. Of course, this is not 
exhaustive since the transitional object might be considered in a myriad of ways; but it is 
important to note that in all cases, the object alludes to the loss of the immediate relation 
between self and other (Mortensen, 2003: 132) as well the illusion of representation. 
           Mortensen describes the metaphor as one of the central ways of leaping the epistemological 
chasm between old and radically new knowledge. In the movement of doubling, the learner 
takes something already known but breaks with it in order to see it as something else 
(Mortensen, 2003: 134-5). Meaning-making thus takes place in the middle space between old 
and new. Furthermore, Mortensen considers the value of narrative. As a means of ‘forming 
and shaping consciousness’ (Mortensen, 2003: 133), he suggests that narratives of any kind 
mediate between a learner’s acquired knowledge of the world and their own identity, 
allowing them to adapt and explore the structures of the world for themselves. This takes the 
form of self-transcendence, occurring through and as a result of literary engagement or 
interplay (Mortensen, 2003: 134). 
           Significant for this discussion is the literary form finally explored in Mortensen’s chapter. 
Resonating with metaphor and narrative, the parable is described as the means by which both 
doubling and self-transcendence allow for the learner to interpret his or her own life 
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(Mortensen, 2003: 135). It is suggested that a parable, as an integral part of human 
experience, allows learners to make sense of other aspects of life as the two interact. 
Transcendence allows for the learner to learn what is being learnt, thus effecting the 
interruption by which mastery in any other kind of story might be evaded. This establishes a 
triadic structure of learning and as Mortensen writes: 
           meaning does not arise out of the blue, but as change of, or cross between already 
existing meanings. In the parabolic exchange or doubling, transcendence of meaning 
takes place, generating new meaning’ (Mortensen, 2003: 136). 
           The parable, which represents the ‘fluid and intermediate position’ as the transitional object, 
allows the learner to reflect on everyday life in its light (Mortensen, 2003: 136). In standing 
apart from the learning to reflect on the reflections, both doubling and transcendence create 
‘an imaginative distance to reality’ making it ‘impossible to get hold of or interpret reality’ 
(Mortensen, 2003: 137). This suggests a new hermeneutic akin to repetition that whilst 
interpreting the story within the contingent life of the individual, also takes the individual 
beyond the self to re-evaluate what is already known. As a continuous process, the learner 
returns to ‘reality’ transformed, with a different perspective to that held before (Mortensen, 
2003: 138). 
           As cited in Chapter Five, Rowan Williams describes how Christ employed parables as a means 
for individuals to think again about themselves in relation to God (Williams, 2000: 91). Using 
the power of story, Christ was able to avoid preaching in the dogmatic sense and similarly 
avoided presenting fixed meanings. The Biblical parable might now be identified as the 
condition that is the potentiality for the moment of learning, and will be investigated in more 
detail later in this chapter. However, it is important to note here how ‘Bildung as Repetition’ 
establishes the triune relational shape that allows for the learner to reflect on reflection and 
so inspire learning for authentic faith.  
           In ‘Bildung as repetition,’ the interplay of the individual with the parable (or Bible story as 
suggested above), establishes the creative interplay of Bildung. This is a relation of ideality 
and reality, within which (again as suggested above), the learner is able to reflect on Christ’s 
words and consider their meaning. However, ideality is interrupted as the educator and 
learner allow Spirit, as the ‘teacher,’ to intervene. This interruption signifies the moment in 
which ideality (or immediacy) is surrendered and the middle space is opened up for 
possibility. This inspires the leap of faith that creates the triadic relational shape that is the 
relation of relations. In the middle space between the relation of interplay and the Absolute, 
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the learner reflects on what he or she has understood in the reflection. As he or she returns to 
consider the parable again in the light of this reflection, a more dynamic understanding of 
what Christ’s words might mean is gained. The words are not claimed or possessed, but 
meaning-making that is both authentic to the lived experience of the learning individual and 
to the Christian context of the story evolves. This is authentic learning.255 
           As Mortensen points out, in this new hermeneutic existing meaning is not disallowed. Aspects 
of Christianity such as the death and resurrection of Christ and the promise of redemption are 
fundamental to the life of the Christian and should not be denied. However, ‘Bildung as 
Repetition’ allows for the given representations of these aspects to be reworked. ‘Bildung as 
repetition’ regenerates perceptions of traditionally held truths whilst in the light of the leap to 
the Absolute, the individual is also changed. Through this new perspective, one is able to 
encourage a life of faith that is not based on fixed ideas but one that is dynamic, changing and 
relevant to the ongoing life of the learner.  
           7.3 Funding the Imagination 
           An example of a new hermeneutic is offered by Walter Brueggemann in his short book Texts 
Under Negotiation (1993). Utilizing Biblical texts (such as the parable) as learning tools, his 
ideas are relevant to the current discussion and explored critically now. 
           Brueggemann’s premise is that for the postmodern imagination which pertains to the local, 
temporal and particular, methods of engaging with Biblical texts offered by ministers or other 
teachers must also be reflective of the local, temporal and particular (Brueggemann, 1993: 6). 
Alluding to Lyotard’s view of the metanarrative as incredulous (Lyotard, 1997: xxiv; 
Brueggemann, 1993: 8), Brueggemann asserts that one must not be a master of a text, 
espousing ‘grand claims for God’s sovereignty,’ but should experience the loss of totality. The 
reader must approach a text ‘not as its master but as its advocate.’ He continues to note: 
                                                          
255 In a further example from practice, a group of children listened to the reading of the Biblical parable 
‘The Lost Sheep’ (Luke 15), presented on DVD. The parable was read verbatim from the Bible, yet was 
characterised by the actor who was dressed up as a shepherd in the location of a field. Following the 
DVD, the children in small groups were invited to handle artefacts from the story, including other 
‘precious’ items such as jewellery and money. This interplay allowed the children to bring the story into 
their own existence and to provide the starting point for reflection. They were then asked remember a 
time when they were lost or when they lost something precious, recalling emotions and actions. In the 
light of this recollection, they were then invited to consider what Jesus’s story meant for the people of 
his time and for us today. The children’s responses were various and unique to each individual and it 
was stressed that no response was right or wrong. This example of repetition allowed for the learner’s 
own personal lives to contribute to learning regarding the story and subsequently, they were able to 
learn from each other.   
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‘articulation of God will need to begin again in local, contextual ways’ (Brueggemann, 1993: 
11). 
            Brueggemann’s proposal is that when one engages with a text, one funds the imagination 
(Brueggemann, 1993: 19-20). The text becomes part of the mix of objects and resources 
through which new ‘material might emerge’ - or as suggested earlier, old material is ‘freshly 
voiced.’ This sets up the possibility for a counter-imagination of the world in which one’s 
interaction with a text gives voice to what is learned, but is never claimed as truth 
(Brueggemann, 1993: 20-21). His notion of self embraces ‘existence’ as a starting point 
(Brueggemann, 1993: 29). Yet further to this, the move to faith drives ‘the reason for 
existence’ out beyond the self to an ‘inexplicable’ dimension that ‘redefines all our modes of 
reasonableness’ (Brueggemann, 1993: 29). Whilst existence is the inspiration for learning, 
faith embraces Other (Brueggemann, 1993: 29). This is resonant with Levinas’s idea 
considered in Chapter Four, that the subjective self, through crossing ‘barriers of immanence’ 
(Levinas, 2003: 27) welcomes the ‘absolutely Other’ (Levinas, 2003: 33).256 
           When engaging with a text in this hermeneutic, the learner recognises the tradition of which it 
is a part (including the world and community). Funding the imagination allows for the 
emergence of aspects of the past that are relevant for now and provides hope for an 
alternative present. The author writes: through being ‘playful with the past,’ the ‘present is 
recontextualized’ (Brueggemann, 1993: 37). Concerning the future, existence is given over to 
God. Citing the future as a continual act of recreation in the light of the past, the dynamic 
relation of the existent self with God avoids completion. No explanation can then be given to 
the relation with or knowledge of God. The movement inspires a newness of Spirit that in turn 
inspires a renewed passion for scripture. 
           In some ways the author’s ideas, although not using such terminology, have Kierkegaardian 
resonance. For example, Brueggemann alludes to the interiority of the single individual as the 
locus of learning. Each individual’s inner life acts as a ‘zone of imagination’ in which 
interpretation of the texts takes place (Brueggemann, 1993: 62). Furthermore, the 
contingency of the individual is recognized: contingent influences here are cited as interests, 
fears and hurts. It is Brueggemann’s contention that these lie ‘at the bottom’ of one’s 
imagination and thus any authentic Biblical engagement should not be discontinuous with 
their influence (Brueggemann, 1993: 63). 
                                                          
256 See page 120.  
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           Brueggemann makes reference to the church, family, economics and social ideology in terms 
of external influences. He posits that these ‘competing influences’ must be ‘lost’ in order to 
gain one’s own meanings. He writes: ‘subjects themselves must answer for the process of 
learning’ (Brueggemann, 1993: 62). Being fiercely adamant that a postmodern hermeneutic 
ruptures the control for knowledge held by Western white male hegemony, he likens the rift 
to the biblical Exile (Brueggemann, 1993: 64) - the social displacement of Israelites from 
Jerusalem to Babylon – which inspired a renewed theology in the light of memory and 
hope.257 Other biblical examples of rupture (e.g. Israelites leaving Ur, Egypt and the 
Wilderness),258 are also cited, suggesting that such rupture opens the way for vulnerability 
(Brueggemann, 1993: 64). In this hermeneutic, an absolute idea of the Absolute is shattered, 
so to allow for the work of memory and hope upon the individual. This incites risk and 
uncertainty. 
           Ideas reflective of Hegel’s self and other relation are also evident. Each as a participant is 
necessary for learning - the other is in the self as the self is in other. Here self and other 
equate to both the individual and absolute. As Brueggemann states: ‘the impact of otherness 
cannot always run in one direction’ (Brueggemann, 1993: 68). Since the relation of self with 
absolute other259 enters the drama of the text, each is impacted and changed. And this change 
has ‘cosmic significance’ (Brueggemann, 1993: 68) that effects the rupture of self-sufficiency 
and totality. Brueggemann concedes that this is not necessarily a palatable view within 
‘traditional theology’, but continues to argue that the affirmation of self as other in relation to 
God is Biblical and therefore should be embraced (Brueggemann, 1993: 68). In summary, 
Brueggemann describes his hermeneutic as such: ‘I suggest that impingement on the zone of 
imagination is not done in large reductionist summaries’ but ‘is done one item at a time.’ The 
outcome will be ‘a liberating process of imagination’ that permits learning ‘in the context of 
this Other who with us traverses the stage and script’ (Brueggemann, 1993: 71). 
           Whilst having striking resonance with earlier material, it might be argued that Brueggemann’s 
hermeneutic is not a movement of ‘Bildung as Repetition.’ It is rather a liberationist cycle. 
Here the freedom to interpret a text comes from the partnership of an individual with a 
subjective and personalised idea of the absolute. Although the author is keen to avoid 
relativism and reductionism, (Brueggemann, 1993: 66), the existential trajectory of learning 
                                                          
257 Psalm 137.  
258 Stories found in the books of Genesis and Exodus. 
259 The use of lower case letters here signifies the absolute other as encountered within temporality 
rather than the absolute Other who opens up the middle space. 
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that takes place ‘with’ the other (who is mutually ‘in’ the self), represents the movement of 
recollection that has not yet achieved repetition. Since repetition requires the paradoxical 
breaking through of the Absolute Other into existence, Brueggemann’s hermeneutic is like a 
spinning wheel (Kierkegaard, 2009: 4). Starting with existence and drawing the other to the 
self on the strength of the past and present, the learner interprets a text accordingly. The text 
does not represent the interface of self and other; rather the self and other relation, as A=A, 
works upon the text. As such the individual is not confronted by the absolute but reflected in 
it. Unlike the mobius strip that indicates an interruption in circularity, the movement here is 
continuous. 
           However, there is a middle space that is an existential realm. Located within the self, the zone 
of imagination presents as an area of interiority reminiscent of the womb as cited in Chapter 
Four. This zone is the host of mutuality. Being part of the circle, the text is not a transitional 
object. Indeed, it might be argued, akin to the ideas of Gunther-Heimbrock outlined in 
Chapter Six, that it is the absolute here that is the transitional object. In the light of Hegel’s 
proposition in Logic, where the imperative of the self and other relation is mediation (Hegel, 
1975: 17), it is the mediate self in other (here named God) that is transformed. 
           Regarding loss, within the postmodern view, loss pertains to the dissolution of the absolute as 
Absolute. According to Derrida and Lyotard for example (Smith, 2006: 39; 63), the shattering 
of both the metanarrative and idea of an absolute Absolute opens up the opportunity for 
meaning to become local, individual and provisional. Indeed, as argued by Jane Erricker and 
noted in Chapter One, it is the subjective, changeable ‘discursive self’ that learns (Erricker and 
Erricker, 2000: 113). However, in ‘Bildung as repetition,’ loss does not negate but invites the 
absolute (Kierkegaard, 1974: 22). As subjectivity’s subjectivity, the absolute gives truth to the 
learner, and both subjectivity and objectivity are lost. The loss inspires a return to 
contingency. Again, alluding to the Babylonian Exile, following God’s people’s loss of identity 
and place, their return to Jerusalem evidenced a new idea of faith gained from the loss. It was 
in exile that their learning was lived out. 
           Also in ‘Bildung as repetition,’ the metanarrative still exists intact. It is a part of the relational 
shape of self and other with Other. What happens as a result of the rupture or leap is not a 
loss of the metanarrative of the absolute, but the loss to the Absolute. The ethical self is lost 
to the Absolute and on the strength of the absurd, makes a return to the contingent world. 
With no loss, learning becomes its own totality and is subject to critique. The role of the 
metanarrative provided by the Biblical parable is explored now, and evaluating representation 
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in this new perspective of Christian education, it is considered how, as the nexus of self and 
other, this Biblical ‘event’ might inspire authentic learning.   
           7.4 Lost Icons 
           At this stage of the current thesis, Lost Icons by Rowan Williams (Williams, 2000: 5) provides 
further clarity regarding the new perspective. Visiting familiar themes such as loss (Williams, 
2000: 6), tension (Williams, 2000: 7) and brokenness (Williams, 2000: 9), Williams asserts that 
in learning, a negotiation must take place between the subject and world (Williams, 2000: 5) 
through cultural icons. History, tradition and culture are all key aspects in his argument and as 
such, both the metanarrative and cultural contingency are embraced - not overcome. Through 
the main theme of the book, that is cultural bereavement (Williams, 2000: 6), Williams 
outlines how the loss of the icon in contemporary culture has reduced the possibility of a 
dialectical method of meaning-making; thus, it is his conjecture that the icon, which might be 
considered the condition that allows for learning in the middle space, must be reconsidered. 
           Williams suggests that such a consideration might serve to provide a ‘window into an alien 
frame of reference that is at the same time the structure that will make definitive sense of the 
world we inhabit’ (Williams, 2000: 2). As such it can become an educational tool. For example, 
the icon might reflect the Janus-face of repetition that looks forward in the light of the past 
(Williams, 2000: 144). It might also be an example of the middle space between self and other 
that prevents self-sufficiency (Williams, 2000: 145). Furthermore, as a transitional object, the 
icon might allow for the creation and recreation of meaning in the middle space of self and 
other, and this will be considered more fully towards the end of the current chapter.  
           In Lost Icons, Williams initially critiques liberationist ideology. In so doing he incites freedom as 
illusory, indicating its role in the loss of corporate responsibility (Williams, 2000: 35). Writing 
in the context of schooling, he posits choice for example as reflecting indifference to others, 
and in the reduction of the agent to consumer (Williams, 2000: 36), this involves the influence 
of ‘misplaced dogmatism’ (Williams, 2000: 39). For education, asserting that choice is made 
for and not by learners, this highlights issues of power; Williams identifies that this results in 
learners becoming subject to the control of others and this he contends, is ‘potentially tragic,’ 
(Williams, 2000: 47). In the light of this, he argues for a space in which learners can negotiate 
the choices that are made on their behalf: ‘where gradually the consequences, the self-
defining knots of adult choice can be figured, fingered and experimented with’ (Williams, 
2000: 47). To challenge the forces of choice and control is to take part in formative education 
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– although not in the von Humboldtian sense – revising the relationship of the self to external 
influences. This takes place in the middle space. 
           Williams also criticises self-certainty, arguing that personalisation is a distorted doctrine, and 
linking illusory identity with violence against the vulnerable (Williams, 2000: 102). Reminiscent 
of the Hegelian struggle, he highlights the mastery attained when an interior consciousness is 
liberated from relation. He also notes the dangers of self-reclamation, citing the political 
regimes of Germany in the 1940s and South Africa in 1991, as examples. He argues that 
without other, one can absolve oneself and thus wield the same power one seeks to 
overcome (Williams, 2000: 103-4). A learner must relinquish his or her identity to the other so 
that he or she might not ‘lose moral substance and refuse the work of historical thought’ 
(Williams, 2000: 111). This again is a familiar point.  
           Not dissimilar to the conjecture of Kierkegaard, Williams proposes that learners recognise how 
the significance of an experience of ‘now’ is borne by the past that they can relate to. This is 
recollection. However, the past is also changed in the light of ‘now.’ The movement forward is 
a continual re-telling of self in the light of knowledge of the past (Williams, 2000: 144) and this 
is repetition. As such, any representation of the telling is always partial, thus transitional. 
Furthermore, to prevent the circularity critiqued above, there requires a conflict. Citing 
Hegel’s Unhappy Consciousness, Williams explains that there should be no fixed position for 
the self, nor should the self be considered an item (or object). Indeed, he argues that learning 
without ‘friction’ is an enemy of the self (Williams, 2000: 147). It is only through tension that 
the self can be developed (Williams, 2000: 146), resonating with Gillian Rose’s assertion that 
the leap from self-certainty is the most ‘undangerous’ position (Rose, 1992: 159), and the idea 
in the current thesis that authentic learning arises through difficulty.260  
           For education then, it is in critical reflection that the self can move forward. This involves the 
negotiation, not the resolution, of the conflict of ideality and reality. Williams posits that it is 
the recognition of the significance of tension that is the essence of self - development and 
writes: ‘I can only be where I truly am by recognising that there is no fixed place where I am 
.... alone and incorrupt’ (Williams, 2000: 145). Here the learning self is always in question. The 
                                                          
260 See pages 171-2.  
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imperative is the individual thinking about thinking, checking against uncritical expressions of 
‘reality’ so to provide material for a telling and retelling of the self (Williams, 2000: 145-7).261 
           Equally, doctrine is warned against fixedness. Alluding to traditional forms of religious 
language and rhetoric, it is Williams’ assertion that historical meanings and values cannot be 
replicated in a contemporary context. To be meaningful, doctrines must consider the context 
and narrative of the self that they are being addressed to (Williams, 2000: 149). However, 
their relation with context is not dialogic: this would only incite mutual recognition and 
illusion. What is required is a dialectical relation which invokes the presence of a non-existent 
Other, through whom brokenness and incompleteness are revealed and old meanings are 
given new life (Williams, 2000: 152).  
           As identified in Chapter Two, when ‘I’ reflects back into its self, it becomes its own certainty 
and misrecognises its own (illusory) truth (Hegel, 1977: 104). For Williams however, the 
learning individual is a critical self that refuses to explain truth subjectively and cover up the 
tension that comes from the relation of the Unhappy Consciousness. This self learns to live 
with contradiction. It is proposed that the education of the single individual takes place within 
the relation of relation in Absolute relation.  
           This then has implications for representation. When other is contingent, representation 
becomes subjective, the result of which might be the bid for power and subjective gain, 
impacting identity and behaviour and reinforcing hierarchical views. Williams highlights the 
dangers of contingent religious language, not least the projection and construction of an 
image of Other. This he incites as the potentiality for misunderstanding (Williams, 2000: 180), 
violence against other, and the wielding of power. In his rhetoric, this is religious corruption 
(Williams, 2000: 162). Because in contradiction the ‘non-existent Other’ is both absent and 
different to self, it cannot be depicted finitely. This then requires a letting go of fixed forms of 
representation. 
           In practical terms, this is challenging. For instance, Bible stories located within the Judeo-
Christian tradition encourage certain cultural and religious interpretations; therefore, it is 
difficult to engage with these stories without resorting to inherited language and 
                                                          
261 This idea is explored more fully in the published article: Wills, R., (2014), ‘Challenging ‘the they’: an 
Heideggerian reflection on the impact of power figures in children’s spiritual lives’ in International 




representations of God. Nevertheless, again akin to proposals in the current thesis, Williams 
posits that representation should not be surrendered totally; rather, the fixed truths that 
result from representation must be surrendered. It is this relinquishing that provides the 
condition for the breakthrough of the Other who is non-contingent, and the revelation of the 
moment of learning that unveils learning’s learning as truth. 
           The condition, which provides the locus of learning, ruptures any theology, models or 
methods that the individual (be it the learner or teacher) might lay claim to. Williams names 
this condition the ‘soul’ (Williams, 2000: 160). Here the presence of ‘I’ is recognised only in 
relation to the other who is in relation with Other. Being clear that the rupture is not an 
example of anarchy, soul represents a relation of grace. There is no space in the soul for 
power or violence against other; neither is there space for the desires of the ‘I’. There is no 
finality or fulfilment. Rather the soul accepts knowing as not knowing and in the ‘suspension 
of gratification,’ invites the ‘non-existent Other’ (Williams, 2000: 75-6; 79) who is revealed 
(not represented) within (Williams, 2000: 160). 
           As a tangible illustration of this, and for Christian formation, Williams revisits the role of the 
icon. He posits that it is out of the tension between one’s experience of the Absolute and the 
refusal of fixed representations, that the Christian icon emerges (Williams, 2000: 184). In this 
context, he writes about the iconography of Eighth Century Eastern Christianity as a tool for 
Christian learning. Never viewed in profile, the characters (and scenes) depicted in the icons 
are not intended to be representations, but rather point the individual in a direction towards 
new perceptions (Williams, 2000: 184). As the nexus of self and other, Williams proposes that 
these images invoke a surrender to the absent Other who illuminates the self and other 
relation, to provide new meanings. 
           Letting go of preconceived ideas of the subject matter, the learning individual relinquishes the 
idea that the icon is a ‘motionless phenomenon.’ Instead, the movement of the eye towards 
the source or centre of the image, allows the image in turn to ‘bear down’ upon the individual 
(Williams, 2000: 185), to allow for self-examination and critical reflection. The icon acts as a 
window to the non-contingent world and in the condition provided by the movement 
between the individual with the icon, the Other confronts the relation so to inspire a revisiting 
and retelling of contingent and inherited ‘truth.’ 
           Returning to the task of this thesis, it might be argued that Williams’ idea of the icon provides 
an apposite illustration for the role of the Christian symbol (story or parable) in ‘Bildung as 
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repetition.’ The icon provides the interface of self and other which is the condition for the 
moment of learning, and as a window whose view is dual-directional, inspires a glimpse of the 
face of the Other. It furthermore inspires recognition of the paradox that the absolute indeed 
might give the truth. As the inspiration for the loss of self to the (Absolute) Other, the icon 
establishes the unequal triadic relation of subjectivity’s subjectivity that ruptures mutuality 
and in turn opens up the aporia in the middle space.  
           As a transitional object, the icon inspires meaning-making that is shaped in the outworking of 
the relation of relations. This is an educational process that involves both self and other in a 
movement of interplay for the transformation of each. However, also invoking a transcendent 
dimension, the icon inspires the condition in which the learning individual is able to critically 
reflect on the interplay. This inspires the failure of mutual recognition (Rose, 1996: 75) that is 
the beginning of spiritual learning. This failure allows for new ideas and meanings regarding 
the images to be established in the middle space, as well as the creation of new images and 
impressions. Some practical examples of this have been outlined recently (Wills, 2015).262  
           As the role of the educator has featured in the current thesis, it is necessary here to note that 
in ‘Bildung as repetition,’ the educator must protect the middle space; this space should not 
be the condition for the truth of Being in which the outcome is self-sufficiency, but the 
condition in which new ideas are negotiated in the light of Being and the non-existent Other. 
Repetition of course is an essential factor in this new perspective. The role of the educator 
here is to encourage recognition of the rupture as the condition in which to negotiate and 
                                                          
262 These examples form part of the conference paper ‘Bildung – a spiritual learning tool?’ presented by 
Ruth Wills at the International Conference on Children’s Spirituality (Lincoln, July 2016). For instance, in 
a Music lesson, the icon, represented by the Civil rights song ‘Oh Freedom,’ inspired creative and 
emotional reflection amongst a group of children. In the movement of interplay, the learners engaged 
with the meaning of the song as they sang. Drawing on previous learning about Rosa Parks and Martin 
Luther King’s march to Selma, and more pertinent examples of oppression such as the current 
treatment of refugees in Europe, they could recollect; in the middle space created by the action of 
singing, they were able to reflect on their recollection and revise their impressions regarding previous 
learning to create new and authentic meanings (repetition). In response one child began to cry and 
stated that we should never let oppression happen in this way again. Another child asked the existential 
question of why oppression exists, and another asked what can be done to help those who suffer.  One 
child led the way in providing an answer to the questions and suggested that the whole class should 
begin by talking to people at home about identity, encouraging them to accept all peoples, regardless 
of difference. Whilst the icon in this example is not necessarily a Christian symbol, it might be suggested 
that it illustrates ‘Bildung as repetition’ in practice and so is relevant to the current thesis. The song as 





understand differently the nature of the self and inherited truth in the light of the Absolute, 
and from this new understanding, consider what it means to live a life of faith. 
           Faith no longer concerns the adoption of fixed ideas and values. As the Janus-face, the icon 
allows the learning individual to re-evaluate the images of the Christian tradition in the light of 
his or her contingency. In the triune relation, the presence (or breakthrough) of the 
paradoxical non-existent Other allows for new meanings to be illuminated. These meanings 
transform both the learning individual and the tradition in which the learning takes place. As 
stated previously, when the contingent single individual is transformed by the truth given 
through the Absolute paradox, he or she able to live out his or her learning in this light and 
this is the life of faith. 
           As suggested by both Williams (Williams, 2000: 91) and Mortensen (Mortensen, 2003: 136), it 
might be proposed that the parable as a transitional object and icon might serve as a learning 
tool within the middle space. As a literary genre, the parable might take a number of forms – 
Aesop’s Fables and some fairy tales for instance. However, in the context of the current thesis, 
it is the Biblical parable that is considered here, and its role in ‘Bildung as repetition’ is 
outlined.  
           7.5 The Parable 
           The proposition of the parable as a learning tool serves here to provide an example of how 
‘Bildung as repetition’ might be applied in practice. Being a perspective rather than model, 
‘Bildung as Repetition’ has no particular agenda. However, as a means by which educators and 
learners might be able to reconsider learning, it acknowledges the contingent life of the 
learner without denying the Christian tradition of which it is a part, and allows for the 
creativity that inspires meaning-making. Representing the window that ensures the interplay 
of self and other, and as the Janus-face that inspires repetition, the parable invites the third 
partner in learning, that is Spirit.  
           Rarely providing any meaning regarding his telling of the parables, Christ encouraged his 
hearers to create their own meanings. Locating the stories in the world of his followers 
(several parables include sheep, vineyards, journeys and employment), he allowed them, in 
the light of interplay with the stories, to reflect and so inspire meanings that were relevant to 
them. Spirit, as the third partner in the learning triad, allowed for creative reflection. Similarly, 
the parable today might also provide an example of the icon that inspires repetition and 
allows learners to reflect on meaning making in order to afford authenticity in faith.  
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           When learners hear or read a parable or Bible story in its entirety and original form, creative 
interplay (in the form of artistic activity, or just listening in silence), allows them to reflect on 
what it might mean for them. In recollection, learners draw on their own experience or 
knowledge of the situations of the main characters, as well as their prior understanding of 
Christ and his ministry. Reflecting on their reflections, Spirit as the teacher, or Absolute, allows 
the learners to revise what has previously been taught, and in repeating forward, create new 
understandings of the parables that are personal yet still remain within the context of ‘The 
Christian Faith.’  
           These reflections can never be subjective or total since in this perspective, the Absolute 
intervenes. It is the learner’s reflection on the parable on the strength of the leap of faith to 
the Absolute (or unknowing) that allows for authenticity in learning and it is suggested, the 
life of faith. The parable therefore, provides an example of the ‘event’ that inspires the 
moment of learning in authentic education, and as the image that opens up the middle space 
of reflection, it acts as a transitional object that inspires the vital relation of relations. The next 
and final short section, summarises how ‘Bildung as repetition,’ including the parable as the 
icon for learning, might represent the new perspective of Christian education that the current 
thesis requires, and provides conclusions that might be noted for practice.  
           7.6 Proposing a new perspective  
           In this concluding section, it is noted how the proposed new perspective of Christian 
education, described in this thesis as ‘Bildung as repetition,’ reimagines relation and 
recognises a new relational shape, that is the dialectic of Bildung and repetition. Rather than 
positing self and other as opposites (illustrated variously as the learner and teacher, learning 
and the learner, the tradition and the individual, and the learner and God), as presented in the 
Literature Review and early chapters, the relation in the new perspective is authentic to both 
self and other. The triune relation of relations highlights the inadequacy of paradigms, models 
and methods when considered in themselves, and renegotiates how fixed representations of 
God or truth for example, are perceived, understood and learnt.  
           ‘Bildung as repetition’ considers illusion as a pedagogical tool. Recognising the illusory nature 
of self-sufficiency, including the dualistic mutual recognition, it highlights the illusion of both 
objective and subjective teaching; to that end, it transcends ideality and reality. However, as 
the dialectical relation of the illusion of illusions, this new perspective allows learners to 
renegotiate what is illusory, reflecting on such learning in the light of their own contingency, 
and moving forward into new experiences and understandings. It might be suggested that 
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‘Bildung as repetition’ is the means by which the self-certain nature of the paradigms 
presented at the outset, as well as their dichotomous positing, is ruptured, so to inspire a new 
way of teaching and learning that as aporia, is uncertain. 
           Having no telos other than its own meaning, this new perspective embraces the unknown. The 
outcomes cannot be pre-determined or even hoped for. The teacher provides and protects 
the condition that is the middle space, in which Spirit inspires and informs; yet, as what is 
learnt or understood results from the creative interplay of the learner and the ‘icon’ in 
relation to the Absolute, Spirit cannot be defined or claimed. As dynamic learning, it changes 
and evolves, allowing the leaner to revisit and revise what is understood through learning as 
life continues.  
           The contingent life of the learner is significant in this perspective, as is the Christian tradition 
within which learning takes place. To that end, in the creative interplay between the learner 
and the ‘icon,’ mediation plays an important role. Mediation, as explained in Chapter Two, 
ensures that the truth of learning can never be grasped or re-presented as truth. Mediation 
also represents the middle space between self and other that ensures that learning is not 
linear, progressing towards a fixed goal, but a broken cycle that affects surrender, loss and 
return. Loss involves the leap of faith, that surrendering immediacy and totality, invites the 
unknown. Yet, recognised as the Absolute, it is on the strength of an encounter with this 
unknown Other that learning has meaning and might be considered authentic.  
           The leap of faith invites the intervention of the Absolute. This takes place in the ‘moment’ in 
which, albeit a paradox, the Absolute enters temporality. Illustrated by the incarnation of 
Christ, this intervention might in contemporary terms be represented by the Christian icon, or 
parable. As the paradox, also represented by a Janus-face that looks both forwards and back, 
the parable presents the words of Christ, and so introduces his life and teachings to learners 
today. However, as a teacher in the parables, he holds back. He does not provide any meaning 
but rather allows his followers to make their own responses. As in the allegory provided in 
Revelation 3:12, he stands at the door of his learners’ lives, but waits for them to allow him to 
intervene.263 
           When choosing to choose and being willing to learn learning, the learning individual allows the 
words of Christ to intervene in his or her own life. In the middle space between the learner 
and the story, the Absolute, as Spirit, allows for creative reflection that in turn inspires 
                                                          
263 Revelation 3 vs 20; New International Version. ‘Here I am! I stand at the door and knock. If anyone 
hears my voice and opens the door, I will come in and eat with that person, and they with me.’  
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transformation. This, it is suggested, is the crux of authentic learning. When engagement with 
Christ’s words in the parable, Bible story or Christian symbol allows for reflection on reflection 
and this is transferred back to the contingent life of the learner, Christian education has 
ongoing meaning and so inspires an authentic life of faith.  
7.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion to this discussion, it is necessary now to highlight the wider context for the 
implementation of ‘Bildung as repetition.’264 As already stated, it proposed that this new 
perspective might encourage practitioners to reconsider teaching and learning for an 
authentic life of faith. This conclusion considers how this might occur in the workplace, for the 
development of authentic learning and unconditional educational experiences.  
Having identified at the outset that the inspiration for this thesis arose from philosophical 
reflection on practice within a Christian mission organisation, the conclusions presented 
above primarily concern a church context. Again, as already indicated at the outset, the new 
perspective does not form a new position or propose a new methodology. Neither is it 
restricted to education with children. Rather it is suggested that ‘Bildung as repetition’ might 
encourage practitioners to reconsider how learners learn, recognise the significance of the 
relationship of learning and the learner with the Absolute, and embrace the risk and 
uncertainty that comes with suspending fixed ideas for the inspiration of new thinking.  
When one considers education in the light of this new perspective, the relationship between 
the learner and teacher must also be reconsidered. The unequal triadic educational shape 
allows for each to be the learner, as the Absolute interrupts certainty and inspires new 
understandings. The ‘one degree shift’ that educators might make, therefore requires that 
claims to authority and dogma might be suspended. The condition that opens up the 
possibility for learning in the middle space thus allows education to be personal yet remain 
within the realm of Christianity, whilst the icon provides the window through which the 
individual might grasp a personal glimpse of the Absolute. 
In the thesis, the illustration of the parable in the Biblical gospels serves as an example of how 
both uncertainty and the loss of fixed meaning invites the opportunity for individuals to 
consider the words of Christ for themselves. The parable is the icon that is the Janus-face 
between the individual and the Absolute. However, in considering the practical application of 
                                                          
264 Noted as a provisional working title, this phrase is not to be taken forward to practice; as the current 
thesis is theoretical, it will remain as such here. 
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‘Bildung as repetition,’ it is important to note that the icon as an educational tool need not be 
limited to the parable. As indicated by Mortensen and Williams above,265 other literary styles 
might form the transitional objects that represent the inspiration for learning in the middle 
space. In a Christian context, the icon might be illustrated in terms of other Biblical texts, 
symbols, liturgy and even sacraments. The key issue here is not the nature of icons as such, 
but how educators embrace their provisionality, allowing for the interruption of any prior 
claims to their meaning or representations as fixed truths.  
From a practical perspective, it is suggested that educators might reconsider the role of the 
icon in learning. For many in church contexts, pre-published curricula and teaching outlines 
present a platform of ideas for engagement with a Bible passage.266 The passage often serves 
to teach a pre-determined object lesson that reinforces a certain Christian truth. In the new 
perspective however, when considering the text as an icon and suspending any claims to pre-
determined objectives, as well as allowing the interplay of the contingent individual with the 
Bible text in creative ways, ‘Bildung as repetition’ might allow learners to identify and 
construct meanings that are authentic to their own life experience and their understanding of 
Christianity. Neither the curriculum outlines nor Bible passage are rejected; yet by applying a 
new perspective to how learners experience the Bible, Christian education that has meaning 
for their own personal lives is inspired.   
Considering the implication of the new perspective for a wider context of Christian education, 
it might be suggested that the ideas proposed here are also applicable to school-based 
learning. According to Government-led inspection criteria, all schools must currently provide 
evidence of a spiritual dimension to learning. This means that spirituality must be embedded 
throughout all curriculum areas and considered integral to the holistic experience of school 
life (Ofsted, 2015:35-6). Additionally, under Section 48 of the 2005 Education Act,267 all Church 
schools are inspected on their provision for Religious Education. Catholic schools are 
encouraged to follow set curricula268 and all children must engage in daily acts of collective 
worship.  
                                                          
265 See pages 143 and 190. 
266 Examples of curricula include Light, published by Scripture Union (www.scriptureunion.org.uk/Light 
accessed 31/01/17) and Roots, published by Roots Ecumenical Partnership (www.rootsontheweb.com 
accessed 31/01/17).  
267 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/18/section/48 accessed 31/01/17. See also Statutory 
Inspection of Anglican and Methodist Schools (SIAMS) handbook, 2017). 
268 www.comeandseere.co.uk accessed 31/01/17. 
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Considering the curriculum as an icon, it is possible to apply the premise of ‘Bildung as 
repetition’ to Religious Education in schools as well as in church. Not negating the set 
teaching, again educators might be encouraged to make the ‘one degree shift’ away from 
teaching with certainty, to allow the space for children and adults in the learning environment 
to personally reconsider the meaning of what is presented in the light of their own 
experience. In the middle space between the curriculum and the individual, learning as Spirit 
can inspire a new understanding of Christian doctrine, with the potential for a renewed 
experience of the Christian faith to be made manifest. Representing a dialectical relationship 
between the spirituality agenda in schools, which promotes ‘a sense of enjoyment and 
fascination in learning about themselves, others and the world around them, including the 
intangible’ and a ‘willingness to reflect on their experiences’ (Ofsted, 2015: 35), and the 
nationally agreed syllabus for Religious Education, the new perspective provides the 
opportunity for learners to draw on their own existence in learning, yet without minimising 
the influence of the Christian tradition within which it is located.  
 
It must be acknowledged that in the current school-based educational climate, there is little 
space or time for teachers to reflect on how children learn or indeed reconsider their own 
perspective on learning. When inspections, targets and learning objectives direct practice in 
the classroom and when even the spiritual development of learners must be evidenced, the 
consideration that educators might rethink teaching and learning is certainly not a priority. 
Additionally, presented as a perspective and not a model, it is acknowledged that the thesis 
proposed here is not easy to put into practice. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that in 
church-based education, which is mostly served by volunteers, and in a climate where the 
training of potential church leaders in Christian education is at an all-time low, little reflection 
on practice takes place. This means that popular models and methods such as Godly Play269 
and Messy Church270 are adopted by church leaders without much consideration of how these 
may or may not contribute to an authentic life of faith. 
Therefore, the intention of this thesis is to allow church and school - based educators, leaders 
and policy makers to think again about learning for faith. From a personal point of view, the 
conclusions presented here have influenced practice at a local level in terms of children’s 
work in church and school; ‘Bildung as repetition’ has had an impact on colleagues and it has 
also been possible to experience the transformative nature of learning. For the new 
                                                          
269 See page 41. 
270 See page 77. 
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perspective to have wider impact however, it needs to come to the attention of leaders in 
schools and churches, as well as those who train teachers and Christian ministers. To that end, 
knowledge exchange in the public arena is essential.  
Proposed outcomes involve the presentation of theory at academic conferences and the 
submission of a paper to a relevant education journal. Outside of the academic arena, a 
proposal for a ‘Grove Booklet,’271 training sessions for church and school leaders and the 
opportunity to write via social media will all facilitate the dissemination of ideas. Finally, 
drawing on existing networks and contacts within the realms of church and school-based 
Christian education, it will be possible to present the new perspective to policy makers and 
those who develop curriculum. Consultation meetings will enable such partners to consider 
the value and implication of ‘Bildung as repetition,’ with a view to influencing the way in 
which educators access pre-published curricula and teaching outlines. 
The time-scale for implementing the proposed outcomes is long-term. In promoting the new 
perspective, it is likely that assurance must be given to leaders and educators that it does not 
serve to undermine Christianity, nor indeed personal spirituality. It will be also important to 
note that whilst it is a new perspective, it does not either undermine or eschew established 
methods, models or beliefs; rather it encourages teachers and learners to reconsider their 
relationship with such methods, models and beliefs, in relation to the Absolute. In this case, it 
is suggested that in adopting the proposed ‘one degree shift,’ Christian learning in church and 
school might become more authentic, relevant to individual’s lives and thus, contribute to a 
long-lasting life of faith.  
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